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FOREWORD
The essays collected in this volume comprise a
panel on Russian foreign policy that was presented
at the Strategic Studies Institute’s (SSI) annual Conference on Russia on September 26-27, 2011, held at
Carlisle, PA. These chapters aimed at analyzing not
just the day to day diplomacy, but some of the deeper
structures of Russian foreign policy, both their material basis in actual policy and the cognitive structures
or mentality that underlies it. This issue is now more
important with the return of Vladimir Putin to the
presidency of Russia and the fact that major transformations in international relations are occurring today
across the globe and at an unprecedented pace.
The assessment of such changes, and of governments’ policy responses to them, lies at the heart of
any effort to conceive of a strategy that makes sense
in today’s world. Without some viable sense of trends
and of the forces that shape key actors’ strategies and
policies (which are decidedly not the same thing), no
government can navigate safely through the shoals of
contemporary world politics or make informed judgments concerning war and/or peace. Since both war
and politics are interactive processes “where the enemy gets a vote,” a profound grasp of global political
and economic trends is essential to the formulation
of sound U.S. policies and strategies, especially as regards so important an actor as the Russian Federation.
Providing such informed strategic analysis is SSI’s
primary function. Such analytical efforts constitute
the bedrock of its activities and of its responsibilities
to its audience. Accordingly, we are happy to present
this volume to our readers in the belief that it will contribute substantially to their understanding of the con-
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temporary world and help them to make the informed
judgments about U.S. interests, policies, and strategy.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
DEFYING THAT SINKING FEELING:
RUSSIA SEEKS TO UPHOLD ITS ROLE IN THE
MULTISTRUCTURAL INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM IN FLUX
Pavel K. Baev
INTRODUCTION
The economic and political turmoil of the year 2011
has shown that the ever-evolving international system
is growing rapidly in complexity and generates challenges that not only catch the policymakers by surprise, but also exceed their ability to produce adequate
answers. Russia is struggling to adjust to these accelerating power shifts while also sinking into its own
crisis of governance driven by the exhaustion of the
economic model based on redistribution of expanding
petro-revenues.1 As its domestic politics are based on
preserving stability that is eroded by systemic corruption and accumulating discontent, so, too, its foreign
policy aims at upholding the role of a major power
that is not supported by sufficient resources. In both
domains, the Russian leadership, which now has to go
through another round of self-reformatting, typically
remains in denial of the weakness of its control over
the game-changing developments but demonstrates
high ambitions for staying in charge of the rules.
In the period of increasing self-assertiveness in
the mid-2000s, the rather simplistic worldview prevalent in the Moscow political elite was shaped by the
concept of multipolarity, which essentially predicted
an unraveling of the unfair and unnatural U.S. domi-
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nance on the global arena.2 This proposition is omitted
in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept (which also does
not mention Russia’s status as a Great Power), but
just a month after its approval, President Dmitri Medvedev formulated five principles of Russian foreign
policy, and the second one asserts that:
The world should be multi-polar. A single-pole world
is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot
allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one
country makes all the decisions, even as serious and
influential a country as the United States of America.
Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.3

The economic recession that originated in the subprime U.S. debt crisis in the autumn of 2007 was initially seen in Moscow as a manifestation of multipolarity,
but in late 2008, the Russian economy experienced a
contraction of such depth that foreign policy thinking
lost any coherence. The proud feeling of a rising power
that has every right to demand respect from declining
peers has suddenly changed into a sinking feeling accentuated by unavoidable reflections on the collapse
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 20
years ago. The scheme of multipolarity has been put
aside as much too simplistic but in its stead nothing
more sophisticated was adopted, so the current big
picture, as seen from Moscow, comes out as an eclectic mix of residual great-power ambitions, intrinsic
anti-Americanism, wishful thinking about the golden
age of gas, and shallow hopes to retain the privileges
granted to Russia by international law.4 This chapter
does not sort out this discord and cacophony, but attempts to evaluate the implications of compulsive attempts to punch above its weight by looking into the
nuclear domain, the hard power-centered geopolitical
2

interactions, the economic relations, and the workings
of international institutions.
STRUGGLING TO PRESERVE THE NUCLEAR
BIPOLARITY
With all the revolutionary changes of the last 20
years in the symbolically rather than practically important area of nuclear armaments, the world system remains essentially bipolar because the U.S. and
Russian strategic arsenals exceed those of three other
legitimate nuclear powers—China, France, and the
United Kingdom (UK)—by an order of magnitude.
Russia attaches pivotal importance to preserving this
inherited status, which involves pursuing the unattainable goal of maintaining a strategic parity. The
prime value for Moscow of the reset process initiated
by U.S. President Barack Obama in the spring of 2009
is in formally fixing this parity in the legally binding
Prague Treaty, and that largely explains the exhaustion on this process after the miraculous ratification in
December 2010. The built-in paradox of this achievement is that Russia insisted on fixing the quantitative
ceiling of this parity rather high, so that its superiority
over other nuclear powers would be in no doubt, but
it cannot sustain any leg of its strategic triad at the
prescribed level.5 Far greater investments than in the
United States are channeled into the programs for deploying new generations of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), yet the rate of decommissioning the missiles
that are past the expiration date—and in the near future, long-range bombers as well—is so high that the
aggregate number is fast going down, which is never
acknowledged in the official discourse.6
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Russian concerns about preserving a semblance
of strategic parity are exacerbated by U.S. plans for
building a missile defense system, which is seen as a
means to render the whole system of nuclear checks
and balances irrelevant. The main focus of controversy is currently the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) commitment to deploying a European antiballistic missile (ABM) system, and while the intensity
of Moscow’s objections might appear seriously exaggerated, in fact, through this intransigence the Russian
leadership seeks to exploit the questionable readiness
of many European states to invest in radars and interceptors in a time of severe budget cuts.7 At the same
time, Russia prioritizes the deployment of a new generation of surface-to-air missiles (the S-400 and S-500
systems) and the integration of various assets into an
air-space defense system, which is a dubious proposition given the record of failures with space launches.8
The desire to preserve the status and the privileges
of a nuclear superpower is the main driver of Russia’s long-set course on preventing other states from
acquiring these weapons; however, its nonproliferation policy is not without ambiguity. Proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missile
technologies is defined as one of the military risks in
the 2010 edition of the Russian Military Doctrine (along
with the aspiration to move NATO’s infrastructure to
Russia’s neighborhood and the deployment of an antimissile system), but there is an underlying question
in this assessment about whether a possible appearance of several newly-nuclearized states could make
Russia’s massive arsenal more politically prominent.9
In the crucial case of Iran, Moscow did agree on introducing limited United Nations (UN) sanctions but
has indicated that it is not prepared to go any further
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along this road, generally perceiving the very probable acquisition by Tehran of several nuclear warheads
as an unfortunate development, but one that by no
means constitutes a direct threat to Russia.10 Nonproliferation considerations are only a minor limitation
in the aggressive policy of exporting Russian nuclear
technologies, for which the Rosatom is relying on state
support for expanding into new markets such as Turkey or Vietnam and potentially the Gulf monarchies.11
Grave risks involved in maintaining the resourceconsuming and partially obsolete nuclear complex
do not compel the Russian leadership to share the vision of a nuclear-free world rejuvenated by President
Obama. Paying appropriate lip-service to this farfetched proposition Medvedev actually presides over
the most determined effort to modernize nuclear assets, which are seen as crucial for national security and
hugely valuable for political prestige. One manifestation of this increasing reliance on nuclear instruments
is a pronounced reluctance to engage in any negotiations on reducing the nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear
weapons in Europe or even to allow a modicum of
transparency for this arsenal, which quite possibly
stores more warheads than the strategic forces.12 The
problem with the policy of upholding the position of
the second nuclear super-power is that it consolidates
the material basis of bilateral confrontation, so the
best reset intentions cannot overcome the traditional
deadlock of deterrence.13 In the opinion of the Russian
leadership, the respect coming from the privilege of
being a major strategic adversary for the United States
more than compensates for the lost opportunities that
could have been gained through entering the crowded
marketplace of U.S. allies.
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MANEUVERING IN THE GEOPOLITICAL
MULTIPOLARITY
The construction of nuclear balances occurs in a reality that in many ways is virtual (despite the physical
reality of nuclear weapons), while in the real world,
as seen from the prevalent Russian worldview, states
compete for advancing their national interests relying primarily on their hard power, the core of which
is made up of conventional military capabilities. Despite U.S. superiority in the most modern elements
of these capabilities, its ability to project power is seriously limited, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have brutally confirmed, so the Realpolitik world is
effectively and increasingly multipolar. A large part
of the Russian political elite originating in various
power structures (first of all, the Russian Secret Police
(KGB)/Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) superstructure) instinctively rather than theoretically tend
to interpret international relations as essentially geopolitical.14 In this perspective, Russia must constantly
assert its position as a major and independent powerpole checking and pre-empting encroachments from
all directions on its natural sphere of influence, which
does not necessarily coincide with the borders of the
former USSR.15
A key assumption in this defensive geopolitics
is about the inherent hostility of the West, and that
makes NATO into the main antagonist, which has to
be contained from advancing eastward so that the first
and the most specific military risk defined by the 2010
Military Doctrine would be neutralized.16 Partnership
with NATO could only be a means towards this end,
and the recommendations of some liberal think-tanks
to President Dmitri Medvedev to aim at membership
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in the Alliance amounts to malignant wishful thinking.17 Russia would not have been able to withstand
the drive of the NATO military machine, but it has
enjoyed a run of good fortune because the unity of
the Alliance has been deeply damaged by U.S. intervention in Iraq, and the war in Afghanistan continues to drain resources from the armed forces of key
member-states while heading towards the inescapable
defeat.18 The intervention in Libya, which has caused
some misgivings among the Russian leadership, has
also added to the NATO crisis by exposing the decline
of its power-projecting capabilities and leading to an
outcome that may be very far from the desired one.19
Severe cuts in the defense budgets of major European
states, executed despite the needs revealed by the
Libyan intervention, are interpreted in Moscow as favorable changes that reduce the risks emanating from
NATO.20
The only real security guarantee in the Realpolitik world can be provided by one’s own hard power,
and the military reform abruptly launched in the autumn of 2008 was supposed to gain Russia usable instruments for the period when the United States and
NATO remain entangled in the two unwinnable wars.
The reform was long-overdue, but it is hard to imagine a less fortunate moment to start radical restructuring and downsizing than during the tumble down
into an unexpected severe economic crisis. Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov deserves credit for his
stubborn determination in executing the reform plan,
but his complete ignorance of military-organizational
and strategic matters necessitated severe purges in the
High Command and resulted in a profound deterioration of combat capability, first of all in the Ground
Forces.21 The crucial issue of conscription is in limbo,
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and the main controversy thickens currently around
the viability of the recently approved rearmament
program that aims ambitiously at replacing the whole
arsenal of aging Soviet weapons but boldly ignores financial realities.22 In fact, many yawning deficiencies,
particularly in command, control, communications,
and intelligence (C3I) systems, could only be eliminated by importing technologies or full sets of equipment
from the West, which requires a new level of partnership with NATO.23
The impossible question for NATO in this cooperation is about where and to what political ends the modernized and upgraded Russian armed forces would be
used. Geopolitical fantasies provide few clues about
it; for that matter, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan could result in a destabilization of Central Asia, but Russia would hardly take on the role of
security provided (as it did in Tajikistan in the early
1990s), exactly because this region is no longer seen as
a frontier of geopolitical competition. Much speculation has been fueled by the geopolitical struggle for
the Arctic, but Moscow has discovered that its military
position of strength, even if augmented with a couple
of specially trained brigades, generates few political
dividends, and so Russia opts for a cooperative policy, confirming this choice by the new border treaty
with Norway, which is far from popular with public
opinion.24 One region where Russia is keen to put its
military might into play is the Caucasus, but here its
main security challenge is the smoldering civil war in
the North Caucasus, which the neighbors and competitors are careful not to fan, but Moscow still fails to
extinguish.25 In geopolitical terms, the most unstable
power imbalance has emerged in the Far East, but
Russia has no answer to the staggering rise of China

8

and so prefers to pretend that the ambivalent strategic
partnership is on a solid footing, ignoring its obvious
inability to develop and defend Russia’s vast Pacific
periphery.
FALLING BEHIND IN ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION
Political thinking in Russia is increasingly economized and even mercantilized, and from a strictly
business perspective, the scheme of multipolarity is
only of limited relevance since nonstate actors pursue
their profits with little regard to state interests. The
rather unsophisticated self-descriptions of Russia as
the energy superpower typical for the mid-2000s did
not survive the economic contraction at the end of the
decade, not only because of the sharp but short fall in
oil prices, but primarily because the vulnerability of
the position of raw materials supplier (or appendage
as the Soviet propaganda used to define it) became too
obvious.26 Medvedev’s affirmatively established goal
of modernization signifies an attempt to overcome the
oil curse Russian-style, which involves de-industrialization and decline of the sciences, and this discourse
has contributed to further denigration of energy sector hyper-development. By the end of Medvedev’s
presidency, the false start at executing the modernization proposition has compromised its rational content,
so that Russia has come to depend more on oil and
gas export revenues while the acknowledgement and
even resentment of this dependency has spread from
expert circles to the whole political class.27
It is quite uncertain whether the hydrocarbons
would generate sufficient inflow of petro-dollars
to finance the bloated social programs, but their di-
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minishing political importance is quite certain. In the
mid-2000s, the potential impact of the energy weapon
was the subject of many alarmist assessments in the
West, but at the start of the new decade, it has become
clear for Moscow that opportunities for using energy
towards political ends have all but disappeared.28 Oil,
which in fact generates most of the budget revenues,
has zero political utility, and natural gas, which used
to be the main focus of Western concerns, has become
a product that requires a lot of political effort to market, particularly as a consequence of the massive increase of shale gas production in the United States.29
Gazprom remains unable to open an export channel
to China despite great many political commitments
and has found itself under serious pressure to cut
prices for Germany and other major consumers.30 The
much-anticipated opening of the Nord Stream pipeline
across the Baltic Sea by the end of 2011 could improve
reliability of Gazprom’s deliveries, so it can hope to
sell extra volumes to compensate for the interruption
of supply from Libya, but the presumed geopolitical
profile of this controversial pipeline is yet to be discovered.
The energy intrigues provide constant entertainment for professional Russia-watchers but they hide
the trend of Russia’s marginalization in the fast-moving economic globalization. Medvedev’s attempt at
breaking this trend by identifying directions where
Russia could become a leader utilizing its scientific assets and cultivating high-tech innovations has been too
feeble to make a difference, and the European Union
(EU) initiative for promoting partnership for modernization has fallen perfectly flat.31 The key condition for
any progress in modernization is the inflow of foreign
direct investments (FDI), but in reality Russia has experienced a colossal outflow of capital, estimated at
10

$134 billion in 2008, $56 billion in 2009, $35 billion in
2010, and continuing in 2011, despite Vladimir Putin’s
strict directive to secure the annual level of FDI at
$60-70 billion.32 Medvedev correctly characterized the
Russian investment climate as very poor but has been
pathetically helpless in inducing any changes, which
would have inevitably involved curtailing interests of
corrupt bureaucratic clans.33
Having accumulated foreign exchange and gold
reserves of about $550 billion (as of September 2011),
Russia could have been a major player in the global financial market, and Medvedev keeps insisting on the
plan for organizing an international financial center
in Moscow. Domestic confidence in Russian moneymanagement is so low, however, that the ruble falls
against the euro with every piece of sad news from the
euro-zone.34 Despite the relatively high and remarkably stable oil prices of 2011, investment funds prefer
to move away from the Russian stock exchange, which
keeps falling deeper than most world indexes during
the current bumpy ride.35 While the level of state debt
is very low, the external corporate debt has grown
again above $500 billion, most of which is made by
state-owned corporations, so the costs of borrowing
for covering the budget deficit could be even higher
than its Better Business Bureau (BBB) credit rating
indicates.36 As the global economy is bracing for the
next stage of the protracted crisis, Russia has nothing
to contribute to addressing the central imbalances but
is very vulnerable to negative external impacts.
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GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
It is hard to find many bona fide liberal institutionalists among the Russian political elite, but Russia’s
foreign policy traditionally and persistently attaches
great importance to demonstrating engagement in the
works of various international institutions. Medvedev
presents himself as a firm adherent to international
law, and seeks to follow up on declarations with action, ranging from signing and ratifying the maritime
border treaty with Norway to taking an assertive
stance on the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan. He
was also very eager to advance an ambitious proposal
for a new legally binding treaty on European security
that would have delegitimized war and provided the
foundation for a new architecture.”37 What compromised this stance beyond all diplomatic white-washing was the August 2008 war with Georgia, for which
Moscow has never been able to build a convincing
justification.38 Medvedev was obliged to take responsibility for the consequences of this inglorious victory,
but that has left him with little choice but to quietly
abandon his grand Euro-architectural designs.39
The single most important position in all the institutional miscellany is the permanent chair in the
UN Security Council, so while Moscow periodically
confirms its commitment to reforming this organ (particularly to Germany and India), in fact, it is rather
reluctant to invite new members to this hugely privileged club, and certainly does not want to hear about
cancelling the veto right.40 One of the major concerns
in Russia’s active engagement in the Security Council’s proceedings (which contrasts with its rather low
profile in most UN bodies) is upholding the centrality
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of state sovereignty, so every interventionist measure,
for instance in the spirit of the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine, is scrutinized as an undesirable precedent.41
For that matter, Moscow was extremely cautious about
measuring every step in tightening the UN sanctions
against Iran—and very upset by the enforcement of
unilateral sanctions by the United States and the EU.42
Medvedev had to defend the decision to let the UN Security Council pass Resolution 1973 on Libya against
sharp criticism from Putin—and then was left complaining about NATO’s abuse of this mandate for protecting civilians.43 Russia wants to ensure that the UN
remains the sole maker of international law, but this
desire is clearly at cross-purposes with the preference
for this unique organization to do as little as possible.
Another highly valued membership in an exclusive club is the hard-earned seat at the G-8 (United
States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom,
Italy, Canada, and Russia), but this privilege has become diluted as the global crisis necessitated the shift
of economic debates to the G-20 (Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union).
Seeking to ensure a special place as a connecting link,
Moscow engages in transforming the odd grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(BRICS) into a real organization.44 In fact, however,
it cannot qualify as an emerging economy because it
lacks economic dynamism and a growing population,
so Russia is as much an odd man out in the company
of China, India and Brazil, as it is among the seven
industrial democracies. It is characteristic in this respect that Russia remains outside many key economic
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organizations: It has never been accepted into the G-7
(France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, the United States,
and Canada) forum of finance ministers; despite being
the major energy producer, it keeps its distance from
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and does not take part in the International Energy Agency (IEA), while the Forum of gas producers
has failed to grow into a real organization; its bid for
joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) is still
deadlocked and so membership in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
is not in the cards.45
Russia is active in a great many overlapping regional organizations around its borders, from the
Arctic Council to the Caspian “five” and to the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), seeking to utilize the advantage of its unique geography. Political
priority is formally set on cooperating with the postSoviet neighbors, but the ambition to establish effective leadership in this natural sphere of influence has
been derailed not only by reluctance to support this
role with sufficient resources but also by arrogant and
selfish political behavior. Every existing format from
the broadest Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), which functions mostly as a presidents’ club,
to the narrowest bilateral union state between Russia and Belarus, which has been bedeviled by quarrels with President Aleksandr Lukashenko, generates
more problems than solutions.46 Moscow is in a good
position to exploit the post-Soviet autocrats’ fears of
domestic discontent escalating to revolution, but it
is reluctant to commit itself to guaranteeing their regimes, so the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) remains a talk-shop despite recent declarations about making it into a shield against the threat of
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revolution.47 Much expectation and concern has been
focused on the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) to mature into an effective security provider, but Russia and China obviously have
very different ideas about patronage over Central
Asia.48
Russia, therefore, is prepared to engage with as
many international institutions and regimes as possible only insofar as they aim at preserving the status
quo (which most of them are built for) and securing for
it a far more prominent global status than its economic
weight or feeble soft power would justify. The mercantilist nature of its foreign policy, which conflates
the interests of the corrupt authoritarian regime with
national interests, determines the essentially unilateralist character of its external behavior.
CONCLUSIONS: THE BLUNDER OF INFLATED
SELF-ASSESSMENT
In Russian political thinking, Russia’s place in the
world system is conceptualized not just as one of the
great powers or poles in the multipolar world, but
also as a unique position determined both by geography and by its development along a particular path.
This model of a strong state directing economic and
social development combines some features typical
for Western democracies and some characteristics
of the emerging powers, so that Russia could swing
between various groups as it sees fit.49 The problem
with this ambitious vision is that the model does not
work. Since the spasm of crisis in the autumn of 2008,
Russia’s petro-economy has generated insufficient
revenues for sustaining the investments in strengthening the military might and the social cohesion, and

15

the massive out-flow of capital proves that the class
of super-rich has lost confidence in harvesting further
profits.50
A major advantage of the Russian model is supposed to be political cohesion secured by the tightly
centralized self-reproducing leadership, and it is exactly here that the crisis of Putinism has grown particularly malignant. The problem is not that the experimental construct of power-sharing between Putin and
Medvedev is not organic to the hierarchic bureaucratic
structure, but that the dominance of bureaucracy over
business has resulted in unstoppable growth of corruption that has become the operational mode of this
system of power rather than its side-effect.51 The leadership will probably be reformatted after the tightly
managed parliamentary and presidential elections,
but that cannot restore the irreversibly diminished efficiency of a patently undemocratic political system.52
Lacking soft power and discovering that its traditional
hard power has become unusable or unreliable, Moscow finds itself not in the desired position of balancer
but in the group of hopeless laggards, with no allies or
friends and with the massive exposure to the phenomenon of China’s growth.
This vulnerability should have been the central
concern in Russia’s foreign policy, but in fact, it is only
a peripheral concern that leads to such seemingly odd
moves as the deliberate escalation of the old quarrel
with Japan over the South Kuril Islands.53 The main
focus of external activity is set on securing the regime’s survival, and this obsession dictates an explicitly negative attitude towards any mass uprisings and
revolutions, including those that have shaken the Arab
world since the start of 2011.54 This ideological stance
that translates into readiness to stand by the Bashar al-
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Assad regime in Syria no matter what crimes against
own population it commits secures Moscow some
moral leadership among the post-Soviet presidentsfor-life and provides some foundation for a counterrevolutionary alliance with China.
This uncharacteristic departure from pragmatism,
however, is not enough by far to compensate for the
stalling reset with the United States and the deteriorating partnership with the EU, or to reverse the estrangement between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbors, or to erase China’s growing contempt of Russia’s
self-made decline. It was Putin’s resolute restoration
of domestic order by the mid-2000s that underpinned
the strengthening of Russia’s international profile, and
it is the deep degradation of Putinism that determines
Russia’s current marginalization in the chaotically
changing international system while the ambitions of
its national leader are still on the rise.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SACRED MONSTER:
RUSSIA AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR
Stephen J. Blank
INTRODUCTION
Writing in 2002, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Igor
Ivanov, proclaimed that the Russian Federation was
qualitatively different from all of its Russian predecessors. According to Ivanov, Russia differed from them
in its nature of government, territorial boundaries,
the geopolitical environment it faced, and in its capabilities and power. Therefore, it “needed to develop
a new way of looking at its foreign policy goals and
priorities.” Ivanov further argued that Russia did not
and implicitly does not see itself as heir to the Soviet
policy in pursuing a foreign policy dictated by the
requirements of an international class war.1 Therefore, according to Ivanov, Moscow no longer pursues
a policy based on a fixed idea of a particular enemy
or adversary and has renounced all the trappings of
Leninism, including an ideological approach to foreign policy. Since then, according to Ivanov and many
other commentators, Russia has instead struggled, finally with success in recent years, to conduct a foreign
policy based solely on the pursuit of national interests.
But is this the whole story? While Russia certainly
no longer pursues a “class-based” foreign policy based
on Marxism-Leninism; and certainly manifests a horror of revolution abroad today, is Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin and his successor, Dmitry
Medvedev, really a qualitatively new foreign policy,
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or are there significant elements of enduring Russian
approaches to foreign policy that developed during
the Tsarist and Soviet periods of Russian history? Is
there no ideological component to Russian foreign
policy and only the strict pursuit of national interests,
obviously conceived of in a manner resembling the
19th century fashion? Can Russia, or any other state for
that matter, escape history and start anew even if we
allow for a new environment and new (and reduced)
capabilities for exercising power? Or is it, in fact, the
case, as certainly appears to be developing in Russia’s
domestic politics and maybe its foreign policy, that
Russia is to some considerable extent still enmeshed in
its past history? Is it the case, in contrast to Ivanov’s
argument, that, as the contemporary Russian novelist
Vladimir Sorokin says, “Our future is becoming our
past”?2 In that case, would not Russian foreign policy
under Putin reflect, as well, the siren call and abiding
forces of Russian history?
INNOVATION AND CONTINUITY
Without denying substantial and ongoing change
(which also visibly occurred under the Soviet system),
this work argues that Russian policy, despite undoubted innovations, is less innovative than Ivanov claimed.
We argue here that much of the tone and content of
Russian foreign policy represents an outward projection of its autocratic domestic political system and
that system’s attendant mentality. Indeed, the leaders of this system consciously and frequently invoke
Russian history as a justification for its continuation
in power.3 Therefore this continuity allows us to judge
Moscow’s foreign policy from within a framework of
Russia’s historical development. We use this term au-
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tocratic because it is obvious to us and to several other
writers that today’s Russian state bears many defining
characteristics that resemble in considerable degree, if
not always totally, Tsarist and Soviet precedents. Just
as both the Tsarist system, as it evolved over time, and
the Soviet system exemplified the patrimonial Russian
state; so too does the current system represent a patrimonial autocratic system as defined below. That state
is characterized by personified power, currently in
the form of the President or even the tandem of Putin
and Medvedev and state ownership of property at the
expense of legally enshrined property rights. It also
manifests itself in the recurrence of a modified version
of the old service state and the feudal relationship of
patron and client networks or the phenomenon of nul
home sans seigneur (no man without a lord) that typified
feudalism. Indeed, many scholars have recognized
this linkage between what we might call the domestic
constitution and foreign policy.4 For example, Alexei
Arbatov states that:
This interdependence between the regime’s nature at
home and its projection abroad explains why those
trying now to rehabilitate Stalinism and appeal for a
return to this or that form of authoritarian regime always link it to a revival of some form of Russian (or
Soviet) empire and permanent confrontation with the
West.5

The announced transfer of power in September
2011 whereby Premier Putin and President Medvedev
announced that they would exchange positions in 2012
indicates that for the ruling elite, the state is conceived
of, indeed, as nothing more than Putin’s personal
property, or to use the old Russian term for patrimony
(Votchina), upon which he can act as he pleases. This
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patrimonial attitude confirms the genetic resemblance
to Tsarist and Soviet models of the state. This recent
ministerial or presidential leapfrog between Medvedev and Putin, to use the late Tsarist term, validates
our use of the concept of patrimonialism because it so
vividly demonstrates this concept’s continuing practice, along with its subordinate manifestations of an
enduring contempt for law and for the Russian people.
It also is arguably a vote for the entropy of the system
as occurred under Leonid Brezhnev and arguably a
guarantee that sooner or later, though we cannot say
when, why, or how this will occur, a violent crisis will
shake the system. Indeed, Putin’s spokesman recently
contended that “For us, Brezhnev is not a minus sign
but rather a positive sign.”6
This patrimonial state formation is a recurrent phenomenon in Russian history. Therefore, we employ
here a historically-based explanation of contemporary
Russia’s foreign policy continuity with its forbears.
While this approach is certainly not the last or even
necessarily the first word in analyzing contemporary
Russian policy, it does represent an under-represented view or word that must nevertheless be spoken.
Certainly the evidence of congruence with past governmental systems is there for any observer to find.
For example, as it developed into the 19th and 20th
century, the autocracy spawned a vast but incoherent
bureaucracy that made it ever more difficult for the
Tsar or for policymakers to control policy, not least
foreign policy. Thus Heinrich Vogel observed that:
It is becoming more and more clearly evident that
President Putin can place only limited trust in the officials of the partially reformed public institutions. The
Kremlin is granted obsequious obedience in suppressing undesirable political activities, and the resulting
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political correctness engenders lip service to a strong
state; but the most immediate loyalty is to each local
authority.7

Today’s Russian press is filled with repeated instances of both Medvedev’s and Putin’s repeated
frustration and anger over the systematic inability to
implement state policies or willful disobedience by
bureaucrats, much as was the case in the Tsarist and
Soviet past.
Due to the failure to reform, today there is neither
a lawful or specifically legislated overall policy process for resolving critical foreign or defense policies
nor a specific institution legally ordained with regular
and general oversight and leadership of national security policy. The long lasting struggle between the
General Staff and the Ministry of Defense as well as
the fluctuating status of the Security Council graphically testify to this fact, and the consequences of this
absence emerged clearly in both the descent into Pristina and the second Chechen war, both in 1999, and
has now morphed into the entire North Caucasus, two
episodes that show how easily the unchecked rashness of the General Staff, supported by the regime,
could entrap Russia either in big or in endless wars,
if not both.8
Thus Russia still lacks a reliable and consistent or
stable mechanism for either making or conducting defense policy. Those who claim otherwise, like former
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as former Secretary of
the Security Council, must hide or distort the truth.
Like Tsarist statesmen, they pretend that a regular,
law-governed bureaucratic process or system is occurring in defense policymaking and that a regularly
functioning institution or institutions are currently
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making or coordinating policy.9 However, as they well
know, the reality is exactly the opposite of a regularly
functioning system. Indeed, every reliable account of
how the system actually operates points to a system
of unending and often vicious bureaucratic struggle.
Accordingly, major policy questions, and not just on
defense policy, are always subject to obstruction by
interested bureaucracies and to lack of coordinated
follow through. Alternatively major policy initiatives are launched behind the government’s back so
to speak, denoting a continuing failure to devise even
what Soviet scholars called a rule of law government
(Pravovoye Gosudarstvo). This disorganization typified the late Tsarist regime’s approach to policymaking, and students of Soviet history know full well how
much bureaucratic infighting and lack of coordination
occurred there. In this respect, contemporary Russian
national security policy (and probably other realms
of policymaking as well) are eerily reminiscent of late
Tsarist Russia when Baron A. P. Izvol’skii, about to be
named Foreign Minister, told the Quai D’Orsay that:
‘Despotism’ always bore the same fruits—’incoherence
if not contradiction in the conduct of affairs which are
treated simultaneously by various departments which
ignore each other—and which obtain from the supreme leader detailed decisions which are irreconcilable in fact: the Russo-Japanese War came from that.”10

This failure to achieve political reform has therefore precluded genuine military reform and civilian
control of the multiple armed forces. This gap in control over the structures of force (Silovye Struktury)
impedes democratization, because it leaves control
of the military outside of the normally functioning
democratic channels of control, and undermines Rus30

sia’s ability to maximize its security position in international affairs because Russian policy is ad hoc, unpredictable, and subject to no regularized institutions
of policy control. It also impedes Russia’s ability to
defend itself against real threats like the jihadi insurgency in the North Caucasus.
For example, President Putin’s proposals in 2000
for a missile defense initiative involving Europe
to counter the U.S. missile defense program were
worked out without consultation or participation by
either the Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs.11 Not
surprisingly, there were public expressions of dissent
by powerful military figures like the Commander in
Chief (CINC) of the Strategic Nuclear forces, General
Vladimir Yakovlev, that outside observers could not
reconcile with Putin’s statements and which left everyone confused as to what the policy really was.12
Former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin’s September
2011 outburst against excessive defense spending cited below suggests that this phenomenon of struggle
and lack of control over the instruments of force continues, even if it is generally carefully hidden behind
the Kremlin’s walls.
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY CONTINUITY
Today Arbatov, among many, laments the absence
of coherent policymaking mechanisms or institutions,
Parliament’s nullity as a counterweight to the executive, and the predominance of informal relationships
at the top that break down any attempt at orderly policymaking, even within the executive.13 Izvol’skii and
his colleagues would undoubtedly find themselves at
home in today’s Russia; so would post-Stalin Soviet
bureaucrats, if not their predecessors. Thus Andrei
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Ryabov writes that, “Freedom and ownership rights
gave not been given an institutional framework, nor
has there been a return to the numerous rules that the
old system had for regulating the elite’s recruitment
and transfer of power.” Moreover, power remains
personified, not regulated by law. Putin’s primacy
as Premier, constitutionally the No. 2 position in the
government after 2008 and the recent exchange of
positions with Medvedev demonstrate this.14 Indeed,
discerning analysts see in Putin’s regime a kind of
reversion to aspects of Stalinist personnel practice or
policy, whereby police or security services cadre play
the role of both the party and the security services under Joseph Stalin. Thus already in 2004, Nikolai Petrov
wrote that:
The old system of appointment and staff rotation
has been reduplicated. Establishing an infrastructure
of secret services the local police do not control, the
federal center regained the previously lost leverage
with the regions. Shifting representation in law enforcement agencies, the president ended up with a
“security horizontal” at his service. Along with the
executive verticals, it forms a kind of carcass holding
the state together. To a certain extent, the authorities
have reduplicated the Stalin system when control over
regional elites was maintained through (and with encouragement of) a confrontation between party organizations and security structures. In conflicts like that,
the federal center is always well informed on everything. These days, we have a conflict between security
structures and regional elites. State officials feel themselves under observation and abstain from what they
were free to do only recently.15
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More recently, Gregory Carleton has written that:
To frame contemporary culture without reference
to the Soviet legacy would seem irresponsible—just
as this article cannot avoid. Moreover, current realities give credence to this logic. The centralization of
power by United Russia, the consequent emergence of
an identifiable single party line, the state’s key control
of key sectors of the economy, and the suppression
of independent media—all, inter alia, recall Soviet
practice and policies. Additional corroboration of this
impression comes from the conscious resurrection of
Soviet symbols, such as the national anthem and the
flood of Stalinist hagiography, particularly as popular
history, with some of it more grandiose and fictitious
than what circulated in his lifetime.16

In other words, we see multiple signs of regression to past Soviet and Tsarist practices. Moreover,
these reversions go well beyond the examples cited
here to encompass much, if not all, of Russia’s socioeconomic-political and even cultural life. Therefore
contemporary observers do not hesitate to describe
the bureaucracy as patrimonial.17
To the degree that the Russian elite, beginning
with President Boris Yeltsin (1991-99), consciously
opted to rebuild an autocratic system of power in the
traditional sense, it also adopted both the trappings
and substance of many historical policies that have
characterized Russia over the years. Among these
traditional manifestations of Russian autocratic thinking and policy are an obsession with Russia’s uniqueness or specificity (Samobytnost’ or Spetsifichnost’ in
Russian), its refusal to account to anyone at home or
abroad for its actions (itself a projection outward of
autocratic power) to other governments, and the neoimperial concept of the state that is explainable not
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only in terms of material interest, but also in Russia’s
obsession with status and in the relentless quest for
an exclusive sphere of influence in the former Soviet
Union at the expense of the sovereignty of the new
states there. Lastly, there are a series of geopolitical
continuities with past regimes, the presupposition that
Russia is threatened by enemies everywhere and thus
must have a free hand in its policies and not be subordinate to anyone (itself linked with the autocratic impulse), the enduring obsession with the United States
as the main enemy and also most desired partner, and
the constant effort to prevent any kind of European
integration or at least to freeze it in its tracks.
To be sure, no state can simply abandon its history without incurring serious, diverse, and longterm costs. Indeed, the fundamental changes in Russia since 1991 are incontestable. This goes beyond
the end of Marxism-Leninism, support for socialists
and revolutionaries abroad, a planned economy, and
at least until now, the excessive militarization of the
economy. Likewise, the priority placed on economic
instruments in foreign and domestic policy and Russia’s unprecedented wealth represent fundamental
changes. But even here, in this most innovative realm
of Putin’s foreign and defense policy, we find traditional elements holding their ground, so to speak.
Moreover, we find some distinctly disquieting signs
of a pervasive moral nihilism that has accompanied
and been both cause and outcome of the endemic corruption and unbridled criminality of the Russian political system, one that Medvedev described as legal
nihilism. Logically, it should not surprise observers
that the progression from legal nihilism and the ongoing failure to confront honestly the Soviet historical
record has contributed greatly to this pervasive moral
nihilism.
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As Dmitri Trenin recently observed, much elite
thinking sees international politics as simply a struggle for power between competitive states where values and their invocation merely cloaks hard power
designs.18 Essentially, this is a bastardized version of
Otto Bismarck’s realism that harks back to conservative German thought in the 19th and 20th centuries
as embodied by people like Friedrich Nietszche, Carl
Schmitt, etc.19 Ironically, as is the case with so much
Russian social theory after 1800, there is much that is
originally German more than intrinsically Russian in
it, except possibly for its intransigent absolutism and
extreme nihilism that there is nothing beyond this
struggle for power in international relations. Thus
Russia, like China, is a pillar of the “high church of realism” in international affairs. Its realism, as described
by Trenin and discussed below, is of a particularly
atavistic and even nihilistic kind that believes in nothing but power.20 Therefore, its thinking and behavior
antedate the theories of realism in world politics that
appeared after World War II and are a throwback to
19th century Realpolitik of a particularly brutal kind.
Trenin incisively captures the worldview of the
elite and the practical consequences that flow from it.
•	The world is primarily one of struggle of all
against all, of fierce competition for markets
and resources. Cooperation emerges not out
of good will but competition, whose point is to
determine the conditions on which future cooperation may be possible.
•	Economics are paramount, and business and
money are both driving forces and the prize.
There is no room for emotions in this competition or for values.
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•	Consequently, Western values that are so highly prized there are merely covers, cloaks for a
reality every bit as harsh and no different from
that in Russia where money and power are
king. Democracy promotion is merely a tool for
promoting U.S. interests.
•	Russia is strategically alone, but only needs
itself as it is self-sufficient. Other major powers are its rivals and smaller powers the objects
and purpose of these struggles.
•	Russia’s key comparative advantages, at least
for the foreseeable future, are oil and gas and
its nuclear weapons, the most important guarantors of its security.
The practical consequences of this cynical Weltanschauung are:
• Realpolitik is the only reliable policy.
•	Maintaining the status of a great power under
autocratic rule is the precondition for Russia’s
survival and progress as a great power, which
means that smaller states orbit around its sun.
Otherwise, Russia will be torn apart.
•	Everyone is a potential competitor or partner at
least for a time but because nobody and nothing can be trusted and they will cheat at the first
instance (as will Russia), legally binding contracts or agreements are necessary (but nothing
guarantees that Russia will stay bound, because
the others are no better and only interest guides
Russia).
•	Foreign policy is guided only by the national
interest, which in Russia means the interest of
the ruling corporation.
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•	Interests, not illusory ideology or values, represent the real substance of foreign policy. Pragmatism consists of managing differing and opposing interests.
•	Patriotism is only important for mobilizing the
public and creating a solid base for a pragmatic
foreign policy.
•	Public opinion is only the result of external manipulation by interested parties and experts.
The manipulation of images that are created
and destroyed on demand trumps any concept
of reputation.
•	Foreign policy relationships must be maintained with everyone but without any ideological or value-grounded expectations.
•	The aim of Russian foreign policy is the creation
or formation of a Russian center of power as
one constitutive element of the emerging world
order, a global oligarchy of five or six key players. Only when American hegemonism passes
into history, which Moscow believes is happening, can there be a basis for genuine partnership with America.
As a result, we have a foreign policy elite that is utterly cynical, manipulative, exceptionally venal, and
obsessed with power, wealth, and status. While its utter cynicism may go beyond even the Soviet system,
the pervasive moral nihilism that is so strong a Soviet
legacy is deeply visible here, as is the late 19th century origin of such views. It is narrow-minded, less informed about the world than its predecessors, amoral,
and not interested in bettering the life of the people or
in overcoming the traditional gap between state and
society. It has contempt for the people instead, and
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national interest is often a cloak for personal or sectoral interests. As it has no strategy other than narrow
self-interest, its policies are reactive and essentially
negative threats to obstruct if Russia is not respected.
Those members of the elite who are familiar with the
outside world, like all nouveaux riches, think they
know the price of everyone and everything, and that
they know it all, when in fact much of what they know
is essentially conspiracies to gain power and wealth
among elites who are as corrupt, self-seeking, and
venal as they are. They are at once driven by a paradoxical combination familiar to students of Russian
history and culture of an inferiority complex and an
ingrained sense of superiority and overcompensation.
Thus their behavior is often boorish, uninformed, and
characterized by a resort to crude threats and intimidation, which, after all, is the way they get things done
at home.21
If one compares this with the behavior of gangsters who are obsessed with respect and status as well
as power and wealth and possess a similarly cynical
world view and amorality regarding the means of obtaining these goals, it becomes clear why so many observers rightly characterize Russia as a “mafia state.”
After all, the Mafia and the current state are essentially medieval formations that have adapted but retain
their core essence. Moreover, as described below the
regime has, in its foreign policy, aligned itself with organized crime abroad as an instrument of state policy.
At the same time, Putin’s and his team’s realization of the primacy of the need to develop a modern
economy in Russia and use economic power as the
foundation of Russia’s global standing marks a significant innovation in Russia’s history. Only after
economic stability was achieved do we now see sig-
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nificant increases in defense spending, a pattern also
seen in the 1930s. But the ultimate goal of advancing
the great power standing and capacity of the state is
entirely traditional in nature, as is the belief that the
state must lead this process by itself without reference
to indigenous self-standing social networks.22 Equally
traditional is the fact of the state’s penchant for militarism. Historians repeatedly mocked the paradomania for endless strict military parades of Tsars Paul,
Alexander I, and Nicholas I, and the legacy of state
militarism that the Tsars as a whole fostered continues
to inhibit defense reform in Russia.23
Similarly, critics of the regime, notably former economics officials, like Aleksei Kudrin (Finance Minister 2000-11) and Andrei Illarionov (President Putin’s
economic advisor), have both publicly criticized the
regime’s excessive defense spending and tendency
to think in terms of war. In September 2011, Kudrin
announced that he would not serve under the forthcoming Prime Minister Medvedev (currently President Medvedev) and specifically attacked excessive
defense spending.24 Illarionov has observed that:
Since its outset, the Siloviki regime has been aggressive. At first it focused on actively destroying centers
of independent political, civil, and economic life within Russia. Upon achieving those goals, the regime’s
aggressive behavior turned outward beyond Russia’s
borders. At least since the assassination of the former
Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Doha,
Qatar on 14 February 2004, aggressive behavior by
SI [Siloviki-men of the structures of force-author] in
the international arena has become the rule rather
than the exception. Over the last five years the regime has waged ten different “wars” (most of them
involving propaganda, intelligence operations, and
economic coercion rather than open military force)
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against neighbors and other foreign nations. The most
recent targets have included Ukraine (subjected to a
“second gas war” in early 2009), The United States
(subjected to a years-long campaign to rouse antiAmerican sentiment), and, most notoriously, Georgia
(actually bombed and invaded in 2008). In addition to
their internal psychological need to wage aggressive
wars, a rational motive is also driving the Siloviki to
resort to conflict. War furnishes the best opportunities
to distract domestic public opinion and destroy the
remnants of the political and intellectual opposition
within Russia itself. An undemocratic regime worried
about the prospect of domestic economic social and
political crises—such as those that now haunt Russia
amid recession and falling oil prices—is likely to be
pondering further acts of aggression. The note I end
on, therefore, is a gloomy one: To me the probability
that Siloviki Incorporated well be launching new wars
seems alarmingly high.25

There can be no doubt that many of the methods
used by Moscow reek of traditional coercive Russian
socio-political interactions, not to mention outright
criminality.
Given Kudrin’s well-founded misgivings about the
direction of policy, it is too soon to tell if this priority
of economics represents a long-term and stable trend
or one that could or will give way, as may increasingly
be possible, to renewed emphasis on overt military
great power rivalry. Certainly the statist and dirigiste
notion of economic development that now prevails in
Moscow augurs badly for democracy or for optimal
economic growth but strongly for the perpetuation
of the Muscovite paradigm with its emphasis on defense. That trend is highly likely to lead logically to
an increase in military rivalry and political tensions
with other major powers, as has historically been the
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case. The substantial rise in defense spending and increasingly military cast of the rivalry with America is
a warning sign in this regard. For if the end result of
Putinism is a renewed militarization, then the innovative aspects of his legacy will diminish while the assertion of traditional practices and policies will have
triumphed. Indeed, as of early 2012, we see disturbing
signs in this regard.26
Nonetheless, as Putin and his team have recognized, Russia’s ability to compete in world politics or
to maintain its sovereign and independent freedom
of action in their terms, crucially depends upon its
ability to build and sustain a vibrant technologically
advanced economy. Only on this basis can it compete
in world politics while simultaneously building a
military capable of defending the national interest. Although Russia is currently undertaking a significant,
if not major, military buildup to last through 2020 and
its emphasis upon the military arm is growing (not
least due to domestic reasons connected with the succession to Putin in 2008), Putin’s overall policies have
hitherto been distinguished by an understanding of
the priority of the economic instrument of statecraft
over the military one. This also relates to the primacy
of a perception of domestic rather than foreign threats
in actual policy, as for example in the share of the national security budget allocated to the armed forces
and to those agencies primarily responsible for domestic security like the Ministry of Interior.27
This understanding of the priority of economic
reconstruction and of the economic instrument in foreign policy is also apparent in Russian foreign policies
towards the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), in the extensive dialogue with the European
Union (EU), and in its use of the energy weapon in Eu-
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rope and Asia. Even the primary purpose of arms sales
has arguably been, until about 2005 if not later, the
acquisition of revenue that would allow the Russian
defense industry to recover until it can provide for the
domestic rearmament of the Russian military. Indeed,
as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has acknowledged,
it is “the energy weapon” that has allowed Russia
to gain independence in foreign policy vis-à-vis its
numerous interlocutors.28 On a daily basis, energy
exports, particularly of natural gas, are Russia’s principal foreign policy instrument. Arguably, no major
power has ever before staked its great power standing and identity so nakedly on this cash crop to the
extent that Russia has. This policy, or more precisely
grand strategy, of employing energy as an all-purpose
instrument of national strategy in several different regions was canonized in Russia’s 2003 energy strategy
that openly postulated the connection between Russia’s ability to export large energy volumes, mainly to
Europe but subsequently as well to East Asia, and its
great power standing.29
That energy strategy, subsequent statements by
President Putin and other leading officials confirm
the importance of energy to Russia’s foreign policy,
and that energy policy’s purpose is to promote Russia’s return to great power status in Eurasia.30 Indeed,
as Roman Kupchinsky pointed out, Moscow in 2009
formally admitted in its 2009 national security concept
that:
The change from bloc confrontation to the principles
of multi-vector diplomacy and the [natural] resources
potential of Russia, along with the pragmatic policies
of using them has expanded the possibilities of the
Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the
world arena. In other words, Russia’s energy resourc-
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es were once again officially acknowledged to be tools
of Russian foreign policy, or as some believe, a lever
for blackmail. There was apparently no further reason
for denying the obvious, and the authors of the [2009]
security doctrine decided to lay out Russia’s cards on
the table.31

Although there is a conscious effort to augment
Russia’s real capabilities for projecting military power
into the borderlands, that hardly equates to the use
of that power to enforce compliance with its wishes.
Russia uses energy exports as a multipurpose security
instrument, much like a Swiss Army knife that cuts in
all directions.32
However, at the same time, we have more recently
seen a careful and consistent effort to rebuild Russian
military capability and its capacity for projecting effective power throughout the CIS, most notably in
Central Asia. Thus Russia has been selling to Central
Asian states Russian weapons at subsidized prices,
providing training, buying up former Soviet defense
industrial facilities on their territories in exchange for
debts, building up its military bases in Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and potentially Uzbekistan (in case there is
an emergency, Russia has the legal right to use the air
base at Navoi33), building an expanded Caspian Flotilla, augmenting military capabilities for rapid power
projection into Central Asia, constructing integrated
military alliances with Central Asian states through
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
and a projected Caspian naval force (CASFOR), and
by dropping not so subtle hints that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should become either
or both a military alliance and /or an energy club.34
In so doing, Russia has several objectives. First,
Russia seeks to create a network of defense and de43

fense industrial relationships spanning both Central
and East Asia. Towards this end, it has either begun
to conduct or announced a series of exercises to unite
its own forces with those of Central Asian allies in the
SCO, China, and India, e.g., the August 2005 naval exercises with Kazakhstan and other states in the Caspian. Operation Tsentr’ exercises in September 2011, and
annual exercises among the SCO members, including
bilateral exercises with China after 2005, exemplify
this policy. Second, Russia seeks to transform the SCO
into a true strategic and military alliance whereas
China has openly advocated that it concentrate on
trade and economics. Third, Russia’s force development and base seeking campaigns aim to provide its
forces in Central Asia with integrated ground, air, and
naval (Caspian Sea Flotilla) forces. The recent Russian
moves to gain new bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Tajikistan also clearly aim at providing secure
lodgments for expanding air and ground forces, especially as its own domestic defense reforms aim at generating a real, as opposed to notional, capability for
moving forces rapidly to hot spots, a theme that has
been rehearsed frequently in its exercises since 2004.35
Thus careful analysis of Putin’s policies suggests
that we should not be overly hasty in concluding that
there is a long-term depreciation of the military instrument in Russian policy. Putin has had to grapple
with years of neglect and bad policy and has in his
own way contributed to the abiding dilemmas of Russian defense reconstruction.36 The new arms buildup
also suggests a recurrence or at least an attempt to
foster the recurrence of what the Russian historian
S. F. Platonov suggested was the pattern of Russian
history, namely, that the breakdown of a system of
rule is ultimately followed by the reconstitution of a
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new form of state power, perhaps based on key elements of the old, and most importantly, featuring a
new army some years later as the true incarnation of
that new state power.37 Yet today that process remains
incomplete, given the incompletion of the current
defense reform. Indeed, from today’s vantage point,
we cannot be certain what kind of army Russia will
have and whether or not it can adequately defend the
state and the regime against foreign or other threats
to security. Nonetheless, we cannot gainsay the scope
of the current long-term defense modernization program that is currently underway.
Putin’s innovative emphasis on economic reconstruction above other considerations goes against the
fundamental historical tendencies of Russian statecraft that repeatedly sacrificed the economy to the
military and the pursuit of a great power. Yet he also
has set in motion a process by which the purpose of
this economic development is not growth in and of
itself, or for its own sake, but to serve as the foundation for an ambitious global policy based on Russia’s
supposedly inherent great power status and a quest
for independence from all foreign policy constraint.
This policy logically entails substantially increased
military spending and greater emphasis on defense
threats and issues that is more nearly characteristic
of Russian history. Worse, it inevitably contributes
to the spread of great power tensions along military
lines, some of which are already beginning to surface,
e.g., the U.S. European Command’s earlier demand
for more troops in Europe at least in part because of
an unpredictable situation in Russia and the growing
disposition of certain sectors of the U.S. military to
see Russia as a potential future threat, especially as
regards nuclear weapons.38
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Moreover, the jury is still out concerning the ultimate purpose and “destination” of those policies, given the large military buildup underway and the steady
and large increases in defense spending. This does not
mean that the primacy of the military has been the
only tradition. Examples like those of Mikhail Reutern
under Alexander II from 1856-78, Count Sergei Witte
in 1892-1900, and Peter Stolypin, who was in effect
Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from 1906-11,
display episodes or cases where the economic reconstruction of Russia took priority or where financial
and economic imperatives kept military policy in relative check. Similarly, the New Economic Policy (NEP)
of the 1920s and even the first 5-year plan to some
degree aimed at economic reconstruction or breakthrough rather than at prioritizing the defense sector.
Nonetheless, the priority of defense and foreign policy over Russia’s economic health was a trademark of
the Tsarist, Stalinist, and post-Stalinist systems and in
the Soviet period revealed the logic of Leninism as applied to international politics. Military spending was
prioritized because the regime saw the Soviet state as
being in a permanent situation of war against domestic “class” enemies and abroad against “imperialism”
while it was in a seemingly permanent condition of
backwardness. Therefore, the economy and the state
had to be permanently mobilized. Consequently, the
Soviet economy was “a sui generis war economy” in
the words of the Polish economist Oskar Lange. That
certainly is not the case today, or at least is not yet the
case today. But it could come back tomorrow, especially in a system characterized by entropy and reversion to past models of governance as increasingly now
seems to be the case.
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THE HISTORICAL APPROACH AND THE
RESTORATION OF AUTOCRACY
In this context, we seek to analyze and assess contemporary Russian foreign policy as part of Russian
history, i.e., through the lens of what historian Alfred
Rieber has called “the persistent problems” of Russian
foreign policy.39 But to do so, we must first discuss the
nature of the contemporary Russian state. Indeed, as
this writer has argued before, Russian foreign and defense policy (i.e., its overall national security policy)
directly derives from the nature of the state. Therefore,
to grasp the nature of that state, we must go beyond
the insufficient contemporary theories to see today’s
state in its historical context. Here, we must point out
that we do not say that Russia’s state and foreign policy are mere replicas of the past. Russian foreign and
domestic policies are by no means historically determined. But the Russian elites made a conscious choice
during the 1990s and that choice, to replicate the historical formation of autocracy, has had consequences
in foreign policy. As David Cameron and Mitchell
Orenstein recently observed:
The erosion of rights, liberties, and democracy that
has occurred in Russia over the past decade is most
frequently associated with the presidency of Vladimir Putin. But there is good reason to believe that the
causes of that erosion lie deeper, in the institutional
structures of the state, and that whatever erosion of
rights, liberties, and democracy occurred during the
Putin presidency only continued a process that began
during the presidency of his predecessor.40

Specifically, this trend is attributable to the outcome of the battle between President Boris Yeltsin and
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the Duma in 1992-93, a struggle that ended in a violent conflict in Moscow and with the establishment of
what amounted to an unfettered and thus autocratic
presidency under Yeltsin, who quite consciously liked
to be seen as a traditional Russian boss and Tsar.41
There are those misguided U.S. analysts who have
the bizarre and quite unfounded idea that U.S. writing
on Russia suggests that Russian imperialism and antiAmericanism is somehow historically determined.42
Instead of such misguided and uninformed analysis,
we would do better to realize that while today’s Russian foreign policy is entangled with Russian history,
it also is very much the product of conscious elite
strategies based on the interaction of domestic and
foreign conditions, elites, and other factors (as is U.S.
foreign policy). Marx was right. While men make history, they do not do so as they please but rather under
the circumstances bequeathed to them from the past.
Consequently, it is entirely arguable that the decision
to reconstruct the Russian state along lines based on
Russian history is the primary, though hardly the sole,
reason for Russia’s enduring antagonism to the West,
neo-imperial policies towards the CIS, and the suspicion with which many other governments view Russian policy today.
This mutual suspicion is, in no small measure due
to the fact that the construction of such a state necessarily implies a presupposition of hostility from all of
its interlocutors. As one 2008 analysis observed, “An
atmosphere of tension and suspicion towards foreign
interests has been crucial to the economic and administrative expansion of the Siloviki, and they will resist
attempts to dispel it.”43 Indeed, the study of Russian
foreign policy history makes clear that, to Russia, any
integration of Europe, as such, has been an enemy
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threat. This made perfect sense with regard to Napoleonic France and to Hohenzollern and Nazi Germany.
But a democratic debellicized Europe integrated in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
the EU, with the latter’s emphasis on negating power
politics, represents no threat to Russia unless we or
Russia proclaim that democracy and the renunciation
of unfettered sovereignty—the two hallmarks of contemporary Europe—are in their essence threats to the
patrimonial state Ab Initio. It should also be pointed
out that ultimately the nature of the European project and its emphasis on civil power and democratic,
pacific values is utterly incompatible with spheres of
influence, neo-imperial power plays, and the corruption of European governing institutions that are all
hallmarks of Russian policy.
Interestingly enough, some Russian writers celebrate this inheritance by the state of its patrimonial
form and the accompanying historical legacy that the
decision to accept this poisoned chalice has extended.
Oksana V. Goncharova, of the Russian Public administration, thus writes:
Russian foreign policy of today is dependent on a lot
of factors, including the right use of historic experience. Restoration of the continuity of Russian foreign
policy broken by the October Coup of 1917 is the primary goal of those involved in international affairs of
the Russian state. The solution of the task will be the
formulation of the national idea which the politically
active and patriotic segment of Russian society needs,
and which would make a solid basis for the national
consensus in fundamental foreign policy issues.44

Vyacheslav Nikonov writes that, “Something else
that is an extremely important thing and distinguishes
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Russia from the other powers is that we have preserved
the important resource of our historical heritage. With
all the revolutionary changes, its historical matrix
was reproduced.”45 That matrix is the patrimonial
state. Russian elite thinking about Russia’s domestic
and international position in a world of states and
other international actors and about the nature of the
policies it should therefore conduct is also decisively
shaped and influenced by, and even enmeshed to a
considerable degree in, Russian history. Indeed, its
progenitors explicitly invoke that history, e.g., Putin’s
aforementioned essay of January 2012 that explicitly
invokes a famous quotation from the Tsarist Foreign
Minister A. M. Gorchakov and openly appeals to Russian history to justify his course, Sergei Ivanov’s remarks below, and former Foreign Minister and Prime
Minister Evgeny Primakov’s and other analysts’ appeal to Gorchakov’s struggle after the Crimean War
to reassert Russia’s power in Europe.46 More recently,
Putin seems to have wrapped himself up in the mantle
of Petr Stolypin; Nicholas II’s last reforming Prime
Minister (1906-11). Meanwhile President Medvedev
tried to cast himself in the mold of the Tsar Liberator,
Alexander II.47 Putin’s success in invoking, incarnating, and reconfirming Russia’s great power position
is bound up not only with his ever tightening control
of the media to drown out competing narratives and
opinions, but also with the fact that he appealed to
and appeared to incarnate to a considerable degree
a historically shaped identity and personal role that
were perceived to be clearly in danger upon his arrival on the scene.48
Therefore Russia arguably presents itself to the
world as a kind of “Monstre Sacree” (“sacred monster”) to invoke the French term. Russia still tends to
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see itself as a sacred or at least privileged and unique
state with a special path (Osobyi Put’) not bound by the
usual rules of international activity and demands that
others accept this self-valuation as their valuation of
Russia. It projects autocratic unlimited power into the
international arena as a justification of its unfettered
sovereignty and right to do as it pleases regardless of
international law, practice, or any other constraint.
Meanwhile, its interlocutors still frequently also see it
as a monster intent on dominating, if not trampling,
the neighborhood.
At the same time this phrase, “sacred monster”
connotes the self-perception of a singular entity that
demands that others accord it the status it claims for
itself, i.e., its undisputed right to be above any form of
international accountability. For example, the Russian
government in the person of Foreign Minister Lavrov
most recently basically told the world that it does not
have to account to anyone for sending a ship laden
with ammunition to Syria to assist the government
in murdering protesters.49 Russia’s belief that it is beyond accounting to any state or institution’s norms,
which are in any case simply an expression of a strong
state’s interest, not any kind of objective moral value,
transfers Russian domestic values into Russian foreign
policy. Indeed, it places those domestic values at the
heart of foreign policy as an object that is under attack
and must be defended by a pervasive threat. Thus
Timofei Bordachev, a Europe specialist at the prestigious Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP),
wrote that a new format for developing Russo-EU relations must acknowledge Russia’s special role in the
world and should therefore not relate to any past EU
partnership and cooperation agreements with anyone else. Any agreement with Russia must be unique,
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reflecting Russia’s undefined, but taken for granted,
uniqueness. Second, the new agreement cannot be
a kind of European lesson plan for Russia, instructing it how drawing it closer to Europe by postulating
reformed regulatory political and economic policies.
Russia cannot adopt EU legislation or standards if it is
not to become a member of the EU (even if they would
immensely benefit Russia) for that allegedly makes no
sense. Third, “any new document between the parties
must avoid evaluative judgment of the Russian economy and its society as a whole.” Russia must remain
beyond any foreign or other evaluation.50
Thus Moscow regards Russia’s internal structure
as a point of contestation that must be removed from
the agenda of world politics. On the one hand, this
patrimonial structure is integral to the establishment
of a great and feared power, even empire.
In practical terms, this means a “Conservative
change” later translated into restoration of the famous
power Vertikal, the taking over of competitive private
enterprises by state companies, maintenance of natural monopolies economic and political instruments of
government, reform of armed forces, social protection
system, banking and financial sectors. Russia’s internal agenda represents a constitutive part of a plan
designated to reclaim the great power status on the
international arena.51

Obviously this system must be protected from foreign attacks. It must be free from having to answer
for its behavior, and Russian leaders must obtain that
freedom of action through their conduct of foreign
policy. Arguably, they have succeeded to a considerable degree. In 2009, Arkady Moshes of the Finnish
Institute of International Relations observed that:
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As far as European actors are concerned, the following
moments have to be taken into consideration. First, in
the middle of the current decade Russia has successfully taken its internal order off the Russian-European
agenda. With the help of a rather influential European
school of thought, Moscow effectively promoted the
line of being an ‘imperfect democracy’ and lobbied for
the prioritization of pragmatic interests over liberal
values. Whereas the question whether or not Europe’s
consent not to lecture Russia on its internal affairs
helped the former to pursue those interests remains
largely rhetorical, Moscow got an impression that in
reality values did not matter for Europe. Rather, they
were a bargaining chip, which could be traded for economic or other concessions.52

Not surprisingly, many Russian political figures
see the state as essentially traditional. Mikhail Gorbachev recently said that the Stalinist system is still being partially used in Russia.53 Semyon Novoprudsky
sees the state as bearing enormous resemblances to its
Soviet predecessor throughout the state structure, and
even in the society.54 Dmitry Furman observed that,
“managed democracies are actually a soft variant of
the Soviet system.”55 Moreover, Russian patrimonialism and autocracy probably cannot survive without
replicating itself in Ukraine and across the CIS. Thus
it is hardly surprising that Medvedev, like Putin and
Yeltsin before him, has now formally claimed an
undefined sphere of influence going beyond the old
Soviet borders as a fundamental principle of Russian
foreign policy.56 Celeste Wallander, now Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, called this transimperialism, although the label is less important than the imperialistic reality.
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Transimperialism is the extension of Russian patrimonial authoritarianism into a globalized world. Russia
can trade and invest without being open and permeable by selectively integrating transnational elite networks in the globalized international economic system
and replicating the patron-client relations of power,
dependency, and rent seeking and distribution at the
transnational level. Russian foreign policy is increasingly founded on creating transnational elite networks
for access to rent-creating opportunities in the globalized international economy. Moscow functions as
the arbiter and control point for Russia’s interaction
with the outside economy to ensure that Russia is not
exposed to the liberalizing effects of marketization,
competition, and diversification of interests and local
power. If that were to happen, the political system that
keeps the present leadership in power would be at risk
of failing. In this sense, globalization is a threat not to
Russian national interests but to the interests of Russia’s political leadership.57

Both NATO and EU enlargement to Ukraine represent this kind of globalization. Accordingly, the reform
of Ukraine’s politics, and in particular Ukraine’s enormously corrupt gas trading operations with Russia,
is a critical component of Ukraine’s integration with
the West and the rest of the world. This corrupt trade
and Ukraine’s undefined political trajectory are foundations of Russia’s autocracy and efforts to corrupt
Western public institutions and politicians through
the use of energy in tandem with organized crime, the
Russian state, and intelligence agencies.58 Thus this
strategy, in its energy and military dimensions, aims
to stop the threat posed by European integration in
its tracks, or to limit the damage to what has already
been lost and, if possible, reverse it by hollowing out
the institutions of European unification as Medvedev
noted above.59
54

Effectively Moscow aims to undo in practice the
content of the post-Soviet and former Warsaw Pact
states’ sovereignty. Michael Emerson of the Center for
European Policy Studies in Brussels, Belgium, reports
the comments of a civil society leader in Belarus who
told him that, “we have the impression that Moscow
has come to see a certain Finlandization of Belarus as
unavoidable and even useful.”60 As Emerson describes
the term, Finlandization means:
Remaining in Moscow’s orbit for strategic security affairs (strategic military installations, 50% ownership
of the gas pipeline, no question of NATO aspirations),
but becoming more open to its EU neighbors for personal contacts and eventual political liberalization and
for modernizing its economy. All this has the ring of
plausibility to it.61

While this may look attractive to Moscow or maybe even to some of the governments of the region like
Belarus and Armenia, and possibly Moldova, it clearly does not satisfy Ukraine and probably Azerbaijan,
not to mention Georgia, or leave any of these states
with full sovereignty over their foreign, defense, and
economic policies. According to Emerson even if none
of those post-Soviet states currently has a credible
prospect for either the EU or NATO, Russia’s multidimensional presence is either sustained or growing
throughout the region.62
Although some American analysts like Thomas
Graham have recommended Ukraine’s Finlandization as a goal of U.S. policy, it is quite unlikely, given
Ivanov’s and many others’ statements, that Moscow
really looks forward to these states’ political liberalization and enhanced contacts with the EU; quite the
contrary.63 In other words, Moscow has rather a differ55

ent definition of Finlandization, one that is much more
politically and economically restrictive. Meanwhile,
in Central and Eastern Europe Moscow wants “trojan
horses” inside the EU and NATO. For example, upon
Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007, Russian Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov publicly said
that Bulgaria was Moscow’s trojan horse there, and in
2008 stated that Russia counted on Bulgaria and other
states to block sanctions against it in the wake of the
2008 war with Georgia.64 Certainly NATO as well as
the EU regarded the Dimitrov government in Bulgaria
that was in power until earlier in 2009 as little more
than just such a trojan horse.65
Moreover, close examination of Russian policies
throughout Eastern Europe as defined here indicates
that Moscow’s aims go beyond those listed by Emerson. The multiplicity of incidents we have listed here
or that others like Keith Smith, Robert Larsson, Anita
Orban, and Janusz Bugajski et al., have listed indicate
that we are witnessing a coordinated Russian strategy
directed against Europe.66 As a recent assessment of
Russian policy in Latvia concluded:
We see several, interrelated short-term [Russian] strategies focusing on exercising ever-increasing influence
in the politics of the target states. What we do not see
is a policy of military conquest but, rather, a gradual
but unswerving drive to eventually regain dominance
over the social, economic, and political affairs of what
are to become entirely dependent client states.67

56

NORMATIVE OR IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
IN RUSSIAN POLICY
Here we must realize that, Igor Ivanov’s writings
aside, contemporary international politics is once
again or perhaps never stopped being ideological
as well as geopolitical and geoeconomic. Not even
Trenin’s Russians are ready to get up in public and
say they recognize nothing but power and interest.
Thus Moscow’s foreign policy approach, especially in
the former Soviet borderlands, becomes an ideological-political one as acknowledged by both foreign and
Russian observers. Temur Basilia, Special Assistant to
former Georgian President Edvard Shevarnadze for
economic issues, wrote that in many CIS countries,
e.g., Georgia and Ukraine, “the acute issue of choosing between alignment with Russia and the West is
associated with the choice between two models of social development.”68 The aptness of this observation
transcends Georgia and Ukraine to embrace the entire
post-Soviet region, since it is clear that Moscow viscerally opposes “exporting democracy” to it. Indeed,
it regards the idea with contempt and thus attracts
the local dictators who cleave to it for support against
Western pressures for democratization.69 Basilia also
pointed to the local perception of Russia as a security
threat.
Nowadays there are many in the West who believe
that Russia has changed—and, having reformed, seeks
to interact with neighboring countries in conformity
with international norms. Some Eurasian countries
would disagree with this opinion, and believe instead
that the Russian mentality has not changed much, and
that Russia continues to deem the “near abroad” as its
sphere of social influence. After the second war with
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Chechnya, many think that Russia regards violence as
its major tool for resolving social and political problems, especially with regard to non-Russian peoples
from the former empire. Thus integration into the international community should be viewed as a guarantee for security and further development.70

Similarly Sabine Fischer writes:
Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation does not only involve a choice between different partners for political
and economic cooperation. It is a strategic decision
between two models of development, and as such essentially a decision on the identity and future of the
country. It forms part of Ukraine’s state and nationbuilding processes, and its outcome will have a decisive impact on the future of the region, and Europe in
general.71

Finally, Lilia Shevtsova reminds us that:
No matter whether the Russian foreign policy takes
the form of a dialogue or confrontation with the West,
its aim remains to keep in place a personalized power
system that is inherently hostile to liberal democracy.
The optimists who get excited every time the Kremlin
starts cooperating with Western partners would do
well to remember this.72

Russian analysts like the late Dmitry Furman also
acknowledge that “The Russia-West struggle in the
CIS is a struggle between two irreconcilable systems.”73
Furman’s analysis is instructive of the regime’s compelling need for a foreign policy enemy that seeks not
only to weaken Russia but to block its full return to
great power status, particularly in the CIS.

58

Our system’s democratic camouflage demands partnership with the West. However, the authoritarian,
managed content of our system dictates the exact opposite. A safety zone for our system means a zone of
political systems of the same kind of managed democracies that we are actively supporting in the CIS and,
insofar as our forces allow, everywhere—in Serbia, the
Middle East, even Venezuela. The Soviet Union’s policy might seem quixotic. Why spend so much money
in the name of ‘proletarian internationalism’? But if
you do not expand, you contract. The same could be
said about our policy toward Lukashenko’s regime [in
Belarus-author]. The system of managed democracy
in Russia will perish if Russia is besieged on all sides
by unmanaged democracies. Ultimately it will once
again be a matter of survival. The West cannot fail to
support the establishment of systems of the same type
as the West’s, which means expanding its safety zone.
We cannot fail to oppose this. Therefore the struggle
inside the CIS countries is beginning to resemble the
Russian-Western conflict.74

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN
HISTORY
Rieber’s approach emphasizing the persistent
problems of Russian history originated in his dissatisfaction with the pieties and clichés of earlier generations of Russian historiography and of foreign historiography about Russia. But it also represented an effort
to find satisfying answers to what are also discernible
persisting continuities in Russian history up to the
end of the Soviet period and more recently to the present even under conditions of profound revolutionary
change.75 Any worthwhile account of this history must
account for both the continuities, most visible in the
continuing form of rule, i.e., the Muscovite or Tsarist
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paradigm of autocracy described here, and the ruptures like the revolutions of 1917 and 1991. This Muscovite or Tsarist paradigm is characterized by the government’s or the Tsar’s control, even ownership of the
national economy; the absence of enforceable property
rights, public, legal, or Parliamentary controls on the
government; the absence of the rule of law, a strong
tendency towards emphasizing the military or martial
aspects of national security policy over other dimensions; a quasi-militarized state rhetoric, if not concept
of the state’s organization; a caesaro-papist ideology
making the ruler the object of cultic veneration; and
an accompanying great power and imperial mystique
as well as reality. One major purpose of that imperial
mystique and its accompanying reality is to translate
these domestic factors into international factors to
ensure the security of this inherently insecure and illegitimate (in contemporary European and Western
terms) regime.
The state in this paradigm was also, as were the
Tsarist and Stalinist states, a service state in which everyone was bound to serve the state and power as well
as income, especially at the top of society, only came
from the rewards of service. Just as the “Boyars” must
serve in order to gain control over the rents coming
from the state and are thus a rent-seeking elite, so too
the state grants these rents with the proviso that they
serve the Tsar well (even if corruptly). Hence the state
is a rent-granting state and the elite a rent-seeking
elite. Today the service state is still far too present (not
just in the army still subject to conscription, but also in
the government). To cite one example, in a notorious
late 2007 interview, Oleg Shvartsman, a “businessman” admitted that he was the front for an interlocking series of organizations representing high-ranking
government figures and their families that raided cor60

porations to take them over on behalf of his “clients”
and their families. Shvartsman further admitted that
the government had set up an organization at Putin’s
direction in 2004 to compel businesses to be “more
socially responsible” and that it engaged in what he
called “collective blackmail.”76 Similarly, we see the
large role of so-called informal taxes, i.e., demands by
the state and Kremlin for contributions outside the formal system of taxes and other rule-based obligations.77
The Kremlin’s ongoing expropriation of foreign and
domestic businessmen who run afoul of it, most recently expressed in its late summer of 2011 raids
against British Petroleum (BP) is another example of
a government who feels that all the property belongs
to it, that it can seize that property whenever it suits it
to do so, and that this is nobody else’s affair. All these
manifestations of state expropriation and compulsory
service as a condition of possessing property and/or
political position derive from the medieval phenomena of such taxes, predatory confiscation of estates,
and krugovaya poruka (collective surety).
In less stringent times, e.g., after the emancipation
of the serfs, the obligation to serve was partially relaxed, but it is clear in Putin’s Russia that his topmost
elites are state servants in exactly the same way as
were Tsarist or Soviet officials.78 That is, they retain
their office and property on the basis of their loyal
service to Putin or Medvedev, a service that exempts
them from true legal accountability to anyone or any
institution and enables them to retain their access to
rents throughout the system that are obtained by a
pervasive corruption. Absent legal and institutional
checks upon the power of the autocrat, rival bureaucracies emerge out of rival factions and clans at court,
and the Tsar’s task is to check each group by the other,
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while remaining in some sense above the fray, not
least through the mystique of Tsardom and the cult of
personality. Or as Clifford Gaddy observes, the Tsar
is the ultimate arbiter of rents.79 But as all good histories of Tsarist Russia show, this resembles the political
function of the later Tsars who constantly were balancing off factions around them, each of whom wanted
preeminence and unimpeded direct access to the Tsar.
Much the same behavior is also observable among Soviet General Secretaries, including Stalin. Even though
his power was as absolute as anyone could wish for,
he was constantly balancing off competing factions in
his Politburo and cabinet. Policy thus often emerges
out of the strife of these bureaucratic and “courtly”
factions.
But given the pervasive corruption, patron-client
relationships, and endless rivalry of courtiers for the
favor of the Tsar (or president), the end result is a blurring of the distinction between personal and national
interest and thus persistent, endemic, and structurally
rooted, as well as culturally permitted corruption on a
grand scale. Indeed, given the interpenetration of officialdom and business, it is often all but impossible to
distinguish between the motives of each side in foreign policy deals. It becomes clear that it is equally difficult to distinguish between the personal or sectoral
interests of actors and the national interest for each of
those conceptions of interest is, as James Sherr, notes,
“a primary color” that must be combined in the overall picture to be seen properly.80 Such features typify
the authoritarian and backward state. The following
observations about Afghanistan could be literally
word-for-word true about Russia.
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The structural lack of competition and representation
has significant ramifications for performance, for it inhibits accountability and pushes political competition
outside the formal, legal system, where it has taken
the form of informal contests for patronage and the
capture of resources. The formal rules of the game become meaningless, and performance by state officials
becomes transactional rather than rational.81

Therefore, the personal interest of elite members
often, if not always, trumps any true concept of national interest. We see examples of this and of the
rivalry between competing bureaucracies, elites, and
factions, with particular vividness in the energy sector. For example, Russia and China have been discussing oil and gas pipelines for years to no avail. Indeed,
in 2003-08 the issue was whether to go with a pipeline
to China alone or to the Pacific Ocean coast and Japan.
In reality, it is not China or Japan, but Russia that wants
to bring large volumes of its oil and gas to the market
of Northeast Asia in the most economical way. Also, it
is not Japan and China who are the main contenders
for a pipeline route, but rather diverse interests within
Russia. Indeed, some interest groups would prefer to
explore the oil and natural gas reserves in a way that
would not necessarily gain local industries and communities, and without considering the overall groups
that prioritize regional developments, social advancement and national energy markets, as well as access
to multiple markets in Northeast Asia. The problem
is that the Chinese decided to side with the former,
while the Japanese aimed towards the latter. Tokyo
was only supporting, not proposing the pipeline route
that Transneft already advocated and that President
Putin strongly favored.82
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Consequently, the competition for pipeline routes
and financing in Asia was as much an internal Russian factional fight for rents, bribes, and influence as it
was a foreign policy strategy. Russia’s ultimate decision clearly reflected the personal interests of key bureaucratic players, who prevailed at the expense of the
earlier policy and concept of Russian national interest.
Then in 2009 at the bottom of the financial crisis, Igor
Sechin and Sergei Bogdanchikov, the heads of Rosneft
and Transneft, pushed through loans from China to
their organizations on condition that they build an oil
pipeline to China, which opened in 2011. But they did
so under conditions that undercut Russian national
interests, which called for a pipeline to more than one
customer. At the same time, they undermined the Russian railways, which had previously carried the oil to
China in return for a handsome Chinese subsidy. It is
difficult to imagine that their motive was not as much
bureaucratic and personal as it was supposedly in the
national interest, for Russia still is hobbled in the Far
East with regard to energy sales to Japan, South Korea, and other potential buyers.
Similar examples exist in the struggle over foreign
arms purchases. While it is clear that the Russian defense industry cannot provide the quality and hightech weapons demanded and needed by the military,
it and its bureaucratic patrons refuse to let go of the
rents accruing to them and insist against all reason
and evidence that they can do better. This is not just
(although it is in part) nationalist boasting.83 These
examples therefore indicate to us the continuing saliency of historic Russian structures, mentalities, and
behavior patterns: imperialism, a particular kind of
militarism, factional rivalry, and the continuation of
the autocratic state and its particular mentality.
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If we view this collective elite mentality and behavior of the elite at home and abroad in the light of
this historical inheritance, we encounter a revived
form of the essence of the Soviet Nomenklatura, namely
the medieval and feudal fusion of power and property, along with feudal patron-client relationships and
many elements of the service state. In other words, a
great deal of medievalism still attaches itself to Russian politics at home and abroad. In the light of such
episodes as those recounted by Shvartsman and, for
example, the Magnitsky and Khodorkovsky affairs, it
becomes clear why foreign diplomats and officials, including the U.S. embassy have labeled Russia a “mafia
state.”84 Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes called Putin’s
system a protection racket some time ago.85 Even former Russian officials have done the same thing. As
Andrei Illarionov testified to Congress in 2009:
According to the classification of the political regimes,
the current one in Russia should be considered as
hard authoritarianism. The central place in the Russian political system is occupied by the Corporation
of the secret police. The personnel of Federal Security Service—both in active service as well as retired
one—form a special type of unity (non-necessarily
institutionalized) that can be called brotherhood, order,
or corporation. The Corporation of the secret police operatives (CSP) includes first of all acting and former
officers of the FSB (former KGB), and to a lesser extent
FSO and Prosecutor General Office. Officers of GRU
and SVR do also play some role. The members of the
Corporation do share strong allegiance to their respective organizations, strict codes of conduct and of
honor, basic principles of behavior, including among
others the principle of mutual support to each other in
any circumstances and the principle of omerta. Since
the Corporation preserves traditions, hierarchies,
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codes and habits of secret police and intelligence services, its members show high degree of obedience to
the current leadership, strong loyalty to each other,
rather strict discipline. There are both formal and informal means of enforcing these norms. Violators of
the code of conduct are subject to the harshest forms of
punishment, including the highest form.86

What this means, and the second conviction of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky in December 2010 confirms, is
that executive power is undivided, the courts cannot
check it, there is no unconditional right of property,
no truly enforceable contracts by recourse to impartial
law costs, and the state leadership is determined to
keep things this way. Its Mafia-like qualities testify to
the fact that force is the ultimate arbiter of all decisions, that rivalries for control of property and power
dominate the state, and that the regime refuses to subject itself to any legal accountability so that those who
cannot be bribed or simply intimidated are subjected
to force majeure or killed. Likewise, we see the control
by members of the government of the major engines
of economic activity and the use of unbridled and unaccountable state power to oust rivals from the scene.
These state megaliths have grown, thanks to state
cronyism and systematic predation, not excluding officially sponsored corporate raiding.
Indeed, as Khodorkovsky observed, corruption is
probably Russia’s greatest export, much as in a criminal racket. We see this not only in Ukraine’s notorious
corruption or the similar phenomena in Central Asia,
but also in countless examples in Eastern Europe.
Thus events and trends in Central and Eastern Europe
fully display the linkages between energy firms, intelligence penetration, efforts to buy up strategic sectors
of the local economy, influence peddling, corruption,
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and the buying and subversion of politicians and political institutions that we see across Europe and that
can only be part of a centrally directed Russian policy
to achieve the objectives stated above of eroding European security and democracy.
Simultaneously, European intelligence services
and NATO have discerned a vast expansion of the
Russian intelligence network in Europe and its efforts
to penetrate and destabilize European governments.
These trends are particularly noticeable at NATO
headquarters in Brussels and in Eastern Europe. The
head of Polish Military Intelligence, Antoni Macierewicz, observed in 2007 that Poland was under attack
from a greatly expanded covert network of agents.87 In
2008 Vladimir Fillin, the Ukraine office chief of forum.
msk, told a gathering of Ukrainian law-enforcement
officials that:
For some time now the Ukrainian special services have
been discharging the country’s international commitments by working actively to curb smuggling that is
‘sheltered’ by influential Chekist forces in the Russian
Federation. The Chekists have taken over Russia’s internal heroin and cocaine market and are now trying
to expand as far as they can into the Ukrainian and
European markets. . . . However nothing has come of
their efforts.88

In July 2009 Kyiv expelled two Russian diplomats
from the Crimea, not for spying, which would be
bad enough, but unfortunately something we all live
with. Rather, they were trying to incite the population
against the Ukrainian government.89
We find analogous examples in Poland, the Baltic,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, if not elsewhere in
Central and Eastern Europe. For example, in 2004 Ro-
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man Giertych, Deputy Chairman of the commission
that investigated the notorious Orlen scandal in Poland, concluded in his report that:
The commission has evidence that a certain kind of
conspiracy functioned “within the background of the
State Treasury Ministry, the Prime Ministerial Chancellery, the Presidential Chancellery, and big business,” which was supposed to bring about the sale
of the Polish energy sector into the hands of Russian
firms.90

In Lithuania, former President Rolandas Paskas
was impeached for his connections to Russian organized crime and intelligence figures. As of August
2009, the Seimas was moving to block any possibility
that the Russo-Lithuanian capital bank Snoras could
gain control of the Lieutvos Rytas media group.91 But
this is hardly a new Russian policy.
In 2007-08, Lithuanian businessman Rimandas
Stonys, President of Dujotekana, Lithuania’s Gazprom intermediary, who has close ties to Russian and
Lithuanian officials and has extensive investments in
Lithuania’s energy and transit sectors, was brought
under investigation by Lithuania’s Parliament. These
investigative reports charge that he had used his ties
to Russian intelligence and other Lithuanian political
connections to advance personal and Russian interests
in Lithuania’s energy sector. Dujotekana is reputed to
be a front for Russian intelligence services that are already entwined with Gazprom. A counterintelligence
probe into a foreign citizen’s efforts to recruit senior
Lithuanian Intelligence (VSD) officers led to the firm,
which also recruited government officials. Key executives of Dujotekana are apparently also KGB alumni.
Similar charges are also raised in regard to Stonys’
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and his firm’s influence in Lithuania’s transit sector
and his large contributions to politicians and media
and his influence over political appointments.92
Since then, it has become clear that the company
was established with the help of Russian special services, but because Stonys failed to gain control of a
new power plant in Kaunas that would have legitimized Gazprom as an investor and power in Lithuania, he may well be on his way out.93 However, that
would hardly stop other friends of Russia from trying
to capture key positions in the state and its policy.94
Indeed, Gazprom is still trying to obtain a long-term
contract to supply Lithuania with gas and make a deal
with the main gas company, Lieutvos Dujos, until
2030. 95 Clearly, this is a constant, long-term Russian
policy. Thus Stonys only took off from where earlier
efforts had failed when attempts were made to compromise Lithuanian politics by using such figures as
Viktor Uspaskich, founder of the Labor party, who is
trying to make a comeback, and Paskas.96 Likewise, in
Estonia, the 2006 annual report of the Security Police
noted that the Constitution Party is financed partly
from Moscow.97
In Hungary, Istvan Simiscko, a member of the
Christian Democratic People’s Party and Chairman
of the National Security Committee of the Parliament,
has publicly charged that Russian (and possibly Slovak) intelligence and criminal links may be involved
in the murder of members of the Hungarian Roma
in an attempt to incite ethnic unrest inside Hungary
and/or discredit Hungary abroad.98 There are also repeated examples of Russia, either acting on its own or
through the Austrian energy firm OMV, attempting
to gain control over Hungarian energy firms, notably MOL.99 Thus there has been good reason for open
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U.S. concern about Hungarian policy, especially when
the Socialists led by Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcany
were in power.100 Indeed, Gyurcsany had, at various
times, proposed that the EU, Russia, and Caspian Sea
governments form an energy partnership or said that,
despite Hungary’s democratic orientation, it cannot
expect to become independent of Russia.101 More recently, there are discernible signs of this phalanx of
business, crime, and government money establishing
havens for itself in Iceland and Montenegro.102 In other words, we are confronting a pervasive and strategic
policy on the part of the Russian elite to corrupt European public institutions.
However, the most comprehensive recent example
occurred in the Czech Republic. Prague’s recent expulsion of two Russian diplomats, including the defense
attaché, for spying has revealed the scope of the problem even though Moscow, as is its habit, denounced
the charges as provocations. Diplomats have stated
that Russia is increasing its network in Prague to the
extent of activating sleepers or past agents and reverting to Soviet methods. For some time, the Czechs
have been investigating this expansion of Russian intelligence, subversion, and espionage activity, thanks
to the arrest in 2008 of Herman Simm, a high-ranking
Estonian official in the Ministry of Interior who was a
Russian spy. As one NATO diplomat told the Czech
newspaper Mlada Fronta Dnes:
The extensive building up of Russian espionage networks in the Czech Republic and in other NATO countries, and also the hitherto unprecedented amounts of
money that Moscow was starting to invest in this ‘project’ in the recent period have exceeded the acceptable,
and sometimes also tolerated, limits of espionage, . . .
In the recent period this has exceeded any kind of
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degree, whether this is a case of infiltrating the intelligence services or of contacting experts involved in
NATO strategic defense.103

What reportedly most disconcerted NATO about
these trends is not the intelligence gained by Moscow,
but the fact that Russia has returned to Soviet practices and clearly views NATO as enemy number one.104
Had NATO paid closer attention to Russian statements
and policy, it would not have been surprised. Formally, Prague expelled these diplomats for attempting to
influence public opinion against the planned U.S. missile defense installations in the Czech Republic. Czech
officials and reports have long observed that, using
business and either Czech or Russian businessmen as
a front, Moscow has been trying to make contact with
and suborn politicians to influence Czech policies.
Moscow has doubled the number of known agents
in the Czech Republic from 50-100, and many officials
believe that the leadership of the Czech Social Democratic party is either prey to dangerous illusions about
Russia or worse and would undermine Prague’s proWestern policies.105 A report from Radio Free Europe
indicates that an increasing number of Czech politicians have ties to Russia in one form or another, including state-owned Russian enterprises in which energy
enterprises figure prominently.106 Most of these firms
operate by stealth like the gas trading firm Vemex that
controls 12 percent of the Czech domestic market and
which is controlled by the Centrex Group Ltd., whose
official ownership is impossible to trace but is one of
Gazprom’s East and Central European firms set up to
muscle into the European utilities business. Likewise,
Lukoil has enormous pull inside the Czech Republic
and has secured preferential contracts to provide oil

71

and jet fuel to Czech concerns and the Prague airport.
There is good reason to believe that these business activities are also transferring money to Czech political
groups.107 Czech intelligence thus reports that Russian
intelligence has attempted to establish and exploit ties
to Czech politicians and civic groups for purposes
hostile to government policy and on behalf of Russia.108 As one representative of Czech Intelligence, the
BIS, told the Czech journal Respekt.cz previously:
In the last few years we have noted numerous attempts by business entities that had proven connections to suspicious Russian capital to gain control over
telecommunications, information systems, and transportation infrastructure from railroads to airports and
airlines. To what extent the Russian secret services
are involved in these activities, however, we do not
know.109

Knowledgeable Czech experts like the former
Ambassador to Moscow Lucas Dobrovsky have little
doubt what Moscow wants to achieve through such
efforts to penetrate the Czech government. As he observed:
We would stop resisting the efforts to bring Russia’s
economic, political, and perhaps, to a certain extent,
military, influence back to the area of Central Europe.
The current Russian Government and the president
believe that this is a natural influence in the area that
was directly and indirectly occupied by the former Soviet Union. You will find a lot of evidence of this in the
statements of Russian politicians. This would lead to
the weakening of our Euro-Atlantic relations.110

Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Thomas Pojar
echoes these comments and notes that recovering
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Russia’s position in Central Europe has been a Putin
priority since he took power in 2000.111
Apart from Russian efforts to undermine popular
support for the stationing of U.S. missile defense radars in the Czech Republic, these espionage activities
are clearly connected to Russian efforts to take over
and penetrate key sectors of the Czech economy. For
example, Russian interests are trying to buy into the
nuclear storage sector, an effort that according to intelligence experts immediately raises questions, especially as Russian diplomats are involved in this project.112 Indeed, the whole question of the tenders for the
Temelin nuclear plant, a major project intended to facilitate Czech energy independence, reflect substantial
attempts by Russian entities to buy into Temelin and
control it. In all these cases as well, we find examples
of corruption, price overruns, and criminality ensnaring Russians and Czechs in an intricate web of corruption.113 Russian agents have likewise repeatedly tried
to infiltrate Czech political parties and make contact
with members of Parliament, their staffs, and personnel in the foreign relations departments of political
parties in order to gain key access to critical economic
sectors.
Shell reportedly wants to sell its 16 percent share in
Ceska Rafinerska, a refinery company. One of the
main suitors? Supposedly, Russian Lukoil which recently expanded its local network of gas stations. The
troubled Polish company PKN Orlen might want to
sell its stake in Unipetrol, the Czech company that
controls Ceska Rafinerska. The likely suitor? Again
the Russians. The list goes on. Such worries about
Russian expansion aren’t surprising when one considers that the Russian company TVEL will, beginning in
2010, start supplying the Czech nuclear power plant
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Temelin with fuel, replacing Westinghouse, the American firm; a Czech subsidiary of the Russian company
OMZ will take part in additional work on Temelin;
and Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, controls Vermex,
the second largest importer of gas from Russia.114

Although Russian officials deny interfering in the
activities of Russian companies, the record clearly contradicts such denials. So until the charges of economic
expansion subside and the opacity characteristic of
Russian business-government relations lifts, nobody
will believe that the signs of increased Russian activity in the Czech Republic are purely commercial, certainly not the Czechs.115 Indeed, the criminalization of
the energy sector is so great that a Russian newspaper
opined that one of the reasons for President Medvedev’s violent attacks on Ukraine’s government on August 11, 2009, and refusal to send Ambassador Mikhail
Zurabov there, is that the attacks also intended to keep
Zurabov from gaining control over gas flows through
Ukraine, so that the state, not Gazprom, will run the
policy and control those flows at the end of the day.116
Through such means, Russia tries to corrupt European public institutions, forestall European integration, and remain a wholly free and independent
“sovereign democracy” that answers to nobody for
its conduct and possesses an unchallenged sphere of
influence in countries with which it claims to have
“privileged interests.”117 This “damage limitation”
posture is inherently revisionist and ultimately opposes the pacification of Europe that is the greatest
product and triumph of our times.
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SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY IN EURASIA
While Russia may have renounced formal empire
and territorial expansion, it certainly has not abandoned the autocratic state, its neo-imperial proclivities, many historical mental and behavior patterns,
and its assertion of Russian Samobytnost’ (uniqueness)
or revisionist policies in Eurasia. However, if this is
the matrix, to use Nikonov’s term, from which the current state has issued, it is quite logical that it will be a
state whose foreign policy is dominated by the a priori
presupposition of conflict with its main interlocutors,
if not its neighbors as well. There are several reasons
for saying this.
As we noted above, one of those resemblances to
the Russian historical tradition is the imperial concept
of the state, which is expressed in the assertion that,
of the post-Soviet successor states, only Russia truly
has sovereignty, and those states are in some way
artificial, illegitimate, and not truly sovereign. Therefore, Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in these
states, and the consolidation of that sphere is a test of
the viability of the state. In other words, as we shall
see below, Russian elites believe that if Russia does
not have this dominion over those states, it will not
only cease to be a great power, but its own statehood
will come under question.
For example, in 2008 at the Bucharest NATORussia Council on April 4, 2008, President Putin told
President Bush, “But, George, don’t you understand
that Ukraine is not a state.” Putin further claimed that
most of its territory was a Russian gift in the 1950s.
Moreover, while Western Ukraine belonged to Eastern
Europe, Eastern Ukraine was “ours.” Furthermore, if
Ukraine did enter NATO, Russia would then detach
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Eastern Ukraine (and the Crimea) and graft it onto
Russia. Thus Ukraine would cease to exist as a state.118
Putin also said that Russia regards NATO enlargement as a threat, so if Georgia received membership,
Moscow would “take adequate measures” and recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia to create a buffer
between NATO and Russia.119 Putin’s outburst is not
unrepresentative of Russian foreign policy. Instead,
it mirrors numerous statements by officials made to
former Soviet republics and Eastern European states
to the effect that they are not really sovereign states.120
On August 11, 2009, Medvedev published an open
letter, ostensibly to President Viktor Yushchenko of
Ukraine, but actually to the whole country, lambasting Ukraine’s policies, announcing that he will withhold sending Ukraine a new ambassador, and calling
upon the Ukrainian people to elect a new pro-Russian
president.121 Medvedev specifically charged that:
The leadership in Kiev took an openly anti-Russian
stand following the military attack launched by the
Saakashvili regime against South Ossetia. Ukrainian weapons were used to kill civilians and Russian peacekeepers. Russia continues to experience
problems caused by a policy aimed at obstructing the
operations of its Black Sea Fleet, and this on a daily
basis and in violation of the basic agreements between
our countries. Sadly, the campaign continues to oust
the Russian language from the Ukrainian media, the
education, culture and science. The Ukrainian leadership’s outwardly smooth-flowing rhetoric fits ill with
the overt distortion of complex and difficult episodes
in our common history, the tragic events of the great
famine in the Soviet Union, and an interpretation of
the Great Patriotic War as some kind of confrontation
between two totalitarian systems.
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Our economic relations are in a somewhat better situation and are developing, but we have not yet succeeded in tapping their full potential. Again, the problem is that Russian companies frequently face open
resistance from the Ukrainian authorities. Bypassing
Russia, Ukraine’s political leaders do deals with the
European Union on supplying gas—gas from Russia—and sign a document that completely contradicts
the Russian-Ukrainian agreements reached in January
this year.122

This extraordinarily insulting letter‘s publication,
not to mention its writing, was an overt gesture of contempt towards Ukraine’s sovereignty and Yushchenko personally. Its authorship and, a fortiori, its publication, fully display to the world that Medvedev shares
Putin’s assessment of Ukraine’s sovereignty and, for
that matter, the sovereignty of the other CIS governments. It makes clear that what angers Russia is the
idea that Ukraine might actually exercise the prerogatives of an independent sovereign state and demand
that Russia not meddle in its politics and elections, uphold the treaty on the Black Sea Fleet, desist from trying to take over Ukraine’s energy economy and wage
energy wars against it, and come to terms with the
Soviet (not just Stalinist) legacy. Thus it is clear that
Moscow cannot accept that Ukraine as a sovereign
state may decide its foreign policy independently. Instead, if Ukraine is not neutral on behalf of Russia, its
sovereignty will come under Russian assault.123
Nor is this attitude restricted to Ukraine. At least
since 2007, Moscow’s true aim is Georgian “neutrality,” i.e., a renunciation of its sovereign pro-Western
orientation and a further abridgement of its sovereignty.124 Indeed, it pervades official thinking and
rhetoric about the former Soviet bloc, not just the Sovi-
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et Union.125 As Dmitri Trenin recently acknowledged,
“as an international actor, Russia is at a point where it
recognizes all former borderland republics as separate
countries, even if it does not yet see all of them as foreign states.”126 Indeed, Russian ambassadors and officials, taking their cue, perhaps, from Putin’s remarks
to President Bush, often publicly display their belief
that post-Soviet states and even the smaller states of
Eurasia are not really true sovereign states.127
Clearly the belief that Samostoyatel’naya Ukraina
ne byla i ne budet (an independent Ukraine has never
been and will never be), dies hard among the Russian
elite. Similarly, over a decade ago Russia consciously
opted for an energy strategy predicted on the idea of
forcing Central Asian states to pump gas through the
only available pipelines through Russia to Europe at
Russian-dictated prices that Moscow could then arbitrage for huge profits rather than develop Russia’s
own indigenous but hard to develop holdings in eastern Siberia and the Far North. Thus a conscious decision to erect an economic and political structure on the
foundation of neo-imperial predation lay at the heart
of Russia’s economic growth and the enrichment of its
elite. Naturally, that elite is loath to forsake “the lure
of something exotic in the borderlands.”
This contempt for the sovereignty of small states,
an abiding Tsarist and Soviet tradition, hardly exhausts the catalogue of other manifestations of the traditionalism of today’s Russian state. The public statements of high-ranking foreign ministry and defense
officials clearly indicate their open belief that Russia’s
sovereignty is greater than that of these countries. For
example, the 2007 remarks by Chief of Staff General
Yuri Baluyevsky that if Poland wants missile defenses, it should also give its people gas masks, reflects
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the abiding Russian belief that it can bully other states
with impunity.128 Neither are such remarks new tactics in Russian policy. Instead, they have ample precedents going back years. In particular, Russia’s ambassadors evidently believe that they have license to
interfere in their host countries’ domestic politics and
make threats indicating their belief in these states’ diminished sovereignty, which, of course, in Moscow’s
eyes make them inferior to Russia whose sovereignty
is assumed a priori to give it more equality than other
states have.
For example, on September 15, 2011, on the eve of
the NATO EULEX mission’s takeover of the Kosovo
customs’ points Brnjak and Jarinje, Russian Ambassador Alexander Konuzin created a diplomatic scandal in Serbia that has apparently grown since then.
Speaking at the Belgrade Security Forum, Konuzin
lambasted the audience and program leaders for not
raising questions about this alleged violation of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1244 and other Security
Council decisions and asked if there were any Serbs in
the audience. Subsequently, he told another Serbian
audience in the town of Lazarevac that, while Serbia
needs to cooperate with other countries on economic
deals, it should not do so to the detriment of RussianSerbian relations “because that could prove more
harmful than useful.” Thus he added threats to his
earlier screed. Konuzin’s impolitic outburst was bad
enough, but events since then, including this implicit
threat, have only intensified the outcry against Moscow’s interference in Serbian domestic affairs and unhappiness with the government’s pro-Western policy.
Whatever the merits of the Kosovo issue may be,
it appears that this interference is precisely the case.
After Konuzin’s speech, there was high-profile me-
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dia coverage of the visit to Russia by leaders of the
Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and Democratic
Party of Serbia (DSS) who attended the conference
of the ruling United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) party.
At this meeting, there was mention of one billion Euros in Russian investments should a “nationally responsible government” be formed. Furthermore, the
Danas newspaper’s collaborators, including former
and incumbent government officials in Belgrade outlined what amounts to a network of political officials
in the government, Serbian Assembly, various government bodies, and business sectors who advocate
on behalf of whatever Moscow’s interests are actually
very well paid for their work and that this activity has
gone on for at least a decade.
Thus Vladimir Beba Popovic, former chief of the
Serbian Government’s Communications Bureau, told
the newspaper, “Russia’s role in appointing and dismissing governments in Belgrade was notorious.” He
also claimed that Russian power centers in the Serbian
government and army supported the 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, with the support of agents from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Similarly, Radomir Naumov, Chairman of
the Serbian Power Company’s Board of Directors and
then in 2004 Minister of Energy, was “inspired” by his
Russian connections into making dozens of contracts
with Russian firms.
Russian TV reporters then interviewed the reporters who broke this story, and they admitted that
Konuzin’s outburst had inspired them to publish their
reporting. But these events clearly ignited a scandal
in Serbia. Right wing parties, including the DSS, SNS,
and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) boast of their
close ties with analogous organizations in Russia, and
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there is a lot of smoke, if not fire, suggesting that these
organizations are funded by Russia, as well as the fact
that some of their leaders have grown rich through
business deals with Russia. Naturally, however, these
parties deny any and all such charges. 129
This attitude, reminiscent of the old Brezhnev Doctrine, comes from the top of the government. In particular, it crops up with particular force in regard to
the two issues of NATO enlargement and the frozen
conflicts in and around the Black Sea littoral. Sergei
Markov, Director of the Moscow Institute for political Studies, told a Georgian interviewer in 2006 that,
“Georgia has not yet deserved our respect for its sovereignty because it has proved unable to achieve an
agreement with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian
ethnic minorities.”130 Of course, Markov ignored Russia’s unremitting efforts to ensure that conflict resolution cannot take place. So what is one to make of
the Russian Ambassador, Vyacheslav Kovalenko’s
statement that “Russia wants Georgia to be independent, sovereign, and neutral.”131 Since Georgia’s political class is united on seeking entry to NATO and
then EU, essentially this is a demand that Georgia renounce its independence and leave its territory at risk.
Such double talk is not restricted to Georgia. Neither
was this an accidental one-time affair. Instead, it represents deeply held views in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the government.132 For instance, as Defense Minister, in 2005 Sergei Ivanov openly updated
the Brezhnev Doctrine’s concept of diminished sovereignty for Central Asian states, specifically as regards
NATO or American bases.
The countries of the region are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And [if the
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countries of the region are] making a decision about
hosting new bases on their territory, they should take
into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this
decision with our country.133

Ivanov also said that these states should also take
preliminary consultations with other members of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This
would also give China rights of veto over these states’
defense policies and tie them up by obliging them to
seek collective permission to conduct an independent
defense policy.134 Echoing this view of the CIS members’ inability to stand as fully sovereign independent
states, Russian diplomats still cannot fully accept former Soviet republics as genuine states, e.g. diplomats
at an Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) meeting calling Georgia “some province.”135
This too represents a deeply held attitude in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.136
The examples of such chauvinism are too many to
be accidental. On December 20, 2006, Russia’s ambassador to Latvia, Viktor Kaluzhny, made the remarkable statement that:
The task for Latvia and all other countries is to keep
peace therefore they should follow the example of
other nations, such as Spain and Italy, which have left
Iraq. . . . Latvia, which demands an apology from Russia for Soviet occupation, should apologize to Iraq for
participating in its occupation.137

This extremely impertinent statement would never
have been addressed to Great Britain or Australia, let
alone America. But the fact that Kaluzhny, who presumably was authorized to say this, felt free to do so
reflects the abiding contempt of Russia’s ambassadors
for the sovereignty of small European countries, not
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just the Baltic states. In 1998 Andrei Shvedov, Moscow’s Minister Plenipotentiary in Bulgaria, stated that,
Our position is that NATO’s expansion should not
be effected to the detriment of any country. No state
should be deprived of the right to express its opinion
on this matter. Still, the issue remains of whether the
entry of a certain state into NATO represents a threat
to the security of another country.”138

Here Moscow sought to dictate to Sofia that it could
not have friendly relations with the West and Moscow
at the same time, and that Moscow could exercise a
veto on its defense and foreign policy. Naturally this
gambit went nowhere, and Bulgaria entered NATO at
the Istanbul summit in June, 2004.
The failure with Bulgaria did not seem to dissuade
Moscow from trying again in even more egregious
fashion. Thus in 2002, Russia’s new ambassador to
Ukraine, former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, publicly decried Ukraine’s policy of nonalignment with NATO and Russia, calling for a public
choice on behalf of Moscow.139 Chernomyrdin, who
clearly acted as if he was sent to be Moscow’s proconsul in Kyiv like his Tsarist and Soviet predecessors,
has even endorsed candidates in Ukrainian elections
since then, and Moscow spent $300 million to manipulate the outcome of the Ukrainian presidential election
in 2004, showing again how little actual regard Moscow really has for the sovereignty and independence
of Ukraine.
In 2003 Moscow’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, Andrei Ryabov, overtook and surpassed his colleagues
in the quest for the outstanding chauvinist or neocolonialist outburst against his hosts. “Provoked” by
then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s visit
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to Baku, discussions of U.S. troop deployments there
at Azerbaijan’s request, and offers by the Pentagon
of military assistance to Azerbaijan, Ryabov declared
that, “There has not been and there will not be any
kind of American presence in the Caspian. We will
not allow it, they have nothing to guard here.”140 Ryabov also stated that the appearance of foreign military forces will not ensure, but rather prolong, the
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict that has been
frozen and where Armenia has hitherto prevailed,
not least because of a billion dollars worth of Russian
arms transfers to Armenia. Ryabov also argued that
“positioning foreign military bases in the territory of
other sovereign counties should be considered a partial seizure of those countries’ independence.” Yet
while Ryabov lamented the negative consequences of
foreign military bases in an independent country, he
conveniently omitted Russia’s large military presence
in Georgia and Armenia. Nor did he mention the stationing of troops in Moldova.141
Finally, at a Hungarian conclave called to celebrate
the 50th anniversary of the EU in 2007, opposition leader Viktor Orban, leader of the Hungarian Civic Union
(FIDESZ) Party, strongly criticized Russian policies in
energy and sharply differentiated between what he
called the European and Russian way of thinking. In
reply, Moscow’s Ambassador to Hungary, Igor Savolsky, took the unusual step of interfering in Hungarian
domestic politics and threatened that if Russian businessmen do not feel themselves welcome or secure in
the Hungarian market, then they will leave it, i.e., cutting off energy supplies to Hungary.142
Thus Russia also still cannot accept the sovereignty of unified states that were former Soviet republics,
e.g., Ukraine or Eastern European governments. With
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that derogation of the present sovereignty of former
republics and satellites goes the formulation and implementation of policies designed to undermine it in
fact. Self-determination, as was the case under Soviet
rule, then becomes a principle to destroy sovereignty.
In late 2006, for example, Putin offered Ukraine unsolicited security guarantees in return for permanently
stationing the Black Sea Fleet on its territory, a superfluous but ominous gesture inasmuch as Russia had
already guaranteed Ukraine’s security through the
Tashkent treaty of 1992 and the Tripartite agreement
with Ukraine and America to denuclearize Ukraine
in 1994.143 Putin’s offer also came at the same time
as his typically “dialectical” approach to Ukraine’s
sovereignty in the Crimea where he stated that, “The
Crimea forms part of the Ukrainian side and we cannot interfere in another country’s internal affairs. At
the same time, however, Russia cannot be indifferent
to what happens in the Ukraine and Crimea.”144
In other words, Putin was hinting that Ukrainian
resistance to Russian limits on its freedom of action
might encounter a Russian backed “Kosovo-like” scenario of a nationalist uprising in the Crimea to which
Russia could not remain indifferent. Here we must
note that, as one recent commentary puts it:
Moscow has the political and covert action means to
create in the Crimea the very type of situations against
which Putin is offering to ‘protect’ Ukraine if the Russian
Fleet’s presence is extended. Thus far such means have
been shown to include inflammatory visits and speeches
by Russian Duma deputies in the Crimea, challenges to
Ukraine’s control of Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait, the
fanning of anti-NATO—in fact anti-American—protests
by Russian groups in connection with planned military
exercises and artificial Russian-Tatar tensions on the peninsula.145
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Similarly, in regard to Moldova, Putin in 2000 invoked the Russian diaspora there and other ethnic
minorities in an effort to gain more influence over
Moldova and its frozen conflict. His justification could
have been written by Catherine the Great or, for that
matter, Hitler and Stalin.
Russia is interested in Moldova being a territorially
whole, independent state. But this cannot be achieved
unless the interests of all population groups, including
Transnistria population, are observed. Russia is prepared to participate in creating the conditions in which
all residents will feel secure in Moldova. The political
treaty must firmly ensure the rights of all those who
reside on the territory of Moldova and who consider
that Russia can be a guarantor of their rights.146

Subsequently, in 2003-04 he sponsored a plan crafted by Dmitri Kozak which was rebuffed by Moldova,
leading to perpetual tension between Chisinau and
Moscow. An assessment of the Kozak plan observed
that its:
Institutional features were designed to provide Transnistria a veto over any legislation that would threaten
the leadership. Ultimately these multiple loci of vetoes
would make it impossible for the federal government
to operate. In addition, the Kozak Memorandum included clauses that could be interpreted to easily dissolve the federation. For example, the Kozak Memorandum allowed for subjects of the federation to have
the right ‘to leave the federation in case a decision is
taken to unite the federation with another state and
(or) in connection with the federation’s full loss of sovereignty. . . . [thus] Moldovan integration with international organizations such as the EU could be used
as a basis for the dissolution of the federation under
this clause’.147

86

It is not suprising that EU and American intervention at the last hour to prevent this outcome apparently enraged Putin and the Kremlin, demonstrating that
their idea of partnership with the West, a free hand to
reorganize Eurasia, was incompatible with the interests and values of Europe and Washington.148
More recently, on October 19, 2011, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry blasted Russia’s politicized
objections to its participation in a Trans-Caspian
pipeline (TCP), stating that such a pipeline was an
objective vital economic interest of Turkmenistan, rebuked Moscow for “distorting the essence and gist of
Turkmenistan’s energy policy,” and announced that
discussions with Europe over this pipeline would continue.149 Moscow’s reply came soon. On November 15,
2011, Valery Yazev, Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma
and head of the Russian Gas Society, openly threatened Turkmenistan with the Russian incitement of an
“Arab Spring” if it did not renounce its “neutrality”
and independent sovereign foreign policy, including
its desire to align with Nabucco. Yazev said that:
Given the instructive experience with UN resolutions
on Libya and the political consequences of their being
‘shielded from the air’ by NATO forces, Turkmenistan
will soon understand that only the principled positions of Russia and China in the UN Security Council
and its involvement in regional international organizations—such as the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation
Organization), CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), Eurasian Economic Union—can protect it
from similar resolutions.150

In other words, Turkmenistan should surrender
its neutrality and independent foreign policy and not
ship gas to Europe; otherwise, Moscow will incite a
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revolution there leading to chaos. Other Russian analysts and officials threatened that if Turkmenistan
adheres to the EU’s planned Southern Corridor for
energy transshipments to Europe that bypass Russia,
Moscow would have no choice but to do to Turkmenistan what it did to Georgia in 2008.151
Russian observers fully understand the intrinsically imperial or neo-imperial cognitive foundation of
this great power mantra. For instance, Alexei Malashenko observed that Russia’s response to the Chechen
threat in 1999-2000 only made sense if Russia continues to regard itself as an empire.152 Since then, Russian
political scientist Egor Kholmogorov has observed
that:
‘Empire’ is the main category of any strategic political
analysis in the Russian language. Whenever we start to
ponder a full-scale, long-term construction of the Russian state, we begin to think of empire and in terms of
empire. Russians are inherently imperialists.153

If Russia is an empire of this sort or still hankers for
that empire, then it becomes clear why membership in
NATO or the EU of former Soviet republics or even
of Russia’s erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe becomes a threat to Russian sovereignty and why Russia
must be an independent sovereign actor, unbounded
by any other political association and exercising unfettered power in its own domain. Moreover, it is essential for the concept of Derzhavnost’ (i.e., Russia as
a unique, autocratic, great power) not only that Russia
assert its great power status but that it be recognized
as such by other states and thus granted a superior
status, first of all, vis-à-vis the neighboring CIS countries. Thus in its 1999 official submission to the EU of
its strategy for relations with that organization, made
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by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the Russian
government stated that:
As a world power situated on two continents, Russia
should retain its freedom to determine and implement
its foreign and domestic policies, its status and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and largest country of the
CIS. The “development of partnership with the EU
should contribute to consolidating Russia’s role as the
leading power in shaping a new system of interstate
political and economic relations in the CIS area.” and
thus, Russia would “oppose any attempts to hamper
economic integration in the CIS [that may be made
by the EU], including through ‘special relations’ with
individual CIS member states to the detriment of Russia’s interests.”154

The concurrent and deep-rooted demand for recognition of Russia as a great power with a right to
an exclusive sphere of influence in the former Soviet
Union and a global great power status originated with
Yeltsin at exactly the same time as the drift towards
autocracy and the end of reforms began, i.e., in 199293. Indeed, these beliefs in Russia’s intrinsic great
powerness and the demand for a sphere of influence
in the CIS are linked, for in the minds of many of this
elite if Russia is not a great power, i.e., a neo-imperial
empire, it will not only not be a great power, it will be
anything other than a newly minted version of medieval appendage princedoms. Moreover, as many
analysts claim, democracy is contraindicated to the
preservation of the large state, if not the state as such,
because it will lead to Islamist rule in the south and
other similar breakdowns of power at the center.155
In a recent publication of a U.S.-Russian dialogue,
Russian participants made their views clear.
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Russian participants in dialogue meetings argued that
Russia’s principal objective in the former Soviet region
was to strengthen the country’s security by ensuring
that governments there remained stable and friendly.
From Moscow’s perspective, American democracy
promotion is a direct threat because it disrupts the
existing political order—introducing instability—and,
because of Washington’s selectivity and varied standards, appears to be aimed primarily at installing proAmerican governments rather than democratic ones.
This dynamic drove much of the U.S.-Russian discussion and interaction in Central Asia during the Bush
Administration.156

However, this perspective only tells part of the story. In fact, as can be seen from Moscow’s response to
the Arab revolutions of 2011, democracy is the greatest enemy of the state. Since Russia is obviously not
interested in truly improving the security of former
Soviet allies or republics, but in dominating them for
its own unilateral advantage, it is unwilling to give up
their freedom of action in world politics. As a result,
Moscow regards democracy as such as a threat and,
like its Tsarist and Soviet predecessors, has internalized the Leninist threat paradigm that reformers at
home are paid agents of foreign influence. Therefore,
as Sergei Ivanov, then Defense Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister, wrote in 2006, suggesting that the
main threat to Russia is democracy as such, i.e., a
democratic revolution in Russia or a neighboring CIS
state, not an invasion by any foreign regime or terorrists.157 Democracy and revolution, or autonomous
public political action beyond the limits imposed by
the state is generally, if not always, the result of a conspiracy from abroad. Thus the media and the government regularly denounce U.S. initiatives to distribute
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cellular technology or use the Internet, or the Internet
itself as part of a conspiracy from abroad, and their
first response to such crises is (and this is typical of
all authoritarian regimes), of course, to shut down, or
at least restrict the use of information and social technologies and networks.158
In keeping with the inherited Soviet and KGB
mentality and the traditions of projection onto the
enemy of your own fears and intentions that was so
prominent in Stalin’s makeup, they regularly assert
that such revolutions are therefore merely the product
of external manipulation and subversion, overlooking
the domestic roots of such upheavals. Thus it is now
the case in professional Russian military writing that
the term “color revolution” is now described essentially as a revolution stage-managed from outside by
external political actors with an interest in the constitution of power in the affected state. The citizens of
that state are merely passive bystanders or puppets
of this external manifestation, a clear projection outward of how the Russian government views or wants
to view its own citizens, and also the threats to it from
their arousal.159
Similarly President Medvedev could say, with regard to the Arab revolutions of 2011:
Look at the current situation in the Middle East and
the Arab world. It is extremely difficult and great problems still lie ahead. In some cases it may even come to
the disintegration of large, heavily populated states,
their break-up into smaller fragments. The character
of these states is far from straightforward. It may come
to very complex events, including the arrival of fanatics into power. This will mean decades of fires and further spread of extremism. We must face the truth. In
the past such a scenario was harbored for us, and now
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attempts to implement it are even more likely. In any
case, this plot will not work. But everything that happens there will have a direct impact on our domestic
situation in the long term, as long as decades.160

Neither is it surprising that Putin et al., continue to
raise the phobia of Western instigation as a pretext for
intervention and plots against Russia.161
Therefore a unitary state, led by an autocrat is not
only a domestic necessity; it also is a foreign policy
necessity as what a contemporary great power means,
if not a full-fledged empire. This view dates back to
the Bolsheviks, if not the Tsars. For example, Stalin in
1920 wrote about the Soviet borderlands that:
Only two alternatives confront the border regions: Either they join forces with Russia and then the toiling
masses of the border regions will be emancipated from
imperialist oppression; or they join forces with the Entente, and then the yoke of imperialism is inevitable.162

Indeed, Moscow has historically feared reform and
democracy originating in the borderlands and peripheries of its empire. For example, Ukraine’s historic role
as a gateway for Western ideas into Russia makes a reformed, democratic, stable, and secure Ukraine enormously important for European security.163 Ukraine
tied to Russia allows Moscow to restore its imperial
role and threaten Europe. Contrarily, without empire
a Russian autocracy is much harder to sustain. Consequently, Russia has no choice but to conjure phony
threat scenarios, subvert neighboring regimes and European states, and intimidate everyone.
Western power, embodied in these treaties and
organizations like the OSCE, translates into an often
resented pressure upon neighboring states to democ-
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ratize their economic-military-state organizations in
ways that challenge Russia’s system and imperial pretenses. Those reformed organizations could become
more effective comparative models for their political,
economic, and military organization. As we know from
Tsarist and Soviet times, the demonstration effect of
trends from Central and Eastern Europe into the former Soviet Union, Russia, and now into Central Asia
generally generates pressures for modernization that
corrode existing anti-democratic regimes.164 Similarly
in Russian foreign policy, anti-reformers triumphed
with regard to Asian policy so that by 1993 authoritarian China, not democratic Japan, was regarded as
Moscow’s principal partner in Asia, not least because
of its anti-reform and anti-American proclivities.165
While many Russian elites view this Western pressure as a conspiracy and threat to Russia’s integrity
and state, they have no viable answer to this challenge.166 The Paris Peace Treaty of 1990 and the OSCE’s
1991 Moscow Declaration, foundation documents of
today’s world order, state that democratic norms and
their observation by the states parties to those agreements are “matters of direct and legitimate concern to
all participating States and do not belong exclusively
to the internal affairs of the state concerned.”167 Thus
their laws and their legal, military, and political institutions derive their legitimacy from these documents,
and Russia’s regressive state system duly risks being
branded as illegitimate, not just ineffectual.168 Those
treaties are the product of the George H. W. Bush administration that was singularly deficient in the “vision thing.” Yet they provide legal force to the idea
that domestic sovereignty can be challenged politically by foreign governments and actors, and that states
have a legitimate right to place other states’ domestic
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political conduct under an international microscope
and even to intervene if necessary to prevent unacceptable domestic conduct.169
This Derzhavnost’ outlook also clearly influences
and lies behind recent efforts to generate an ideology
of “sovereign democracy” for Russia to depict its status and place in the world as a state enjoying a uniquely independent standing unlike most other states. This
notion of both intrinsic and threatened great power
status that must therefore be fought for every day
thus ties together other deeply felt and long-standing
Russian concepts, the belief in its uniqueness, the supposed refusal to accept the standards and limits placed
upon other states, and its untrammeled sovereignty,
pertaining to both that of the autocrat at home and
of the Russian state abroad. Therefore, Russia must
be not only an empire but also a wholly freestanding
actor in world politics. Moreover, by virtue of its assumed status and implicit (if not actual) capabilities,
Russia, as people like Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
say, should be a system-forming power in today’s
world politics, not just the CIS.170
Policymakers also stated these views and ambitions at the dawn of Putin’s presidency. For as Deputy
Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov stated in 1999:
Our country is not in need of affiliation with the EU.
This would entail loss of its unique Euro-Asian specifics, the role of the center of attraction of the re-integration of the CIS, independence in foreign economic and
defense policies, and complete restructuring (once
more) of all Russian statehood based on the requirements of the European Union. Finally great powers
(and it is too soon to abandon calling ourselves such)
do not dissolve in international unions—they create
them around themselves.171
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So while Russian history may have bequeathed a
heavy imperial legacy, Russian state policy, the current nature of the state, and its resemblance to earlier
formations to a significant degree represent the result
of conscious elite decisions to seize power and hold it
in accordance with Russian traditions, i.e., without recourse to democratic and legal means, even if today’s
world is utterly transformed from that of the past.
Those traditions most assuredly include as a key core
interest of the state the retention of its neo-imperial
outlook, tendencies, and powers.
That too is not an accidental or arbitrary coincidence with the turn towards autocracy at home and
neo-imperialism abroad. In the chaos of that time, the
armed forces usurped foreign policy to carry out interventions in Moldova and Georgia that set the stage for
a neo-imperial reassertion of Russia and the persisting
frozen conflicts that have remained unresolved since
then. Troops occupied the Transdniester, supported
rebels against Georgia in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and Russia shipped $1 billion of weapons to Armenia
in its campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan. It is no accident that these were the states that
most defiantly asserted their right not to remain tied
to Russia. By 1993, Yeltsin was publicly advocating
this sphere of influence and giving every sign of autocratic power seeking. So it is also hardly a coincidence
that states in Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech and Slovak Republics, all began to assert
their interest in joining NATO at this time. While U.S.
policy was and is hardly irreproachable, it does not
bear sole, or maybe even primary responsibility for
the decline in relations with Russia. Russia may like
to portray itself as the victim (and has habitually done
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so) of misguided or treacherous Western policies. But
objective analysts cannot let Russia off the hook of its
own responsibility so easily.
RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND RUSSIAN
HISTORY
As we noted, Rieber’s search for persistent challenges to Russian foreign policymakers originated
in dissatisfaction with the pieties of Russian historiography that this author shares. Few, if any, studies of Russian foreign policy since 1991 have taken
Russian history before Mikhail Gorbachev’s valiant
but doomed effort to reform the Soviet Union into
account.172 Equally disquieting is the fact that far too
many contemporary discussions of Russian foreign
policy implicitly assume that foreign policy in Russia
and the issues confronting Moscow only began with
Gorbachev. Earlier Sovietological accounts made the
same mistake, assuming that foreign policy issues only
began under Brezhnev, Nikita Khrushchev, or Stalin,
etc. Obviously, this is not the case, and Vladimir Putin
did not happen upon a foreign policy landscape that
was only created or fell from the sky in the 1990s.
These accounts often share the same flaws. They
begin with Gorbachev and forget about the period
preceding him. Second, virtually every study of postSoviet foreign policy divides Russian foreign policy
practitioners and analysts in Russia into three camps.
Whatever title one ascribes to these groups, we usually come down with an approach that finds conservatives, moderates, and liberals whose views are
most often analyzed without any reference to Russian
domestic or contemporary international politics, let
alone Russian history. While foreign policy ideas may
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be free floating, they do not originate in the stratosphere and then descend to earth. Rather, they originate as a response to concrete political and economic
situations. Given the inherent fluidity and dynamism
of contemporary politics, these situations often seem
to be new and unexpected to policymakers or unlike
earlier issues even when there are connections to the
past. Nonetheless, we, unlike politicians, may draw
analytical connections to past experiences and issues
that provide useful insight into a country’s foreign
policy.
Those continuities in Russian history include, inter
alia,
•	The long chronicle of colonization and conquest; Russia’s historic attractiveness to other
elites in neighboring countries that made up for
the empire building phase of Russian history
through 1945, if not 1991 when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed.
•	Russia’s “longevity” as an imperial great power dating back to Peter the Great, if not earlier,
while other contenders fell out of the competition; the enduring longevity of Russian statesmen’s belief that Russia is or should be seen as
an empire or great power regardless of the facts
of the case at any given time.
•	The presence of its frontier of weakly consolidated states that offered numerous opportunities for subversion and then annexation and
incorporation of adding territories, and the
concentration of political power and hence of
foreign policymaking in the hands of a small
group of people clustered around one ruler.173
•	Other enduring geopolitical considerations are
the regime’s abiding awareness that other states
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with which Russia must interact are ahead of it
in economics, democracy, technology cultural
sophistication as defined by Western canons
and often military power.
In that connection, we might also cite the longstanding perception by Russian elites that Russia is
not truly seen by Europe as a fully European and legitimate state either politically or culturally, a stance
that obliges Russia to fight constantly for recognition
and to be taken seriously.174 But at the same time, the
unlimited claims made on behalf of Russia by its leaders and diplomats reflects their perception of dealing with treacherous and often superior foreigners
by whose standards (and those became standards by
which Russia wanted to present itself after Peter the
Great) Russia was increasingly seen as a barbarous,
illegitimate, and threatening tyranny. Indeed, virtually from the outset of its history as a state, Russia has
suffered from the European and now possibly global
perspective that while it commands great power and
material resources, it is not truly a great power because it remains in some crucial sense an uncivilized,
rude, and barbarous kingdom that does not accept the
true European or Western, or global standard of what
statehood and its responsibilities now means.175 Consequently, much of the history of Russian diplomacy
from its inception until the present is Russia’s determined and obsessive quest for status as it sees itself,
and an effort to make others see Russia and accept it
as the Russian government wants to see itself and be
seen by others. If it is not so perceived, Russia will
sulk, seek vengeance, and continue to make trouble
until it is taken seriously.
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This demand for taking Russia seriously lies at
the heart of the issue in East-West relations because
Moscow believes and has complained that the West
as a whole, and particularly America, does not take it
or its interests sufficiently seriously, i.e., at Moscow’s
own, but often self-serving, and inflated valuation of
itself. Putin’s presidential envoy for relations with the
EU, Sergei Yastrzhembskiy, stated that this was Russia’s main objection to recent developments in world
politics.176 Similarly, Russia’s Ambassador to America,
Yuri Ushakov wrote in 2007 that:
What offends us is the view shared by some in Washington that Russia can be used when it is needed and
discarded or even abused when it is not relevant to
American objectives. . . . Russians do not need any
special favors or assistance from the United States, but
we do require respect in order to build a two-way relationship. And we expect that our political interests
will be recognized.177

Similarly, in 2007 then Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev told the annual Davos Conference that while nobody was obliged to love Russia, it
would demand the respect that it deserves. Later that
year, he asserted that through its own efforts, Russia
had returned to the great power status that it deserved
and would not tolerate being told off like a naughty
pupil.178 Since then, for example in 2009 and endlessly
since then, Moscow has repeatedly said:
The further development of our partnership with the
alliance will depend in a large part on whether NATO
is prepared to maintain a dialogue on a fair and equal
basis, with mutual interests and concerns taken into
account and to build relations with Russia in the security area not as with an opponent but as a partner.179
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Unfortunately, those terms mean that NATO gives
Russia a veto on its activities, while Russia has near
complete freedom of action in its sphere of influence,
and that its domestic policies, unlike those of the West,
remain free from any external criticism or rebuke.
Obviously, neither the United States, nor NATO, nor
any European state, nor the CIS states can freely accept such an abridgement of its or their independence
and sovereignty along with the unraveling of the post1991 status quo in Europe. This is where the issue is
and will be joined for a long time to come. As Sergei
Markedonov wrote in 2009:
Russia has its regional interests, resources to defend
them, and a legitimate motivation to protect them.
Acknowledging these interests could basically make
the process of “resetting” indeed something meaningful. However, for this NATO (and its main engine),
the United States need to seriously change their assessments of post-Soviet realities, and Russia needs to
substantially moderate its global ambitions (especially
when it is impossible to pay for them).180

But since the reset of the policy of 2009, Europe
and the United States have indeed moved in the direction specified by Markedonov. But Moscow has not
done so and, indeed, the nature of its political system
precludes such movement. Thus, we can behold the
continuing crisis of bipolarity in Europe and Eurasia.
•	Culturally, the abiding and insoluble issue of
defining a national identity adequate to Russia’s state continues as both intellectuals and
policymakers cannot make up their minds as
to whether Russia is a European state, a bridge
between Europe and Asia, a uniquely Eurasian
phenomenon, a national state or a multinational empire or both, or all of the above, etc.
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•	Finally, and most consistently, is the long
struggle by Russian Tsars and subsequent leaders to ensure the continuity of the autocratic
patrimonial state in its various guises and to
defend it not only physically but increasingly
intellectually against Western onslaughts. This
is a domain where we can most visibly see the
continuity in historical thinking among the
elite. This particular task has been a challenge
at least since Catherine the Great’s time, if not
since the state’s inception under Ivan III, and
it continues to this day. The following examples underscore this continuity. The famous
justification for Tsarist rule was the immaturity, backwardness, etc., of the Russian people,
and this was summed up in the Russian word
Popechitel’stvo, (tutelage). But the Bolsheviks
took it up soon after they seized power. In 1918,
Bolshevik Commissar of Enlightenment, Anatoly Lunacharsky, justified the Bolshevik dictatorship in words that could have come out of
the mouth of any Tsarist official after Peter the
Great. Namely, he said that the masses’ ignorance precluded their self-government whose
precondition was their own enlightenment.181
Lenin’s whole approach grew out of his conviction that the working class could not of its
own accord liberate itself. Since that had not
happened, Soviet power had to rule by what
Lunacharsky termed “enlightened absolutism.” Because the old intelligentsia opposed
Bolshevism, Lunacharsky argued that “we, the
avant-garde, must have the power since we
represent the correct understanding of the majority’s interest. Power must therefore reside in
the proletarian dictatorship.”182
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More recently, Deputy Prime Minister and then
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov replied to a question
about the concept of “Kremlin Inc.,” in the following
manner. (It should be noted that the elite speak of the
system as a corporation, so this was not an innocent
question.)
It’s just a nice phrase, a journalistic turn of phrase. But
I would say that you need to understand our history,
our mentality. Russia is a huge country and mentally,
unfortunately the majority of the population, as before,
relies on the Tsar. Our civil society is weak. It can’t
be strong because only 15 years have passed since it
began to be created. Before then, you’ll agree there
was not the slightest condition for it to be created. It is
still very young. Therefore, you can’t see questions of
concentration of management in Russia only through
the prism of Anglo-Saxon political culture. Russia will
never take its model of management completely, 100
percent from that Anglo-Saxon political elite. Whether
you like it or not is a different question, but I am telling you how it is.183

In the same interview, Ivanov called democracy a
bardak, i.e., a particularly slovenly brothel.79 Here Ivanov self-consciously invoked the Russian autocratic
tradition as justification to prove our point.
Similarly, Putin and Medvedev have both made it
clear that they will never let Russia be governed as
is Ukraine where there is a much greater pluralistic
or democratic component.184 But this refusal to alter
the autocratic nature of the state, even if reform from
the top is contemplated, means that the state is also
increasingly aware throughout modern times that its
legitimacy is suspect and that its people’s desire for
autonomous political self-expression is deeply to be
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feared. Furthermore, its rhetoric of being a besieged
fortress and the enduring argument that reformers at
home are enemies linked with Western governments
and intelligence agencies ensures the continuation of
the Leninist threat paradigm linking both sets of enemies together and freezing the regime in an a priori
hostility towards the West. Neither is it surprising
that Putin et al., continue to raise the phobia of Western instigation as a pretext for intervention and plots
against Russia.185 Cynics may say this is just for domestic consumption, but it clearly reflects leaders’
anxieties while simultaneously creating a corresponding domestic demand for autocratic and strongman
rule.
The flip side of this defense against democracy
is the postulation of Russian statehood in terms that
clearly evoke conservative and Slavophile (if not still
more reactionary) platitudes developed since the 17th
century, if not even earlier. For Dmitri Trenin, Russia is “authoritarianism with the consent of the governed,” i.e., an exact restatement of a Slavophile ideal
that itself looks backward to the medieval Zemsky
Sobor (Council of the Land).186 The renowned movie
director, Nikita Mikhalkov, has praised the “conservatism” of Russian culture and the Russian mind that
unites “ecclesiastic, monarchist, Soviet, and liberal
ideologies.” Democracy is contrary to Russian tradition and incompatible with Russia’s size, therefore the
current regime is indispensable.187 These ideas are no
more original than is Trenin’s description of the state
though Trenin is much more accurate. The examples
of this invocation of a mystical Russian history to justify the regime are omnipresent.
Chairman of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov professes that “autocratic people power” (Samoderzhvnoye
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Narodovlastiye) is the same thing as sovereign democracy and is uniquely indigenous and historically characteristic of Russia. By making this proclamation, Gryzlov also consciously invokes the history of the idea
of the Zemsky Sobor, and the Slavophile notion of
Sobornost’ (“conciliarity”) in order to justify a picture
that looks remarkably like an expanded version of the
medieval Boyar Duma, namely the Prince and his retinue of nobles, as the rulers of Russia. Thus history and
the use of history as justifications for power at home
and abroad continue to shape Russian foreign policy.
Indeed, Gryzlov, like innumerable publicists before him in Russian history, argues that Russian democracy (much to most observers’ amazement) is
characterized by collaboration and harmony between
the executive and legislative powers.188 This kind of
reasoning implicitly rejects the need to have a separation of powers and is a hallmark of Russian autocracy
and political thought. Given the near total emasculation of the legislature in today’s Russia; such reasoning strikes us as Orwellian, if not preposterous. But
undoubtedly it expresses the thinking and cynicism
of Russian leaders. Medvedev, in his 2008 campaign,
expressly stated the presidential system represents
the Russian historical tradition, and with any other
system Russia would fall apart.189 This idea, that without autocracy Russia would fall apart and count for
nothing in world politics, dates back at least to the
18th century, if not earlier, and is a cornerstone of Russian conservative thinking, to the suppression of all
thought of reform.190
As Ivanov’s interview showed, Russians, especially the current elite, insist on Russia’s specificity, most
particularly with regard to the nature of the political
order and regime, whereas Westerners continue to
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insist on seeing it in terms of the categories of Western political thought.191 Indeed, official commentaries
invoke the nature of Russian history as proof of this
uniqueness and thus of the justification of the present order.192 A recent speech by President Medvedev
makes clear the deliberately politicized and mythologized history of the state that the Kremlin today (tomorrow, as we know, it may change) wants to present. Unfortunately, little or none of it is true. Thus
Medvedev said that:
Russian statehood initially developed on a multiethnic basis and did not follow a path of division, but
rather, a path of unification. And that is the only reason why today we have such a unique nation. Even
then, fragmentation was seen as a factor of weakness,
and in the process of creating the nation, there were
no significant barriers to cultural and religious diversity, which, again, allowed for the creation of such a
unique state as the Russian Empire, and subsequently,
the Russian Federation. I feel that this is one of the truly serious, genuinely fundamental lessons in history.
Moreover, consolidation into one state also promoted
the emergence of common values. These common
values served as the foundation for developing new
norms of social life and common rules of behavior,
as well as the development of relations with European and subsequently Asian nations. And, of course,
people adopted the leading examples of culture and
modern ideas of the time. There is another fact that
has to do with the law, which is of particular interest to me as a member of the legal community. We
have discussed it with historians. Initially, Russia was
formed as a law-governed state, that is, as a state with
its own rules of conduct that in modern terms we refer
to as laws. These rules of conduct regulated relationships between people, maintained public order, and,
therefore, sustained a certain lifestyle and values. This
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idea of a law-governed Russian state at that time was
part of the general idea of justice: the government is
needed so that the state can develop and people will
live better, and so the government should take into account both the interests of ordinary people and their
traditions, the traditions of different peoples who live
together in a large country.193

Indeed, Medvedev explicitly stated that the reason
for propounding this theory are explicitly political,
i.e., justifying his political project, and nationalistic in
terms of the state. Thus:
Why do I say this? Because there are all kinds of negativist notions, denying the legal nature of the Russian
state, showing a lack of respect for our legal traditions,
the sense that we are inferior in some way up to the
point that statehood came to Russia from somewhere
in Western Europe, whereas we were not able to come
up with it ourselves. We all realize that this is completely wrong, of course, but at the same time it is
very damaging. That’s why I think that the discussion
about the legal nature of the Russian state also has value in itself. If it is a law-governed state, fundamentally
based on the law, even with all its defects, then such a
state can develop along the democratic path, which is
our goal today. Otherwise, the conclusion would have
to be different, and that would set us back 100 years.194

Thus Medvedev’s speech, like innumerable citations from leaders before him, once again invokes the
centuries-old tradition of the state determining for political purposes what Russian history is, and second,
defending that history as a purely autochthonic process in ways calculated to belittle foreign influence on
Russia’s development and appeal to Russia’s unique
state nationalism. This official mythmaking appeals
to deeply rooted and obviously cherished concepts of
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Russian culture even if they have little grounding in
the actual historical truth. If we may paraphrase the
cynical view expressed at the conclusion of the film,
“The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance,” when the truth
contradicts the legend, “Print the legend.”
Furthermore, since its birth as a state during the
reign of Ivan III or Ivan the Great, 1462-1505, Russia
and its leaders have continually stressed the uniqueness and special, even sacred character of Russia
that distinguishes it from all other governments or
states. As Ivanov demonstrated, this perspective still
dominates the ruling class. Indeed, as Russian commentators know this hostility towards the West and
democracy is almost obsessive. For example, Vladimir
Shlapentokh has shown that an essential component
of the Kremlin’s ideological campaign to maintain the
Putin regime in power and extend it past the elections
of 2008 is anti-Americanism. Thus:
The core of the Kremlin’s ideological strategy is to
convince the public that any revolution in Russia will
be sponsored by the United States. Putin is presented
as a bulwark of Russian patriotism, as the single leader able to confront America’s intervention in Russian
domestic life and protect what is left of the imperial
heritage. This propaganda is addressed mostly to the
elites (particularly elites in the military and FSB) who
sizzle with hatred and envy of America.195

Similarly Russia has accepted a threat perception,
for which ultimately there is no solution for as the
Russian philosopher Sergei Gavrov writes:
The threats are utopian, the probability of their implementation is negligible, but their emergence is a sign.
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This sign—a message to “the city and the world”—
surely lends itself to decoding and interpretation: we
will defend from Western claims our ancient right to
use our imperial (authoritarian and totalitarian) domestic socio-cultural traditions within which power
does not exist to serve people but people exist to serve
power.196

These are not isolated views either. Russian journalist Leonid Radzikhovsky has said, “The existential void of our politics has been filled entirely by
anti-Americanism” and that to renounce this rhetoric
“would be tantamount to destroying the foundations
of the state ideology.”197 Similarly, Fedor Lukyanov,
Editor of Russia in Global Affairs, writes that:
The mentality of Russian politics is such that relations
with the United States remain at the center of universal
attention and virtually any problems are seen though
an American prism. This is partially a reflection of
inertia of thinking which is finding it hard to break
with perceptions of Cold War times. It is partially a
demonstration of a hidden desire to have a sense of
our own significance. There is still a desire to compare
ourselves specifically with the only superpower.198

Lukyanov also notes that both the United States
and Russia see the other as being a power in decline.199 At least one Russian writer boasts that Russia
bears primary responsibility for frustrating American unilateralism by shaping blocking coalitions that
restrained and ultimately foiled U.S. designs.200 This
kind of thinking would conform to the contention by
Kari Roberts, a Canadian scholar, that, “It appears as
though the common themes in Russian foreign policymaking continue to be how Russia views itself visà-vis the United States and its pragmatic approach to
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identifying and tackling foreign policy problems.”201
For example, there is good reason to see Russia’s Iranian policy as being closely tied to its perceptions of
U.S. policies.
For an understanding of security policy, we must
emphasize that the intrinsic nature of this autocratic
service state condemns it to constant suspicion of all its
neighbors and to their equal distrust of Russian objectives. This state’s abiding sense of insecurity is, first of
all, domestic. Its leaders’ habitual resort to fraud, corruption, and electoral manipulation, if not to violence,
against critics, bespeaks its leaders’ inner awareness
of the fragility of their rule, the short-term time horizons of the elite that never knows when everything
might be taken away from them, and the illegitimacy
of their power. The determination to preserve the autocratic matrix intact as far as possible sets the stage
for a state in permanent crisis against its own people
because of the ever-present danger of revolution. The
vast armies and police forces (multiple incarnations of
each as well) that typified Tsarist and Soviet rule still
characterize contemporary Russia, and it is increasingly clear that they are deployed to prevent the public from asserting its civic, human, and political rights,
thereby creating the ever-present potential for a civil
war with inherently international implications.
There is ample evidence that both these dangers
of unrest or of heightened forcible repression are
growing, along with the authorities’ perception of the
manifestation of popular unrest due to the current
economic crisis.202 Already in 2005-06, the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) formed Special Designation Forces
from Spetsnaz brigades under the Minister’s direct
control. They have air, marine, and ground components and conduct peace support and counterterrorist
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operations.203 Since the minister answers only to the
president, essentially this also means putting all Russia under threat of counterterrorist or other so called
operations without any Parliamentary accountability
or scrutiny.
Since then, matters have, if anything, grown worse.
An April 2009 report outlined quite clearly the threat
perceived by the authorities. Specifically, it stated that:
The Russian intelligence community is seriously worried about latent social processes capable of leading
to the beginning of civil wars and conflicts on RF territory that can end up in a disruption of territorial integrity and the appearance of a large number of new
sovereign powers. Data of an information “leak,” the
statistics and massive number of antigovernment actions, and official statements and appeals of the opposition attest to this.204

This report proceeded to say that these agencies
expected massive protests in the Moscow area, industrial areas of the South Urals and Western Siberia and
in the Far East while ethnic tension among the Muslims of the North Caucasus and Volga-Ural areas is
also not excluded. The author also invoked the specter
of enraged former Army officers and soldiers who are
now being demobilized because of the reforms that
should dramatically reduce the armed forces might
also take to the streets with their weapons. But while
this unrest threatened, the government is characteristically resorting to strong-arm methods to meet this
threat. In other words, it is repeating past regimes
(not the least Yeltsin’s) in strengthening the Internal
Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (VVMVD)
and now other paramilitary forces as well.205
More soberly, this report, along with other articles,
outlines the ways in which the internal armed forces
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are being strengthened. Special intelligence and commando subunits to conduct preventive elimination
of opposition leaders are being established in the
VVMVD. These forces are also receiving new models
of weapons and equipment, armored, artillery, naval,
and air defense systems. In 2008, 5.5 Billion rubles was
allocated for these forces’ modernization. Apart from
the already permitted “corporate forces” of Gazprom
and Transneft that monitor pipeline safety, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is also now discussing an
Olimpstroi (Olympics Construction) Army, and even
the Fisheries inspectorate is going to create a special
armed subunit called Piranha.206
Since then, even more information about the extent of the domestic reconstruction of the MVD into a
force intended to suppress any manifestation of dissent have emerged. As of 2003, there were 98 specialpurpose police detachments (OMONs) in Russia. By
comparison, in 1988 during the crisis of the regime
and its elites under Gorbachev, 19 OMONs were created in 14 Russian regions and three union republics.
By 2007, there were already 121 OMON units comprising 20,000 men operating in Russia. Moreover, by
2007 there were another 87 police special designation
detachments (OMSNs) with permanent staffing of
over 5,200 people operating with the internal affairs
organs, making a grand total of 208 special purpose or
designated units with 25,000 well-trained and drilled
soldiers. The OMSNs have grown from an anti-crime
and anti-terrorist force to a force charged with stopping extremist criminal activity. All these units train
together and have been centralized within the MVD
to fight organized crime, terrorism, and extremism.
From 2005 to 2006, the financing of these units was
almost doubled. By 2009, they were also working with
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aircraft assets, specifically the MVD’s own Aviation
Center with nine special purpose air detachments
throughout Russia. Seven more such units are to be
created.
Furthermore, the MVD has developed a concept
for rapidly airlifting these forces to troubled areas
from other regions when necessary. These forces are
also receiving large-scale deliveries of new armored
vehicles with computers in some cases and command,
control, communications (C3) capabilities. Since these
are forces apart from the regular VVMVD, “On a parallel basis with the OMON empire, a multi-level internal security troop machine is being developed with
its own special forces, aircraft, armored equipment,
situational-crisis centers, and so forth.”207 When one
considers this huge expansion of the domestic Silovye
Struktury, it becomes clear why already in 2008 Russia
announced that it would increase funding for the Ministry of Interior by 50 percent in 2010, and where the
government’s estimation of the true threat to Russian
security lies.208
The striking continuity of elite thinking and policy
over several centuries should not come as a surprise to
students of Russia. But what it does show, beyond the
continuing relevance of Russian history, is the degree
of elite consensus that had been attained by the time
Putin came to power. Beyond that, Ivanov’s remarks
show just how much the elite invokes Russian history
as a justification for its rule and how much it insists
upon Russia’s specificity (spetsifichnost’) as part of
that justification. Indeed, such invocations are themselves long-standing phenomena of Russian history.
Unfortunately, as shown above, today’s state is very
much a product of and bears a strong resemblance to
what preceded it. Yet, precisely because these issues
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never have been and probably cannot be conclusively
resolved, they continue to haunt the minds of policymakers, analysts, and foreign observers of Russian
foreign policy.
Second, as Ivanov’s words above indicate, the
leaders’ sense of constant insecurity is a permanent
feature of its foreign policy. This is not just the identification of democracy as the enemy or of the linkage
between domestic reformers and external powers. It
also relates to the struggle over the borderlands as reflected in Stalin’s statement above and the consistent
policy aiming to subvert the new states’ sovereignty.
Russia’s contemporary leadership, like the Bolsheviks,
sees itself in a state of siege with both democracy and
other great powers. How else can we explain the vast
increase in Russian intelligence operations against the
United States, its allies, and Russia’s neighbors under
Putin?
The continuation of geopolitical conflict, much to
the chagrin of many U.S. intellectuals who think it
should have ended with the end of the Cold War, is not
the same thing as the Cold War. In any case, according to prominent and well-connected Russian experts
like Sergei Karaganov, the Cold War never ended and
still goes on. Karaganov, director of the semi-official
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, wrote in the
Jordan Times in 2009 that not only had the Cold War
not ended, it never really finished.
NATO, moreover, not only enlarged its membership,
but also transformed itself from an anti-communist
defensive alliance into an offensive grouping (with
operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan). NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s own borders, and
the membership of countries whose elites have historical complexes in regard to Russia, increased anti-
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Russian sentiment inside the alliance. For all its efforts
to improve its image, many Russians now view NATO
as a much more hostile organization than they did in
the 1990s, or even before then. Moreover, NATO enlargement has meant that Europe itself has still not
emerged from the cold war. No peace treaty ended the
cold war, so it remains unfinished. Even though the
ideological and military confrontation of those times is
far behind us, it is being replaced with a new standoff
- between Russia, on one hand, and the U.S. and some
of the “New Europeans” on the other. My hope is that,
when historians look back at Georgia’s attack on South
Ossetia of last summer, the Ossetians, Russians, and
Georgians killed in that war will be seen as having not
died in vain. Russian troops crushed Georgia’s army
on the ground, but they also delivered a strong blow
against the logic of further NATO expansion, which,
if not stopped, would have inevitably incited a major
war in the heart of Europe.209

Lest we think that the U.S. reset policy towards
Russia has altered this point of view, we should consider the following evidence. Dmitri Trenin recently
wrote that:
The opinion that has predominated in our country
to this day that the ‘reset’ is above all Washington’s
apology for the mistakes of the earlier Bush Administration and their rectification certainly does not correspond to the idea of the current team in the White
House. For example, in our country the concept of the
‘reset’ is understood as almost the willingness in current conditions to accept the Russian point of view of
the situation in the Near Abroad, which essentially is
wishful thinking.210

Similarly, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Dmitri
Rogozin, said in March 2009, “any new relationship
with NATO would be on Moscow’s terms.”211
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THE QUEST FOR SECURITY
Precisely because of this backwardness of the state,
society, and economy and this uncertainty as to whether Russia belongs to some specific community of states
and has the means to participate in its international
interactions, it has been a constant effort for Russia to
import the resources necessary for effective political
competition from the very states that it regards as rivals, if not enemies. The need for foreign investment
in multiple forms, not just economic or technological
investment, has been an enduring feature of Russian
history since Ivan III until today. Russia’s rulers have
long understood Russia’s backwardness vis-à-vis
its competitors in the West and more recently in the
East, even when they rebelled against it and extolled
Russia’s greatness and Samobytnost’ (its uniqueness)
and had to find a way to maintain that competition
without sacrificing what its rulers believed the be the
basis of the state, i.e., its autocratic and imperial nature. That is still the case today. According to Trenin,
modernization means “Russia using its resources to
buy assets in Europe, and Europe supplying Russia
with technology.” This shows just how deep Europe’s
wishful thinking is.212 This is not unlike what Russia’s
position was in the 1920s and what the New Economic
Policy (NEP) was all about in foreign policy.213 It also
shows that the core of Russian foreign policy is not
about identity but about the acquisition of tangible resources and material power at home and abroad.
For all these reasons, Rieber duly identified four
persistent conditions that are neither immutable nor
impersonal but which Russian rulers have invariably
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confronted through modern history. Their dimensions
are subject to change and obviously much depends
upon individual rulers, as well as specific conditions
of each time and place. But their fundamental attributes persist over time.
These conditions are: relative economic backwardness compared to Western Europe and then America
and Japan, a challenge that may now come to include
China; permeable frontiers all along the peripheries
of state power and thus perennial vulnerability either
to physical attack or to cultural-political and ideological trends deemed to be inimical to the security of the
state and its ruling order; a multicultural (one could
refine this to say multiconfessional and multiethnic)
state and society composed of ethno-territorial blocs,
frequently located at these vulnerable borderlands;
and a persistent sense of cultural marginality relative to its interlocutors.214 This last point would also
include the ongoing Russian sense of being ideologically excluded or subjected to what Moscow likes to
call double standards by other powers due to the nature of its political arrangements and policies.215
In this context, however, it might be beneficial
and of utility to introduce and add a fifth persistent
problem that has confronted Russian rulers at least
since Ivan the Terrible’s times. Indeed, that fifth issue
lies at the core of today’s foreign policy because of its
continuity and because of the universal recognition
that it is both state capacity and economic capability
that allows a state to play a great role in world affairs.
That question is the constant need to adapt and even
reform the state structure to the exigencies of international competition. Such competition includes not just
war, but both domestic and increasingly global economic, cultural, and technological development. Un-
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doubtedly one of the persistent problems of modern
Russian history has been the challenge of building, organizing, and running a state that could cope with the
great power challenges of the last 5 centuries whether
they are economic, political, cultural, or military.
Although this challenge relates to Rieber’s point
about a backward economic and social structure, it
also stands in its own right if one takes into account
the ceaseless activity of Russian rulers since Ivan the
Terrible to rebuild the governing state structure to facilitate more effective governance, usable military capability, and economic development. Indeed, Putin’s
fundamental drive throughout his tenure as president
has been the interlinked drive of reviving the economy
and restoring the authority and power of the state. For
Putin and Medvedev, foreign policy’s first priority is
to serve the cause of not just keeping Russia out of war
and crisis, but of providing the conditions by which its
economy and state may be reconstructed.216 Thus, for
Putin, foreign policy has been very much an exercise
in stabilizing the external arena so that he can proceed
undisturbed with those tasks of economic and governmental revival. In other words, foreign policy has
not only been external diplomacy but also a domestic
power resource, one increasingly driven by the need
to justify and defend a particular political-economic
order at home.
This continuing obsession with reorganizing the
structure of government can reach almost epic dimensions, as was the case with Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, who constantly reorganized the state, or in
Lenin’s and Yeltsin’s case, first shattered the state they
inherited and then rebuilt a new one. But in all these
cases, the state building project was decisively shaped
by the exigencies of war and/or international rela-
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tions. That holds true today, for Medvedev’s struggle
for economic and political modernization is based on
his understanding of the rigors of international competition for which Russia is quite poorly organized.
The Soviet regime was, after all, a state built to wage
class war at home and abroad in an era of total war
and often invoked foreign threats or conditions to
justify large-scale transformations of the state and
of society, e.g., collectivization, the purges, and later
on Perestroika. Yeltsin and Putin’s efforts to reform
state structures, though very different and adapted to
different needs are not different in quality. Yeltsin’s
consuming interest in ensuring his power by gaining
Western recognition and acceptance certainly explains
much of his foreign policy, which relied upon Western
support in both tangible (monetary) and intangible
ways in order to silence domestic critics. For him,
too, foreign policy was ultimately a domestic power
resource. But there is no doubt that one of the major
drives of Putin’s foreign policy is the demand that the
West treat Russia as a great power and show it greater
respect than has previously been the case.
Finally, we must understand that when Russian
rulers have confronted and will confront these persisting problems in the future, these issues do not come
to policymakers’ attention as discrete single issues or
in the form that Rieber or this author describe them.
Political issues never come neatly packaged. Rather,
all these problems are bound up with contemporary
issues in dynamic and interlinked, often unexpected
ways. Indeed, they often may come to policymakers’ attention in unpredictable combinations. Thus
the quest for an effective state mechanism is and has
continually been bound up with the perception that
Russia remains behind its competitors or those against
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whom it constantly measures itself in many, if not all,
of the dimensions listed above. Therefore, reform of
the state often has been comprehensive in nature in
an attempt to address many, if not all, of the sources
or manifestations of this backwardness, whether it is
in culture or military power. At the same time, many
of these reforms have been driven by the exigencies
of maintaining an increasingly restive multiethnic and
multicultural empire. This drive continues despite the
truncation of the empire in 1991 with the Soviet collapse.
The ongoing and at best only partially successful
efforts to stabilize the North Caucasus, Russia’s most
disturbed Muslim frontier, testify to this ongoing
continuity. That the linked security threats of terrorism and of Islamism arose in this border area clearly
owes much to the failures of the state administration
to function well in governing these areas. But if these
areas were destabilized, Putin and other high officials
have strongly argued that the integrity of the Russian
state as a whole would be at risk.217 Thus the need for
comprehensive reconstruction of the state administration in a multiethnic and multiconfessional area vulnerable to ethnic or religious appeals from abroad is
very much a priority issue in Russia’s overall security
policy.
But the continuing failures of the state to function
effectively are also tied to the issue of Russia’s sense
of cultural marginality, for example the “accursed
question” of whether Russia is a European, Eurasian,
or Asian power or some combination of all or most
of these phenomena. Despite the undoubted activity
and interest of the Putin regime in enhancing Russia’s
Asian position and occasional statements to the effect that Russia is a Eurasian state, policymakers still
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are torn over these issues. Putin, who personally has
often cited his own European inclinations, has also
given the impression that Asia is something of an afterthought in Russian foreign policy, while his first
Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, explicitly embraced the
idea of Russia as a bridge from Europe to Asia. Analysts such as Alexander Lukin castigate the regime
for regarding China and Asia in wholly instrumental
terms as a card to be played to get the West’s attention and for thus neglecting Asia. Meanwhile, a close
examination of the actual policy demonstrates that
the executive agents who are to conduct that policy
in Asia are continually at odds with each other, thus
undermining the entire foundation of Russia’s Asian
policy.218 So once again, the debilities of the state as an
effective executor of policy reinforce both geopolitical
weakness and also the deep-rooted angst over where
Russia belongs.
Thus all the five persistent questions are present
throughout Russian history until now while the issues
tied to them interact continuously and throughout
Russian history, highlighting the critical importance
of the domestic instrument of the state’s effectiveness
in Russian foreign policy. An effective state and military is inconceivable without some way of overcoming economic, technological, and cultural backwardness. But, to be sure, the reverse equation also holds,
namely that the precondition for overcoming backwardness is an effective state, military, etc. Likewise,
the opportunities for expansion due to the presence
of divided weak states on the frontier also entail the
permeability of Russia’s frontiers to both military and
ideational threats. From the regime’s standpoint this
vulnerability to both geopolitical and ideological-cultural penetration is particularly urgent when peoples
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of another ethnicity, religion, or culture largely inhabit
the borders that are at risk.
Neither do these linkages end here. Instead and in
fact, they only begin here. The realization of Russia’s
vulnerability as a multiconfessional and multiethnic
empire with restless borderlands vis-à-vis constant
but disparate military and political, ideological, or
economic threats also relates to the abiding sense of
cultural marginality postulated by Rieber. The many
complaints about Western double standards apply as
much to the unilateral use of force by America as they
do to the attacks on Russia’s democracy deficit. Those
attacks underscore the continuing feeling in Moscow
of Russia’s cultural marginality as seen from the West,
as do the compensatory statements that Russia will
never be part of the West whether such statements are
uttered in despair or defiance. They are uttered because, as Putin has said in the past, Russia measures
itself as a European state and hence by European standards, even if it violates them regularly.
Similarly, the threat of the state’s collapse and of
its inability to play the role of a great power urgently
confronted Putin, by his own admission, when he
came to power.219 Indeed, he has frequently reiterated
his belief, beginning in November 1999, in the domino
theory that if Chechnya fell, whole provinces would
continue to fall, threatening the integrity of the Russian state.220 These statements clearly unite in a single
policy conundrum the threat to the state posed by its
ineffectiveness as military and political actor vis-àvis an insurgency in these restless borderlands. The
viability of the Russian state clearly was an issue of
the utmost topicality for Putin upon coming to power
because he then discerned quite coldly the crisis of the
state, which convinced him that Russia was confront-
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ing the real threat of dismemberment and disappearance as a great power.221 Thus he devoted himself from
the outset to both the restoration of the state and of
Russia as a great power that could ward off the many
international challenges that he perceived it faced.222
But state reform is not just an effort to stabilize domestic structures against diverse threats occurring in
the borderlands. As often as not, it represents an effort
to defend Russia’s regime against foreign charges of
misrule that then repose among disaffected minorities
or elites at home. Frequently these defenses must be
couched in terms of Western values for this justification to be credible at home and abroad. Indeed, both
in the Soviet Union and today under Putin, Russian
leaders and spokesmen are constantly at pains to
argue that their system represents democracy even
though their regime is anything but democratic.
However, such an invocation of foreign values
itself testifies to the fact of cultural backwardness
and marginality in Rieber’s terms. This lagging behind is clearly tied to the problems arising from both
Russia’s cultural marginality and the unreliability
of the peripheries when they come in contract with
neighboring states. Thus, historically these perceptions of backwardness, of cultural marginality, or of
the borderlands’ inquietude have generally not been
perceived in isolation from each other. Indeed, they
are frequently perceived as a conjoined threat to the
stability and integrity of the regime, e.g., Stalin’s massive purges among ethnic minorities in the 1930s and
1940s. The quest for an effective governing mechanism
is thus naturally bound up with Russia’s many efforts
to overcome its economic, technological, and cultural
backwardness and the restiveness of its minorities in
the borderlands. Similarly, the endless obsession with
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developing a governing structure that can compete
with other powers has consistently been bound up
with the perception that Russia is in a constant, rigorous, international competition with its interlocutors,
imparting the drive of an a priori perception of multiple
hostile enemies to the overall state building project.
This sense that unnamed foreign enemies are always
“out there” supporting efforts to weaken, undermine,
suppress, and even divide Russia has become a leading trope of elite rhetoric in the last few years.223
RUSSIA’S PERSISTING THREAT PERCEPTION
What this means is that despite Russian leaders’
efforts to depict their state as a strong, mighty, and
united monolith or foreign policy actor, in fact they
are constantly haunted by a sense of its weakness and
fragility. Once again, observers have long taken note
of this duality of stridency and insecurity. Heinrich
Vogel alluded to “the typical petrostate combination
of presumed omnipotence and yet political insecurity
of the leadership.”224 Similarly, Boris Tumanov has
written that Russians “simultaneously believe themselves to be the greatest and most oppressed nation on
the earth.”225 It is not uncommon for such contradictory emotions to reside in an individual or in a political elite. One way to dispel the fear of marginalization
is to insist ever more on Russia’s strength and abiding
status as a great power (Velikaya Derzhava). This linkage of the quest for building a competitive economy
and state with foreign threats and this perception of
inherent weakness beneath the protestations of great
power is most famously expressed in Stalin’s 1931
speech that imperial Russia was beaten by everyone
for over 100 years because it was backward. But it is no
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less of a shaping force in Putin’s Russia, especially as
Putin has increasingly turned to accusing the West of
trying to undermine, weaken, exploit, and even break
up Russia. Increasingly, Putin’s Russia is characterized by the belief that despite the Western perception
of a relatively benign threat environment, Russia actually faces mounting and linked threats from within
and without. Moreover, at the same time, the West,
i.e., primarily America, refuses to take Russia, its interests and objectives seriously and refuses to grant
Russia its rightful place as a world power in directing
world politics. Even though nobody foresees an attack
on Russia or a NATO offensive anytime soon, leading
members of the government and armed forces firmly
believe that Russia is under siege from both the terroristic threat and from the allegedly conjoined threat of
ideological subversion as manifested in the Georgian,
Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz revolutions of 2003-05, NATO
enlargement, supposed foreign support for Chechen
leaders, and now the Arab spring and Western designs upon Libya and Syria.226
Therefore they charge that the “enemy is at the
gates,” that opponents of the Chechen war and proponents of reform constitute “a fifth column,” and that
unless the elite is totally united behind Putin, the state
could disintegrate quite easily.227 In keeping with the
inherited Soviet and KGB mentality and the traditions
of projection onto the enemy of your own fears and
intentions that was so prominent in Stalin’s makeup,
they regularly assert that such revolutions are merely
the product of external manipulation and subversion,
overlooking the domestic roots of such upheavals.
In other words, and confirming Sorokin’s fears
above, as a fundamental element of its state building
process, or more accurately regime formation, the cur-
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rent elite is apparently reviving the Leninist notion
of a state challenged from within and without and
where the external and internal enemy are essentially
one and the same. As happened under Lenin and Stalin, this is basically a call for a perpetual civil war at
home or at least a paternalistic state ruling ultimately
by force, not to mention a state of siege abroad. Under
such circumstances, the almost ritualistic invocation
of Russia as a great power and of its revived power
in world affairs appears almost as a fetish brandished
like a medieval talisman to ward off both real and
imaginary apparitions. Consider, for example, the
listing of the threats to Russia given by Chief of Staff
General Yuri Baluyevsky to a January, 2007 conference
of the Academy of Military Sciences on the need for a
new defense doctrine. According to Baluyevsky’s selfstyled comprehensive assessment, the military threats
facing Russia are:
The U.S. military-political leadership’s course to
preserve its world leadership, and to expand its economic, political, and military presence in regions under Russia’s traditional influence; implementation of
NATO’s expansion plans; introduction into Western
practices of military strong-arm actions in circumvention of the generally recognized principles and norms
of international law; the existing and potential seats
of local wars and armed conflicts, primarily in the
direct vicinity of the Russian borders; a possibility of
strategic subversion resulting from violations of international arms limitation and reduction agreements or
qualitative and quantitative arms build-ups by other
countries; proliferation of nuclear and other types of
mass destruction weapons, their delivery vehicles and
advanced military production technologies in combination with attempts by separate countries, organizations, or terrorist groups to implement their military
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and political aspirations; other states’ territorial claims
to the Russian Federation and its allies; the fight for
access to energy resources; international terrorism;
unlawful activities by nationalist, separatist, and other
organizations directed at destabilizing the internal
situation in the Russian Federation; hostile information actions in regard to the Russian Federation and
its allies.228

These are only the specific military threats, even
if their definition is rather broad. Indeed, General M.
A. Gareyev (Ret.), the Head of the Academy, echoed
Baluyevsky’s depiction of the elements of the threats
facing Russia, albeit in a somewhat different order.
Gareyev stressed that these threats, the breakup of
the USSR and of Yugoslavia, color revolutions in the
CIS in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, etc., show
that “principal threats exist objectively, assuming not
so much military forms as direct or indirect forms of
political, diplomatic, economic, and informational
pressure.” Moreover, these threats are continuing (obviously from the West) and therefore the state‘s new
military doctrine, and indeed its overall national security policy, of which foreign policy is a critical part,
must consider military and nonmilitary threats in
their organic unity.229
A state whose leaders perceive it to be so comprehensively threatened can hardly account itself
a strong or secure state or think of world politics as
anything other than a jungle. Hence it is fair to say
that Russia under Putin has come to approach world
politics on the basis of what the German philosopher
Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of enemies and
of conflict.230 Certainly, there can be no doubt that this
is the government’s threat perception as well, despite
undoubted economic success since 2000. For example,
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Putin told the G-8 press corps in June 2007 that Russia and the West were returning to the Cold War and
added that:
Of course we will return to those times. And it is clear
that if part of the United States’ nuclear capability is
situated in Europe and that our military experts consider that they represent a potential threat then we
will have to take appropriate retaliatory steps. What
steps? Of course we must have new targets in Europe.
And determining precisely which means will be used
to destroy the installations that our experts believe
represent a potential threat for the Russian Federation
is a matter of technology. Ballistic or cruise missiles or
a completely new system. I repeat that it is a matter of
technology.231

In other words, if the military says it is a threat, it
is one. Not only does this reinforce the traditional tendency to see Russia as being comprehensively threatened from abroad, in domestic politics, it gives the
General Staff an unchallenged power of threat assessment and formulation. This has decidedly negative
tendencies for both domestic politics (budgetary allocations for example) and in foreign policy. Certainly,
it reinforces the trend towards marital conceptions of
the state and its administrative order, as well as an
atavistic and classical Realpolitik approach of zerosum games to Russian thinking about international
relations. In his speeches dating back to 2006 if not
2004 when he accused unnamed foreign elements of
seeking “juicy pieces” of Russia, Putin embraced the
Baluyevsky-Gareyev threat perception. Putin specifically charged that:
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•	America is a unipolar hegemon that conducts
world affairs or aspires to do so in an undemocratic way (i.e., it does not take Russian interests into account)
•	America has unilaterally gone to war in Iraq,
disregarding the UN Charter, and demonstrating an “unconstrained hyper use of force” that
is plunging the world into an abyss. It has therefore become impossible to find solutions to
conflicts (in other words American unilateralism actually makes it harder to end the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan—hardly an incontestable
proposition). Because America seeks to decide
all issues unilaterally to suit its own interests in
disregard of others “no one feels safe,” and this
policy stimulates an arms race and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
•	Therefore, we need a new structure of world
politics, i.e., multipolarity and nonintervention in the affairs of others. Here Putin cited
the Russian example of a peaceful transition to
democracy! It should also be noted that Russia hardly has a spotless record with regard to
nonintervention as Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine,
and Georgia can tell us.
•	Putin expressed concern that the Moscow Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty of 2002
(SORT) may be violated or at least undermined
by America, which is holding back several
hundred superfluous nuclear weapons for either political or military use. America is also
creating new destabilizing high-tech weapons,
including space weapons.
•	Meanwhile, the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) treaty is not being ratified even
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though Russian forces are leaving Georgia and
only carrying out peacekeeping operations in
Moldova. Similarly, U.S. bases are turning up
“on our border” (here Putin revealed that for
him, the borders of Russia are in fact the old
Soviet border since Russia no longer borders
either on Romania or Poland).
•	America is also extending missile defenses to
Central and Eastern Europe even though no
threat exists that would justify this. In regard to
this program, Putin replied to a question at the
2007 Munich Wehrkunde Conference by saying
that:
The United States is actively developing and
already strengthening an anti-missile defense
system. Today this system is ineffective but
we do not know exactly whether it will one
day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we
recognize that when this moment arrives, the
possible threat from our nuclear forces will be
completely neutralized. Russia’s present capabilities, that is. The balance of powers will be
absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will
benefit from the feeling of complete security.
That means that its hands will be free not only
in local but eventually also in global conflicts.232

•	Moreover, Baluevsky, his successor, General
Nikolai Makarov, the General Staff, and Russian officials all regularly argue that, because
there is allegedly no threat from Iran, these
missile defenses can only be aimed at Russia
and at threatening to neutralize its deterrent.233
•	NATO expansion (the Russian term in opposition to the Western word enlargement) there129

fore bears no relationship to European security
but is an attempt to divide Europe and threaten
Russia.
•	Finally America is seeking to turn the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) into an anti-Russian organization and
individual governments are also using nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for such
purposes despite their so-called formal independence. Thus revolutions in CIS countries
are fomented from abroad and elections there
often are masquerades whereby the West intervenes in their internal affairs.234 Recently Prime
Minister Putin and his spokesman, Dmitry
Peskov, openly claimed that the United States
has been planning for 2-3 years in advance to
unseat Putin by generating a scandal during
the most recent Duma elections in December
2011 and handing out money to oppositionists in support of this goal. While this charge
is both totally cynical and delusional, it is entirely consistent with the mentality behind
Russian policy.235 Obviously, this view projects
Russia’s own politics and policies of interference in these elections (e.g., the $300 million it
spent and the efforts of Putin’s “spin doctors”
in Ukraine in 2004) onto Western governments
and wholly dismisses the sovereign internal
mainsprings of political action in those countries, another unconscious manifestation of the
imperial mentality that grips Russian political
thinking and action.
Since then a new consensus has evolved due to
Russia’s assertive policies, palpable signs of a U.S. de-
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cline, the Russo-Georgian war, and the financial crisis
that began in 2007 and hit Russia in late 2008. That
consensus assumes that Russia has recovered from its
travails and is now a recognized, independent great
power with the will, capability, and status to be a system-forming power capable of helping to contribute to
and help resolve global issues. Second, international
politics are on the threshold of a great change, a presumption that includes the perception of U.S. decline.
Therefore, the key practical goal is to consolidate Russia as the international defense, financial, political,
and security hub in Eurasia, a posture that reflects the
intimate linkage between domestic and foreign policy.
With this in mind, Moscow seeks to establish Russia
as a political hub and model in Eurasia for an alternative path of development other than Western models. Many of Russia’s specific policy initiatives, e.g.,
Medvedev’s proposals for a new European security
architecture and the unrelenting drive to integrate the
CIS around Russia, flow from these assumptions or
consensus.236
Since 2004, the notion of being surrounded from
within and without by the same enemy, i.e., the West,
has grown among elites but was based on the previous
perception Russia was menaced by terrorists at home
who as Putin said were part of a terrorist international
from Bosnia to the Philippines. Since 2004, the notion
has grown, incited by Putin, that these enemies, increasingly viewed as the West, want to prevent Russia
from achieving its rightful place as a great power and
dominator of the post-Soviet space and are aiming
to subvert the foundations of Russian statehood by
misguided and conspiratorial democracy campaigns
directed against both the Russian government and its
nondemocratic neighbors in the CIS. Indeed, Putin has
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recently and repeatedly attacked Western forces along
with domestic reformers, whom he called jackals for
seeking to destabilize Russia, and divide its territory
through support for Russian NGOs and the democracy campaign they promote. Putin even likened them
to the reformers of the Yeltsin epoch.237
Thus the sense of being backward or behind visà-vis the West and the corresponding need for a reformed state structure translates into a belief today
that foreign policy is not only a way of advancing
the national interest, it also is an instrument for ensuring the internal stability of a beleaguered system
at home. The articulated concept that Russia’s domestic security, i.e., its governmental structure, is at
risk from abroad and that the primacy of the domestic threat drives foreign and defense policy not only
borrows from Nicholas I’s hysteria about liberalism,
revolution, and reform and Stalin’s notion of capitalist
encirclement, it also is a hallmark of the security preoccupations of Third World states whose ramshackle
domestic structures are always seen to be at risk of disintegration.238 Thus in many ways, Russia’s national
security posture and outlook resembles that of Asian
rather than European states, particularly Asian states
who are threatened by internal forces and weak legitimacy. Russian experience and overall security policy
conforms to the pattern discernible in Asian and Third
World states where security is primarily internal security and is recognized as such by all the leaders there.
These countries simultaneously confront the exigencies of both domestic state-building, i.e., assuring the
regime’s internal security and defense against external
threats without sufficient means, time, or resources
to compete successfully with other more established
states. Not surprisingly, their primary concern be-
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comes internal security and their continuation in power, hence the proliferation of multiple military forces,
intelligence, and police forces in these countries, often
enjoying more resources than do their regular armies,
and their governments’ recourse to rent-seeking, authoritarian, and clientilistic policies.239
These facts possess significant relevance for any
discussion of security in the Third World but clearly
also for Russia where the security environment perceived by the government is one of “reversed anarchy”
as described by Mikhail Alexiev and Bjorn Moeller.
Moeller observes that:
While in modernity the inside of a state was supposed
to be orderly, thanks to the workings of the state as
a Hobbesian ‘Leviathan,’ the outside remained anarchic. For many states in the third World, the opposite
seems closer to reality—with fairly orderly relations to
the outside in the form of diplomatic representations,
but total anarchy within.240

Similarly, Amitav Acharya observes that:
Unlike in the West, national security concepts in Asia
are strongly influenced by concerns for regime survival. Hence, security policies in Asia are not so much
about protection against external military threats,
but against internal challenges. Moreover, the overwhelming proportion of conflicts in Asia fall into the
intrastate category, meaning they reflect the structural
weaknesses of the state, including a fundamental disjunction between its territorial and ethnic boundaries Many of these conflicts have been shown to have
a spillover potential; hence the question of outside
interference is an ever-present factor behind their escalation and containment. Against this backdrop, the

133

principle of noninterference becomes vital to the security predicament of states. And a concept of security
that challenges the unquestioned primacy of the state
and its right to remain free from any form of external
interference arouses suspicion and controversy.241

Indeed, for these states, and arguably even for transitional states like Russia, internal police forces enjoy
greater state resources than do the regular armies, this
being a key indicator of the primacy of internal security as a factor in defining the term national security.242
These points certainly apply to Russia. As Stephen
Hanson observes:
The central puzzle of Russian politics is that fifteen
years after the collapse of the USSR, the country still
lacks any stable and legitimate form of state order. The
result is continuing pervasive political and social uncertainty—concretized in the palpable official fear that
independent civil society organizations might promote
additional “color revolutions” in Russia or other postSoviet states and the endless rumors about various
unconstitutional or semi-constitutional schemes Putin
might employ to stay in power after his formal second
term ends in March 2008. Bearing in mind that Russia
remains the world’s largest country by territory and
still possesses thousands of nuclear warheads as well
as large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons
of mass destruction, such uncertainty could quickly
become a major international problem as well.243

These political conditions duly represent some
of the reasons why even Russian analysts admit that
Russia remains a risk factor in world politics, not the
reliable pole of world politics that it claims to be.244
Thus Vladimir Mau emphasizes that despite the
transformation of the past 20 years, the state remains
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a weak state, one that cannot effectively manage the
transition to either a growth economy or democracy.245
Similarly, Gordon Hahn’s study of the Islamic terrorist threat to Russia, primarily in the North Caucasus,
flatly states that, “Despite Putin’s efforts to recentralize power, Russia remains a weak state, is becoming
a failing state, and risks becoming a failed one.”246
Russia’s siege mentality, no matter how bizarre it may
seem to us, has deep roots in the structure of the state
and the real threats to it.
In 2004-05, in the wake of the terrorist attack at
Beslan and the Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, Russia’s frustration with its inability to defend its internal
borders or project its system into Ukraine turned into
this portrayal of “the enemy at the gates.”247 Vladislav
Surkov, Deputy Chief of Putin’s presidential administration gave a secret speech explicitly charging that
Freedom House is essentially an extension of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Therefore, “it takes an
idiot to believe in the humanitarian mission of this
establishment.” In so describing Freedom House, he
used the Russian word Kontora or office, the old Soviet
term for the KGB.248 Surkov, like other CIS leaders such
as former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, clearly
believes that democratic revolutions in CIS states are
orchestrated conspiracies against Russia and threats
to the stability of the Russian state itself.249 According
to Kremlin commentator Vyacheslav Nikonov, the
Kremlin views this revolution as a “refined special operation” or as an externally directed unconstitutional
coup against Russia to eliminate its influence in the
CIS and replace it with an American presence.250 Professor Alexei Pushkov of the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations called Ukraine a continuation
of the “West’s strategic line of staging a political takeover of the post-Soviet space.”251 But Surkov was only
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following his master’s and other officials’ footsteps in
warning that the state is at risk.252
This wide-ranging threat perception also embraces
Russia’s domestic politics as well. Regime spokesmen, e.g., Surkov, also have openly stated that Russia must take national control of all the key sectors of
the economy lest they be threatened by hostile foreign
economic forces and so called “offshore aristocrats.”253
In other words, this threat perception links both internal and external threats in a seamless whole (as did
Leninism) and represents the perception that Western
democracy as such is a threat to Russia. Therefore U.S.
and Western military power, even if it is not actually a
threat, is a priori perceived as such.
This outlook affects even those areas where Russia affects to realize a common policy with America,
e.g., arms control. For example, Yevgeny Primakov,
Yeltsin’s Foreign Minister and Prime Minister during
1996-99 and previously head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), writes in his memoirs that,
despite perceptions at the end of the Cold War of an
end to enemy relationships with the West, in fact the
West has behaved like an enemy, seeking to deprive
Russia of its “special role in stabilizing the CIS in order to frustrate hopes for a rapprochement with Russia.”254 Primakov here thus not only postulated the a
priori existence of foreign enemies, he blamed them
for everything that went wrong in Russia and no less
implicitly postulates a Russian sphere of influence in
the CIS. Those outlooks are clearly by no means his
alone. Rather they are shared by most of Russia’s contemporary elites and are fundamental to their ideological Weltanschauung.
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THE MYSTIQUE OF DERZHAVNOST’
Under these circumstances, the centralization and
personification of power that have taken place as the
critical component of the state-building program must
be buttressed by an effort to unify the state and society around the ideology of autocracy and Derzhavnost’
(Russia’s inherent great power status). As Putin has
recently observed, this unity is an essential source of
Russia’s strength.255 By invoking it, he also has shown
his effort to fulfill a key part of the domestic, anti-or
counter-reform agenda of that ideology as expressed
by Retired General M. A. Gareyev, President of the
Russian Academy of Military Sciences.
A Russia that is mired in division and dissension cannot stand in the modern world. To unify the healthy
forces within society and to support a reliable political
system one must first define the reasons for the existence of our fatherland. One such uniting factor is the
idea of a revival of Russia as a great power, not as a
regional one, for Russia stretches across several large
regions of Eurasia, and is truly great on a global scale.
This greatness is not defined simply by someone’s desire, not just by nuclear weapons, or the country’s size.
It is determined by historical traditions and the realworld needs for the development of Russian society
and state. Either Russia will be a strong, independent.
and unified state, uniting all peoples, republics, territories, and areas in the territory of Eurasia, which is
in the interests of all mankind, or she will scatter into
pieces, becoming a source of many conflicts. Then the
entire international community will be unable to cope
with a situation in which Eurasia is brimming with
weapons of mass destruction. Either Russia will be a
great power, or she will not exist at all. There is no
other alternative.256
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Similarly, Dutch Scholar John Loewenhardt reported in 2000 that despite the fact that Russia’s alleged
status as a leading pole in global affairs was then understood to be increasingly more rhetorical than real:
In one of our interviews a former member of the Presidential Administration said that the perception of
Russia as a great power ‘is a basic element of the selfperception of high bureaucrats.’ If a political leader
were to behave as if Russia was no longer a great power, there would be ‘a deeply rooted emotional reaction
in the population.’257

This concept that Russia is simultaneously both
inherently a great power and a state that deserves to
be seen at home and abroad as such or as an empire in
order to survive—even if this can only be asserted irrationally and not by empirical demonstration—is embodied in the term Derzhavnost’ (tellingly, a word that
emerged into popularity only in the 1990s when the
concept it denotes was under fierce attack). As conservatives endlessly insist, going back to the famous line
of the 19th century poet Fedor Titutchev “Umom Rossiiu ne poniat’“ (“Russia cannot be understood by the
mind”), this belief in Russia’s great power destiny is
an article of faith not subject to critical thinking.258 This
irrationalist and organicist approach to the nation not
only aims to dissuade criticism by invoking a mantra of near theological belief, it also is a long-standing
refuge for conservatives and reactionaries against the
rationalism embedded in classical and modern Liberalism. By trying to banish any hope of understanding
Russian politics through critical rational analysis, it
also typically overcompensates for the fear that if Russia is not a great power and not seen as such, then it
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will be nothing. Putin, Yeltsin, and many other figures
like former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov have repeatedly echoed this sentiment
about Russia as an inherent great power that must act
independently of other “poles” of the international
system.259 For example, upon becoming Foreign Minister in 1996 Primakov told Rossiyskaya Gazeta that:
Russia’s foreign policy cannot be the foreign policy of
a second-rate state. We must pursue the foreign policy
of a great state . . . the world is moving toward a multipolar system. . . . In these conditions, we must pursue
a diversified course oriented toward the development
of relations with everyone, and at the same time, in
my view, we should not align ourselves with any individual pole. Precisely because Russia itself will be
one of the poles, the ‘leader-led’ configuration is not
acceptable to us.260

As Primakov’s words suggest, not only is this concept of Russia as a great power inextricably tied to the
idea of Russia as an independent unconstrained actor
in world politics, just as the Tsar is not constrained
by anything at home, the Derzhavnost’ concept entails
Russia as a leader in world politics forming its own
solar system of states around it.261 Equally importantly, this concept is tied to a particular notion of Russia’s identity as an actor in world politics where either
it is acknowledged as a great power or, its leaders
fear, it counts for nothing. But this attitude’s practical implications as seen in ongoing demands for bases
throughout the CIS, obstruction in the CIS frozen
conflicts, and the energy crises with Ukraine and Belarus are unmistakably imperial in consequence. The
Derzhavnost’ concept betokens a belief that Russia is
an empire sufficient unto itself and thus above all of
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the other rules of international life, precisely what it
attacks Washington for doing.262 As Trenin observed,
Moscow wants to create its own solar system of international relations, replete with client states, independent of the West.263
Thus Derzhavnost’ postulates Russia as an empire
freed of external constraints that form a chain of states
around it because while it is a great power, they are
not and therefore cannot defend their sovereignty.
Certainly, Russian scholars know full well that Russia’s elites have long continued to see the Russian state
in imperial terms. As Alexei Malashenko observed in
2000, Russia’s war in Chechnya is logical only if Russia continues to regard itself as an empire.264 More recently, Russian political scientist Egor Kholmogorov
has observed that:
‘Empire’ is the main category of any strategic political
analysis in the Russian language. Whenever we start to
ponder a full-scale, long-term construction of the Russian state, we begin to think of empire and in terms of
empire. Russians are inherently imperialists.265

If Russia is such an empire, then it becomes clear
why EU or NATO membership becomes a threat to
Russian sovereignty. For as Deputy Foreign Minister
Ivan Ivanov stated in 1999:
Our country is not in need of affiliation with the EU.
This would entail loss of its unique Euro-Asian specifics, the role of the center of attraction of the re-integration of the CIS, independence in foreign economic and
defense policies, and complete restructuring (once
more) of all Russian statehood based on the requirements of the European Union. Finally great powers
(and it is too soon to abandon calling ourselves such)
do not dissolve in international unions—they create
them around themselves.266
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It is noteworthy that in Ivanov’s list of reasons for
not joining the EU empire preceded independence
suggesting the deeply rooted belief among Russian
elites that if Russia is not an empire, it is not a state.
Hence, it is not surprising that Ivanov outlined here
the goal, alluded to by Trenin above, of creating a solar
system around Russia. But the quest for great power
and empire is the fetish invoked by Russian statesman
throughout the ages to ward off the nightmare of being marginalized and no longer being a great power.
This nightmare haunts the imagination of Russia’s
political elite and undoubtedly is one of the most primordial psychological and cognitive drivers of Russian foreign policy, even if it postulates only two possible outcomes for Russia, great or even super-power
status, or oblivion and marginalization.267 Indeed, in
pursuing this mirage of being a great power that can
act unconstrainedly in world affairs, Putin has sought
to copy the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption or preventive war to justify its unlimited right to
military intervention in the CIS with rather less justification than did President George Bush, for there have
been no foreign-based attacks upon Russia.268
So this concept of Derzhavnost’ is inextricably
linked to the current notion of Russia being a sovereign democracy, with the emphasis on Russia’s sovereignty and independence, the supposed primary goal
of its foreign policy.269 Of course, it is this sovereignty,
independence, and hence great power status that are
most at risk from the aforementioned threats. In other
words, Russia increasingly defines its independence
and sovereignty as being an inherently anti-Western
and neo-imperial project.
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This concept of Derzhavnost’ did not only recently
spread throughout the elite. Instead, it is in the nature
of the historical legacy handed down from ruler to ruler despite the historical rupture generated by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Nicholas II’s Prime Minister, Count Sergei Witte, famously said that he did not
recognize Russia but rather the Russian empire. After
him, Stalin in 1937 underlined the profound sense of
historical continuity in the minds of Russian policymakers through the ages concerning the vital necessity of retaining the Russian empire and the accompanying status of a great power. At Defense Minister
Voroshilov’s villa, in November 1937, Stalin remarked
that:
The Russian Tsars did much that was bad. They robbed
and enslaved the people. They led wars and seized territory in the interests of the landowners. But they did
one good thing—they put together an enormous Great
Power. . . . We inherited this Great Power. We Bolsheviks were the first to put together and strengthen this
Great Power, not in the interests of the landowners
and capitalists, but for the toilers and for all the Great
People who make up this Great Power.270

The congruence of Stalin’s remarks with contemporary thinking and his backhanded glorification of
Tsardom’s imperial legacy is no accident. Thus Alexei
Malashenko of the Carnegie Endowment observes
that in relation to the war in Chechnya, Russia’s war
in Chechnya is logical only if Russia continues to regard itself as an empire.271 Kholmogorov‘s observation
only brings that observation into the present.272
Similarly, the contemporary publicist close to the
regime, Stanislav Belkovsky, writes that, “In 2004-08,
the foundations of the Russian nation must be laid.
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Our nation has only one destiny—imperial.”273 Yeltsin’s former prime minister, Egor Gaidar, forthrightly
charged that an organized movement of imperial nostalgia that seeks to reject the need to come to terms
with the loss of empire is rampant among today’s officialdom and society. Gaidar states that this attitude
invokes arguments that are all too reminiscent of German conservatives in the Weimar Republic, and represent one of the greatest challenges to Russia’s security
and stability.274
This adherence to Derzhavnost’ was also a foundation point for Tsarist statesmen, who possessed what
Dietrich Geyer calls “the power elite’s traditional
sense of imperial prestige.”275 Geyer was writing
about the historical period of the 1860s, an era of reform, threatened loss of autocratic power, instability,
and renewed imperialism and state nationalism. This
era in particular has been the historical reference point
for much of contemporary Russian policy because it
was another period of weakness abroad and domestic
reform that ended in an increasingly aggressive nationalism comparable to the contemporary scene.276
Indeed, contemporary evidence suggested then that
much of Russia’s foreign policy standing in the decade after the Crimean War stemmed from its efforts
at reform, and that reform was also driven by the need
to maintain its standing in Europe.277 This underscores
the enduring linkage between domestic and foreign
policy in Russian history. Consequently, we can see
that many of the key reference points and foundations
of Putin’s foreign and domestic policies are rooted in
a deeply rooted elite and quite possibly in the popular
consciousness of the historical continuity of the Russian state and of its interests. Likewise, there is a similarity between the cycles of reform and counter-reform
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that were enacted then and are being reenacted now
and using similar arguments against reform points to
underlying continuities in Russian history.278
Russian foreign policy under both Yeltsin and
Putin is inextricably tied to the assertion of this great
power project that depends on the unification of the
population around a counter or anti-reform program.
It is no accident, to use a Stalinist neologism, that Russia’s anti-Westernism takes its point of departure from
the same time, as does the end of democratizing and
liberalizing reforms. Indeed, as we shall see, the enemies of reform consciously appealed to Derzhavnost’
to derail liberalizing reforms. Under both rulers, foreign policy has become very much a resource for domestic politics to ensure their regime’s hold on power.
At the same time, this formulation of Russia as an
inherent and intrinsic great power is tied to an organic view of the state as a unified supra-ethnic political
entity. Proponents of this view, like Gareyev, clearly
believe that Derzhavnost’, i.e., great power ranking
and status is the only alternative for Russia. Thus, they
connect liberalization, not to mention democracy, and
their inherent tendency to deconcentrate state power
with the essential end of Russia as an independent
state. They regard all challenges to this ideal of Derzhavnost’ as a challenge if not threat to Russia’s ability
to conduct an independent foreign policy and survival as a state or great power (the two are essentially the
same identity).279 Likewise, they regard all efforts at
democracy as being akin to treason or at least as representing a threat to Russia’s great power destiny and
standing, not to mention their own power.
The Derzhavnost’ or imperial concept of Russia’s
destiny and status has always been a rock, if not the
rock, upon which major reform has foundered in Rus-
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sia going back at least to the Decembrist revolt of 1825,
if not earlier. It also is tied to a belief that Russia is a
unique actor whose path must be defined by its statist, authoritarian, centralized, and anti-liberal, not to
mention anti-democratic, tradition. In effect, like the
outlook of German conservatives before World War
II, this view of Russia as an inherent great power for
reasons that are often invoked and not analyzed is connected to a view of Russia as having a unique Sonderweg (other way). Like German conservatism, and quite
ironically in view of its unrestrained championing of
Russia’s uniqueness, this view is almost wholly derived from the tenets and categories of German Romantic and conservative thinking in the early 19th
century as well as Russian Slavophilism. At the same
time, the continuing emphasis on an imperial stance
also derives from Russia’s own historical experience
as an empire as interpreted through those earlier German and then Slavophile categories of thought.
Contemporary Russian leaders have clearly inherited this worldview. Indeed, to judge from Putin’s
domestic and foreign policies, they can only conceive
of the state as an imperial, even pre-modern formation based on an organic unity around the Tsar that
rejects political dissent, and which is unified by a
common ideology and a state religion.280 Certainly the
way Putin’s succession by Medvedev as president has
worked out indicates that the state remains essentially
pre-modern in its structure, if not its leaders’ mentality. The authoritarian coalition’s deeply held vision
of Russia’s having to be a great power or nothing denotes the constant sense of inner insecurity and even
illegitimacy of the elite and of the state it has created.
This inner sense of insecurity and even of illegitimacy
are particularly striking when Russia compares itself
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or is compared to European processes and standards,
hence both the sense of cultural marginality and the
often outsized and outlandish claims made to compensate for that sense of marginality. Indeed, the frequent resort to Soviet-like rhetoric and threats against
parties who conduct policies deemed to be inimical to
Russian interests betrays, as much as anything, both
weakness and an awareness of weakness and even
an awareness that Russia does not compare favorably
with its peers. Therefore, one function of these heavyhanded threats and rhetoric is overcompensation: a
way of telling its elite and population that Russia still
is a great power and trying to impress this fact upon
Russia’s interlocutors. Meanwhile, at the same time
this great power status must be an imperial, even opulent one in both style and substance. In order to awe
any potential rivals at home or abroad and reassure
the elite of the awesome power of the Tsar or now of
Putin. It must be imperial to awe potential enemies as
well as subjects with Russian power, to provide security against all manner of internal and external threats,
and to confirm the self-image and unconstrained power of the elite and the Tsar or President.
Consequently and despite the fact that Putin has
explicitly said he is against the restoration of any official ideology, his regime has manufactured one based
on a concept of Russia’s being an inherent great power and relying on the forces of Putin’s autocracy and
cult of personality, the exaltation of the Russian Orthodox Church as the state church, and on a growing
intolerance to foreigners expressed as an official state
nationalism. Arguably, the similarity of this ideology
to Nicholas I’s official nationality that exalted autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationality, and to Stalin’s cult
of personality is not accidental.281 Neither are the now
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visible similarities to the Brezhnev era, as suggested
above.282 Indeed, the continuing need for some state
ideology that defends Russia against its supposed
ideological as well as political enemies and justifies
its system to both domestic and foreign audiences has
been a feature of Russian statecraft since Ivan the Terrible sought to create such an ideology in the 16th century. Certainly Peter the Great, Catherine the Great,
and then Nicholas I each explicitly sought to forge a
body of ideas that justified their policies to both sets
of audiences. The effort to form an ideology during
Yeltsin’s presidency and Putin’s subordinates’ propagation of an ideology called “sovereign democracy”
continues that tradition.
Unfortunately, along with the penchant for ideological justification of its regime, the Putin government has taken over much of this perception of being
under siege from domestic as well as foreign enemies,
and not just terrorists. In this regard, Putin has inherited the outlook that characterized those elements of
the Soviet system that could not reconcile themselves
fully to the post-Soviet world and, like Putin, regard
the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. Just as Lenin instituted a “state of siege,” first within Russian Social
Democracy and then in world politics, Putin’s Russia
now seems to postulate that same condition, albeit
in a less intense form of polarization. Nonetheless,
the similarities between the Putin regime as of late
2007 and its Soviet predecessors are clear to Russian
writers.
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PUTIN’S FOREIGN POLICIES AS DOMESTIC
POWER RESOURCE
Analysts of Putin’s foreign policies must understand that, first and foremost, it was and is an instrument for stabilizing the regime’s ability to pursue a
domestic agenda of reconstructing centralized power,
even autocracy. Foreign policy’s task has been to prevent situations that could obstruct the rebuilding of
autocracy (i.e., the state’s authority conceived of in a
hierarchical power vertical) while elevating Russia’s
effective status and power in world affairs. Then that
strengthened state could pursue a more aggressive
and independent foreign policy, thereby continuing
the reciprocal relationship between domestic and
foreign policy. Numerous statements by Putin underscore that he has understood foreign policy until now
in just such a light, i.e., as having the primary task of
allowing him to pursue his domestic agenda for reconstructing Russia as a great and centralized power
that in turn would then allow him to pursue a stronger foreign policy.
Neither is there any doubt that Putin was the most
popular and successful politician in Russia, even if
much of that popularity is manufactured or the product of fear of repression. In 2007, a poll gave him an
almost 80 percent popularity rating!283 Indeed, he may
be the most successful and legitimately popular ruler
in Russia since Stalin. As Dale Herspring has written
about Putin, “He is in charge. Indeed, one could argue that Putin is more in charge than any post-Stalin
leader of the Soviet Union.”284 This fact makes his regime’s manipulations so that an open election not take
place all the more discouraging. Still, like his Soviet

148

and Tsarist predecessors, Putin rules, as many analysts have noted, as a Tsar, i.e., he is not responsible to
anyone nor is his state subordinated to any control by
law or any other institution.285 In this regard as in so
many others, Putin’s Russia represents a reinvigoration if not reincarnation of what we have called above
the Muscovite paradigm.
Putin has marginalized every other possible source
of political initiative in Russian society and substituted state control over all of these potentially influential segments of Russian society so that there can be
no effective challenges to either domestic or foreign
policy. Indeed, as early as 2005 his entourage boasted
that they had smashed all institutions and bureaucratic “veto groups” as well as any hope of autonomous
political action from the Duma. Igor Bunin, Director
General of the Center for Political Technologies, stated
then that Putin’s reforms have aimed at converting the
entire state system into a mono-centric administration where he and his entourage have all the power.
In such a system, conflicts within the bureaucracy are
supposedly absent because it is vertically integrated.
Hence the government becomes a technical instrument rather than a policy initiator, a task reserved for
Putin and his entourage in the presidential chancellery.286 Foreign observers note that he has essentially
deinstitutionalized the state, robbing all other organs
but the presidential administration of any real vitality.287
In fact, as the traditional Muscovite paradigm and
Russian history clearly suggest, the effort to completely depoliticize Russia and its policies only means that
fierce political conflict has moved into the bosom of
the bureaucracy from where it cannot easily be dislodged. The succession struggle of 2007-08 with vis-
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ible as well as invisible political struggles between the
rival bureaucratic clans who make up the leadership,
going all the way to arrests and political murders,
underscores the opacity of Russian politics. These
struggles are inherent in the Russian political system,
and we find numerous instances of them among the
Tsars and in the Soviet period. For example, Stalin deliberately fostered such conflicts, as did his predecessors and successors, to retain their full prerogative of
power. As bureaucratic conflicts have not abated but
have migrated to interclan rivalries among the power
structures of the regime and Putin’s entourage (the so
called Silolvye Struktury and the Siloviki) a fierce domestic rivalry among these clans or factions invariably
occurs, as has always been the case in modern Russian
politics. But the regular state does not perform better
nor is the public directly involved as anything other
than an object of manipulation.
So, paradoxically, the strengthening of the power
vertical results in the strengthening of the Kremlin
and of centralized power, but it is not clear that the
regular organizations of the state, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, perform any better or that
the state really is more effective.288 If anything, it may
be less effective as a direct result of Putin’s policies
of centralization of power at the top. Consequently,
this program ultimately remains insufficient to fully
revive the economy or improve the state mechanism
as much as Putin wants. In this respect, Putin’s Russia follows in the tradition of Russian political history
where all modern efforts to revive the Muscovite paradigm have led to the same outcome. In many, if not
all of these cases, efforts to reform the system, either
towards greater centralization or towards greater liberalization within the framework of the system, often
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achieved sub-optimal results. Improvements did not
reach full fruition, and that frustration carried within
it the seeds of further crisis. In other words, Putin’s
success suggests that the system he has consolidated
will relatively soon reach a dead end, even if it continues along its own entropy or inertia.
As part of this agenda of strengthening the central
power structures, Putin and his underlings have also
attempted to disseminate through Russian society not
just a cult of Putin’s personality ( thereby confirming
Marx that when history repeats itself the first time—in
this case, under Stalin—it occurs as tragedy; while in
the second case—as is now the case under Putin—it
returns as farce) but also an ideology that emphasizes
Putin’s autocracy, the legitimacy of this autocracy
in terms of support for the regime by the Orthodox
Church, and third, an aggressive doctrine of state
nationalism. They also evidently believe that have
achieved or at least profess their desire for a result that
has eluded Russian rulers since Nicholas I, namely officialdom’s recurrent dream of a perfectly integrated
vertical hierarchy that functioned strictly as a machine
acting on orders from the top and implementing them
in quasi-military style and hierarchy. Because this
machine supposedly incarnated the Tsar’s position as
superseding all factional, partial, and sectoral interests, and subordinating everyone to the service of the
state, it was equally supposedly wholly depoliticized
and had only the state’s true national interest at heart.
Only the state truly represents the genuine national
interest as opposed to partial and sectoral elite interests, which invariably entail oligarchy and ultimately
the loss of empire and great power status. Of course,
this system left those atop the machine with all the
power and opportunities to conceal their self-serving

151

rent-seeking under the cloak of supposedly being the
embodiment of the national interest. Russian and foreign analysts therefore rightly underscore the persistence of Tsarist mores and structures in contemporary
Russian political life.289
Whereas it is debatable how successful Putin has
been in creating an effective state in domestic politics,
Putin is fortunate that his foreign policy—in great contrast to that of his predecessor, Yeltsin—has hitherto
been a key factor in his success, especially as discordant voices have either been silenced or marginalized.
Foreign observers like Hryhoriy Nemyria, when he
was Director of the Kyiv-based Center for European
and International Studies, have stated that, “A significant part of Putin’s legitimacy lies in his ability to control developments in Russia’s near abroad.”290 Indeed,
in foreign policy, perhaps more than in any other aspect of his rule, Putin is more totally in charge since
foreign policy historically and in present day Russia
is regarded as a “Tsarskoe Delo,” something worthy
of the Tsar’s or ruler’s attention (and, of course, a conscious evocation of the continuity in official mores
from Russian history). In other words, all the freelancers of the preceding decade have been suppressed, in
Khodorkovskii’s case, forcibly, and no doubt exemplarily. This does not only mean that Putin decides
policy arbitrarily, although he certainly could if he
wanted to. But it does suggest that his prerogative is
the ultimate and most authoritative, if not irreversible,
one.
In this respect, Putin’s power, as numerous commentators have noted, resembles that of a Russian
Tsar, if not the power of the General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.291 For example,
in September 2001 after the terrorist attacks on the
United States, Putin convened a meeting of his 20
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other senior advisors on the issue of whether or not
to help Washington in Central Asia and to what degree. Of these advisors, 18 opposed the idea of supporting the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and
Afghanistan, two abstained, and Putin supported the
idea of offering such help with no strings attached.
Not surprisingly, his decision prevailed. This authoritative role of the ruler typifies Russian history (one
need only remember that Tsar Alexander II forced
through the emancipation of the serfs even when the
State Council opposed key provisions of the plan292)
and certainly held true under Yeltsin, who as Bobo Lo
and Dmitri Trenin observe, in truly autocratic fashion
“regarded foreign policy as essentially the sum total
of his personal relations with foreign leaders.”293
Thus, foreign policy success and even the appearance of success means Russia’s self-perception as a
great power being accepted abroad and that Russia
can also behave with a free or at least strong hand in
world affairs are critical factors in sustaining Putin’s
domestic power and authority.294 In turn, domestic
needs that go beyond the drive for economic recovery,
to include the stabilization of a particular form of rule
and accompanying political economy, drive foreign
policy. This drive is most noticeable in the CIS—the
former Soviet republics and what was called in the
1990s the near abroad.295 Here, Russia assiduously promotes the perpetuation or extension of its own form
of rule to those states, not least because the perpetuation of domestic Tsarism requires its perpetuation
and extension to the next tier of states as well. But this
also means that because so much of it is driven by domestic factors, or to influence them, much of Russian
foreign policy emerges out of an unregulated struggle
between or among rival bureaucracies and can only be
decided by Putin.
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A key part of both Putin’s domestic and foreign
policies has consequently been his unrelenting efforts
to present himself in a particularly appealing image
to his audience. Apart from Putin’s personal motives
(and such cults only betray the inner insecurity of the
leader and his need for adulation as well as his subordinates’ belief that he needs it and that by stimulating
it, he will reward them), this image campaign naturally
correlates with the efforts to forge a cult of personality and ideology that justifies his policies to domestic
and foreign audiences, all part of a very long-standing
Russian political tradition. Like the trained KGB agent
that he was, Putin has consistently striven to present himself to different audiences as he thinks they
wish to see him, an ability that Stalin also possessed
in abundance. Thanks to his success in this endeavor,
abetted by a managed and suppressed Russian media,
Putin has enjoyed great domestic and foreign success
in coming across to others as a decisive, practical, reliable, and predictable steward of Russian national
interests. One need only cite his strong personal ties
with President George Bush, German Prime Minister
Gerhard Schroeder, and Italian President Silvio Berlusconi as examples. But there are other examples as
well. Still, perhaps more importantly, at home his success has been even greater. By portraying himself to
the public as a sober, tough-minded, masculine, and
plain speaking, no-nonsense leader who was devoted
to Russia’s recovery and prosperity as a great power
and by suppressing alternative voices, Putin tapped
into one of the deepest emotions among Russian political figures, namely the obsession that as Yeltsin said,
“Russia deserves to be a great power.” (It is crucial
here to note the distinction between the present tense
and the conditional in this statement). He also tapped
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into the deep-seated belief that Russia needs a Tsar
“who can make the Boyars jump,” i.e., a man who can
be frightful in the exercise of power.
An example of the ongoing relevance of Rieber’s
approach may be found in an examination of Putin’s
“state-building” activities in the light of the linkages
between domestic and foreign policy highlighted by
this historical approach. By accepting this threat assessment, which was already strikingly outlined in
the Defense and National Security Doctrines of 2000
and the Foreign Policy Concept in earlier forms, Putin has formally ratified the unity of concept between
his perception of the need to reform the state and the
sense of being under threat domestically and externally from more advanced powers.296 Putin’s quest for
an effective governing mechanism, seen in the light of
Russian history, evokes memories of previous Tsarist
and Soviet attempts to create a similarly ideal type of
state against the threat of revolution from abroad that
could exploit Russia’s backwardness. This constant
search for an effective and responsive “power vertical” continues to this day under Putin. It is not just
that what followed in the wake of Communism was
a much more chaotic state that encountered great difficulty in formulating both its identity as a state and
an effective foreign policy, although this certainly was
the case. Rather, we also see as well a similar obsession in the case of Nicholas I and his elite, as well as
his successors, in perfecting the mechanism of government.297 The many upheavals generated by Peter
the Great and Stalin had as their aims, among other
things, strengthening Russia’s capacity to ward off
perceived foreign threats.
As Nicholas I’s obsession was with revolution and
with the threat that an ineffective state structure both
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stimulated desires for radical change and could not
monitor those who might act upon such desires, so
clearly is Putin’s obsession with suppressing dissent,
unifying the state, and imparting to it a quasi-military
and police outlook of unquestioning discipline and
service to the state a response to the threat that he and
his associates perceive in democracy and in Western
superiority. A man and regime that claims that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical
disaster of the 20th century cannot see democratization as a source of strength for his Russia. Neither will
his foreign policy recommend democracy’s extension
to the newly independent states of the former Soviet
Union.
Therefore, these similarities between Putin’s “militocracy” and Nicholas’ cult of quasi-military order are
surely more than personal idiosyncrasies.298 Nicholas’
rule was in itself a continuation of trends observable
under Paul I, his father, and his brother, Alexander
I. Those contemporary challenges to Russia that find
their reflection or response in ongoing reorganization of the state are not just the preparation of a state
for war against what is now perceived as a growing
military threat and the maintenance of a vigorous and
effective diplomacy in service to the regnant national
interest of the day. Rather, they are part of a tradition
of visualizing the state as an idealized military-type
organism that should be pervaded by the same spirit
of self-discipline and selfless service that is to be expected in the army. This is because the fundamental
paradigm of Russian state power, as we shall see below, is one that is inherently pre-modern, patrimonial, martial, and demonstrably suboptimal as regards
great power competition over time.299
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This tradition generally privileged military power
and standing over broad-based economic and technological development.300 The latter’s purpose was
invariably to provide for the former. Nevertheless, as
Rieber rightly observes, awareness of backwardness
has haunted Russian rulers for centuries and stimulated all their efforts to catch up, not just in economic
and technological terms, but also, as noted above, in
remodeling the government to compete with Russia’s
interlocutors. The reforms of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Alexander I, Alexander II, the Witte
and Stolypin reforms, Lenin’s War, Communism, and
Stalin’s revolutions all had the critical goal of preparing the Russian state for war and international rivalry,
and were openly admitted as having such objectives.
Gorbachev’s Perestroika and foreign policies aimed to
reduce the defense burden upon the state and reorient
it for more successful economic competition in world
politics.
Consequently, Putin’s and his team’s realization of
the primacy of the need to develop a modern economy
in Russia and use economic power as the foundation
of Russia’s global standing marks a significant innovation in Russia’s history. Only after economic stability was achieved did we see the meaningful increases
in defense spending that are now taking place. But the
ultimate goal of advancing the great power standing
and capacity of the state is entirely traditional in nature as is the belief that the state must lead this process
by itself without reference to indigenous self-standing
social networks.301 It is too soon to tell if this priority of
economics represents a long-term and stable trend but
one that could or will give way, as may increasingly
be possible, to renewed emphasis on overt military
great power rivalry. Certainly the statist and dirigiste
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notion of economic development that now prevails in
Moscow augurs badly for democracy or for optimal
economic growth but strongly for the perpetuation
of the Muscovite paradigm with its emphasis on defense. That trend is highly likely to lead logically to
an increase in defense rivalry and political tensions
with other major powers, as has historically been the
case. The substantial rise in defense spending and increasingly military cast of the rivalry with America is
a warning sign in this regard. For if the end result of
Putinism is a renewed militarization, then the innovative aspects of his legacy will diminish while the assertion of traditional practices and policies will have
triumphed.
TOWARDS A PUTIN SYNTHESIS
We have mentioned “Putin’s” foreign policy and
not by accident. Putin inherited a state in disarray. He
himself certainly believed it was in danger of disintegration from terrorist threats and from the ambitions
of regional politicians and oligarchs.302 One of the clear
signs of disarray was the fact that foreign policy under
Yeltsin reflected the inability of the state to centralize
control over Russian politics as a whole. Yeltsin was
never fully able to establish his control of that policy,
for all his efforts to that end. As a result, foreign policy
was very often made by diverse forces, often acting on
their own to impose their own agenda or create “facts
on the ground.”
Military and right wing political and public opinion frustrated openings to Japan in 1992.303 This had
major consequences for it left China, a very different
state with a very different and certainly not pro-democratic government as Russia’s main partner in East
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Asia.304 Russian energy policies during the 1990s were
also clearly a matter of competition among private
and state companies and governmental bureaucracies,
making it difficult for Moscow to devise a coherent
and viable energy program to meet both the opportunities and rising foreign challenges it began to encounter during the 1990s.305 Finally in 1999, General
Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, initiated
the Russian Army’s march on Pristina and blindsided
both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign affairs, even though this march almost landed
Russia in a conflict with NATO. Slightly earlier, Yeltsin’s first Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, though
loyal and idealistic, failed to gain control over foreign
policy or impress observers with his competence.306
Kozyrev’s ministry, for example, publicly stated in
1992 before Yeltsin aborted his trip to Japan that it
had given Yeltsin 14 options for his negotiations over
the Kurile Islands before his proposed visit to Japan, a
sure sign of incompetence.307 Not surprisingly, his and
Yeltsin’s pro-American policies were under constant
attack from forces opposed to Yeltsin’s economic and
political reforms and from the armed forces. Indeed,
the Foreign Ministry itself remained largely unreformed despite Kozyrev’s appointment.
These factors, coming on top of the catastrophic
economic conditions and political strife of the 1990s
not only led to a revival of conservatism, based on the
axis of Russian state patriotism, they ensured that the
pro-Western foreign policy associated with Yeltsin
and Kozyrev were under constant pressure from a
growing conservative and statist-oriented coalition.308
By 1992-93, as official documents like the 1993 foreign
policy concept indicate, that pro-Western policy was
in steady retreat.309 But the precedent of politicizing
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foreign policy success or failure in the domestic debate as a way to enhance or reduce the government’s
standing was firmly established. Putin has learned
from this experience and his curtailment of the media and establishment of a consensus from above by
virtue of establishing unchallenged power based on a
notion of Russian state greatness has enabled him to
stifle debate on his foreign policies. Thus today there
is no public consensus as to what Russian national
interests either are or should be because there is no
debate on these issues. Rather, there is an incessant
beating of the drums for state nationalism or patriotism manipulated from Putin’s and now Medvedev’s
office in order to squelch unfettered public debate.
Meanwhile, the chaos surrounding foreign policy
during the 1990s allowed other actors to exploit the
policy vacuum for their own interests. Unilateral military operations in the Caucasus and Moldova, ostensibly in the name of peacekeeping or peacemaking, exploited ethnic divisions in Georgia and Moldova and
Azeri-Armenian tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh to
create lasting proto-states in these areas, often garrisoned or protected by Russian military forces. These
officers and politicians associated with them and these
proto-states not only asserted their political and psychological interest in seeing Russia act as a great power and imperial policeman in the former Soviet Union,
they also benefited and still benefit handsomely from
the many opportunities for corruption provided by
these proto-states. Consequently, they have created a
situation of permanent tension in the Caucasus, particularly with Georgia but also with the West that arguably does not benefit Russian interests as a whole.
For instance, it remains an open question if Georgia
would be so anti-Russian and pro-Western if Russia
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had helped broker a viable solution to the conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In that case, there would
be much less East-West rivalry here and also a much
more stable situation-confronting Russia throughout
both the North Caucasus and Trans Caucasus.
This chaos abated somewhat during the late 1990s
as a stronger hand in foreign policy by Yevgeny Primakov gradually restored some order to policymaking
and veered towards the elite consensus on attempting
to build a multipolar world where Russia engaged everyone and acted or portrayed itself as acting as a great
independent power on a global stage. Although ultimately this approach, too, failed for lack of resources
with which to play this role, it more nearly reflected
the emerging elite consensus and helped to make the
foreign policy debate in Russia less partisan. But it
did so at the price of making it also less democratic.
Foreign policy was now firmly established as a state
activity carried out by the President and his team and
removed from partisan political debate and influence.
Putin has built upon this achievement as well as
the long-standing tradition in Russian history (that
Yeltsin tried but only partially succeeded in realizing)
that foreign policy is the Tsar or dictator’s prerogative
alone. His success is due both to his ability to silence
domestic debate, largely through repression and manipulation of public opinion through the media, and
to his successes. But even if one argues that his policies have frequently not succeeded in achieving their
foreign policy goals, they have done so in a domestic
context, i.e., in consolidating an elite consensus and an
elite form of rule, not necessarily in achieving greater
stature or security for Russia. Arguably, today Russia may be wealthier and in some ways more powerful, but it also is more distrusted than it should be
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or needs to be. Thus this apparent success has been
purchased at the price of a reversion to a traditional
form of Russian rule, i.e., autocracy, which has repeatedly been shown to be inherently sub-optimal in ensuring Russia’s lasting security and stability. For all
the innovative qualities of Putin’s foreign policies and
notwithstanding the newness of today’s international
environment, not enough of Igor Ivanov’s argument is
being validated, while too much of Sorokin’s lament
appears to have come true and still remains the case in
both domestic and foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 3
IDEOLOGY AND SOFT POWER IN
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
Ariel Cohen
Since the Soviet era, Russia has viewed soft power
as a tool of statecraft, from a leaflet to a mob slogan to
ideology, just like a progression from a gun to a nuclear weapon. The Russian leadership views its ability
to use soft power as similar to its use during the Cold
War: To extend its influence and to constrain U.S. policy. While in the 21st century the methods Russia has
at its disposal to hamper U.S. foreign policy and to
change world opinion against the United States have
changed, the end goal has not.
The Soviet Union was a highly ideological power.
It amassed an enormous arsenal of print publications,
movies, television and radio programming, and education exchange programs to promote further the Soviet message for communism and against the West.
It had tens of thousands of leftist intellectuals at its
disposal worldwide. These lessons are still informing
today’s Russian leadership.
Since then-president Vladimir Putin secured control of the media and political system in Russia in the
last decade, his government has embarked on a quest
for the hearts and minds of those outside Russia. This
is where soft power is preferable to military (“hard”)
power in accomplishing state goals. Today, Russia’s
soft power is in the process of reestablishing itself as
a regional and eventually worldwide force to promote
Russia’s interests, including by attacking America’s
global reputation.
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RUSSIAN IDEOLOGICAL REINVIGORATION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse
of Marxist-Leninist (communist) single-track political philosophy, Russia has witnessed the growth of a
myriad of divergent political perspectives. The Russian Constitution bans any particular ideology from
being “official.” As much as this pluralism has allowed
many viewpoints, which previously would have been
suppressed, to flourish, the most prominent contemporary philosophical and ideological trends have often been statist and nationalistic. Experts point out,
without rancor, that the Putin reign is reminiscent of
Emperor Nicholas I (1825-55).1 Lately, these philosophies are informing the Kremlin’s post-Soviet grand
strategy.
Starting in the mid-1990s, then-Russian Foreign
Minister Yevgeny Primakov began a new rapprochement with the emerging non-Western powers such as
China, India, Iran, and the Muslim world in order to
undermine the unipolar preeminence of Western Europe and the United States. While the world wanted to
believe that Russia was no longer its legal predecessor,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and
abandoned forever its zero-sum world view, Primakov was engineering Russian foreign policy in order
to prevent the rise of a unipolar world in which the
United States was the sole superpower. He insisted
that the post-Cold War world contained many power
“poles,” including the United States, Russia with its
surrounding sphere of influence, the European Union
(EU), China, and Latin America.2 Through this time,
Russia was building the relationships beyond the
Western alliances that would become the driving forces to reduce American power in the 1990s.
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In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the Russian
public opinion and emerging civil society held mostly
positive feelings toward the United States and the
West. However, “shame, blame, and nostalgia” began
to percolate through society as the country defaulted
on its bonds in 1998, and the architect of friendship
with the West, President Boris Yeltsin, was deeply unpopular.3
In order to spread a coherent message of Russian
retrenchment against the West, Putin and his government must find and implement a directive at home
and would project it abroad. One element of this
was his famous dictum that the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the
20th century. This means that the search for the new
iteration of the Soviet global power, and its imperial
posture in Eurasia and Eastern Europe, are goals to
strive for.
In that respect, it is instructive to examine the evolution of the changing philosophy of Russian political
analyst, Fyodor Lukyanov. Affiliated with a prominent foreign-relations Moscow think tank, the Council
on Foreign and Defense Politics, Lukyanov was once
a leading liberal supporter of better relations between
Russia and the United States. Over time, Lukyanov
began to criticize the allegedly domineering “American Empire,” stating that “in the foreseeable future, a
new world architecture will be designed according to
American patterns.”4
More extreme political philosophers like Alexander
Dugin evolved, combining in their outlook the NeoNazi, European New Right, and Russian imperialist
and Christian Orthodox perspectives. Dugin vouches
for an imperialist Eurasianist foreign policy that centered on expanding Russian influence throughout former Soviet satellites by using tools such as the Ortho197

dox Church, media outreach, and “the manipulation
of information by the secret services.”5
In 2008, Professor Igor Panarin, a Russian Secret
Police (KGB) veteran and a political analyst who advises the Federation Council, the upper house of the
Russian Parliament, has predicted the imminent demise of the United States by 2010. Panarin stated that
this prediction “reflects a very pronounced degree
of anti-Americanism in Russia today” that is “much
stronger than it was in the Soviet Union.”6 Propagandists like Dugin and Panarin are close to the Russian
military, intelligence community, and generally, the
ruling classes within Russia. Clearly, their services are
in demand.
Vladimir Putin himself has articulated a foreign
policy view that includes a sphere of influence for
Russia; the vision of the Eurasian Union; protection
and expansion of the Russian language and Russian
Orthodox (Moscow Patriarchy rite) religion; use of
energy and economic power as primary geopolitical
tools; and neutralizing foreign, especially Western,
powers, attempting to act in the former Soviet areas.
RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER TOOLS IN MEDIA
With the increased control over the most popular
print, radio, and television outlets in Russia, the Kremlin is now able to project not only a unified, patriotic
image of Russia abroad but also to promote the idea
of a multipolar world. At the core of Russia’s multipolar vision is the hostile message that U.S. dominance
must be weakened and the influence of Russia and
other opponents of the United States, such as China,
Iran, and Venezuela, must be expanded. Therefore,
any Russian use of public diplomacy or strategic communication must be anti-American by nature.
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Russia’s premier soft power instrument is its burgeoning global television empire, led by its flagship
news network RT. Formerly known as Russia Today,
RT was launched in 2005 with the stated objective to
“improve Russia’s image around the world” in the
face of the alleged anti-Russian bias from outlets like
Cable News Network (CNN) and British Broadcasting
Company (BBC). Although occasionally giving viewers a more positive perspective of Russia, the vast majority of RT’s content is aimed directly at criticizing
the United States, Western Europe, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the global economic order, including avidly glorifying the “Occupy Wall
Street” protests. Suffice to say that America-hater and
convicted criminal, Lyndon La Rouche, is often interviewed by RT and other Russian TV channels as a
credible commentator. Moreover, RT is now unabashedly pro-Obama and anti-Republican, which raises
questions about its—and Russia’s—intra-American
political agenda. The channel has received global condemnation for airing controversial programming such
as a documentary that claims that the September 11,
2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks were committed by the
United States itself, not by Islamist terrorists.7
RT’s apparatus includes three separate satellite
channels, which are available as cable channels in
Washington, DC, in English, Spanish, and Arabic; a
website with live streams of the channels; a Twitter
feed; and a popular YouTube Channel with over 200
million hits.8 Virtually all of RT’s content is available
for free.
The budgets of all of these Russian-based global
news outlets have grown significantly since the early
2000s, and with the help of the Internet, all of Russia’s outlets can reach people all around the world.
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For example, RT’s budget has grown from $30 million to around $150 million in 2008.9 Experts believe
RT now has a budget in excess of $200 million. As oil
revenues increase, these and other media budgets will
only grow.
RT even showcases useful American citizens who
have become champions against the U.S. Government,
using Russian media outlets to spread their message.
For example, former U.S. Marine and political commentator Adam Kokesh was the host of his own program on the popular Russian news channel RT. According to Accuracy in Media, RT exploits Americans
like Kokesh to parrot Russian agitprop against the
United States. Another American commentator and
radio talk-show host, Alex Jones, frequently appears
on RT to condemn American domestic and foreign
policy, including America’s support of Georgia during the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, calling the initial
moments of the war a “sneak attack” by the American
military-industrial complex against Russia.10 Accuracy in Media states that to fulfill objectives of Russian
propaganda, the country prefers “to use foreigners,
especially Americans to make [Russia’s] propaganda
points.”11
According to RT’s website, RT has become one of
the most watched global news channels in many major
world cities, including Washington and New York.12
The network was nominated for the best documentary
prize from the 2011 Monte Carlo TV Festival and has
received other worldwide acclaim that has raised RT’s
reputation.13 Yet, the crude propagandistic tone of RT
puts it behind France 24 and Deutsche Welle, let alone
the dynamic Al Jazeera English and BBC.
Beyond the Internet, Russian based media is readily accessible in the West through cable and broadcast
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TV, terrestrial radio, and national newspapers. As RT
attempts to reach out with its anti-American agendadriven news and commentary, Russia will continue to
be able to guide and to distort the opinions of many
North and Latin Americans, Europeans, Middle Easterners, and others.
Besides RT, the global Russian media is more
balanced. It broadcasts through a global radio network called “The Voice of Russia” that goes back to
Radio Comintern (Communist International) and is
accessible on the Internet. “The Voice of Russia” is
broadcast in many languages including English, Russian, French, Arabic, Spanish, German, and Chinese;
and the radio network’s website is available in these
and other languages. Russia also takes advantage of
Western print media by paying major European and
American newspapers to have “Russia’s side” appear in special advertising sections, entitled as Russia
Behind the Headlines or Russia Now, that resemble articles written by the original newspaper.
The Russian base for much of Russia’s global media
is the Russian press agency RIA Novosti, capably led
by its Director General, Svetlana Mironyuk. Whereas
during the Soviet era RIA Novosti often was a cover
for clandestine activities, today it mainly sticks to the
official business. Unlike Associated Press or Reuters,
RIA Novosti is state-owned. It is a professional source
of news and information for Russian news outlets and
international news organizations covering events in
Russia. Recently, the agency has increased its presence beyond Russia by covering global events without
the assistance of non-Russian news agencies.
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RUSSIAN SOFT POWER AND THE RUSSIAN
DIASPORA
Beyond what Russian state media broadcast for
domestic and global consumption, Russian speakers
and former Soviet citizens living outside Russia are
increasingly becoming a target for the long arm of the
Russian state. For the first time since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia’s diaspora is no longer seen
as hostile and anti-communist. On the contrary, the
home country would like to curry favor with emigrants and not to lose it in favor of their new home.
Adopted in 1999, the Russia’s “State Policy toward
Compatriots Living Abroad” was updated in 2010
and now requires Russian compatriots to be “certified
by a respective civil society organization or by the person’s activities to promote and preserve the Russian
language and culture.”14 In part through this “compatriots’ policy,” Russian soft power towards its diaspora is conducted through embassies, a network of
establishments that promote Russian policy outlook,
language, and culture under such banners as the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation, Russki Dom
(Russia House), Russki Mir (Russian World), and online. However, some experts caution that these means
of connecting Russian expats to their home country
may have turned into bases for Russian intelligence
operations and have certainly become advocates of
Kremlin policies.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian government established Russia House, a network of over
50 global “Russophone centers” to promote Russian
culture, Russian language and “ethnic identity” as
well as to generate dialogue between Russians abroad
and their “historical motherland.”15 Experts state that
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the budget for Russia House has swelled from $26 to
30 million, and plans are to expand the operation to
100 branches worldwide by 2020.16
Besides Russia House, Russian World is the Russian government’s primary organization devoted to
connecting to its diaspora through a “common bond
between Russia and its emigrants who left” that would
use the Russian language as the factor that bonds the
two together.17 Although initially nongovernmental,
it quickly became absorbed into the propaganda and,
apparently, the intelligence realms. According to the
Estonian Security Police (KAPO), former Soviet intelligence teams “are active” within Estonia through
Russian World, which some believe that this signals
that Russian outreach organizations are serving “to
advance Russia’s foreign policy interests in the Baltics.”18
Some analysts pointed to the use of the Russian
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchy) branches
overseas as a conduit to the extensive governmental
funding and influence. Just like Russian World, it is
attempting to encourage expatriate Russians to “act”
more Russian while living abroad. It also is trying to
discourage emigrants from adopting the cultural mores, language, and political beliefs of their host country.19 In fact, in 2006, Metropolitan Kirill, before he became the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church,
stated that Russians all over the world “should oppose
Western civilization in its assertion of the universality of the Western tradition.”20 This typifies Russia’s
“compatriots’ policy” that serves to keep Russian expatriates under its influence.
Finally, social networking is still one of the freest
modes of exchange between Russia and the outside
world. However, the Russian language social media

203

are monitored and manipulated through dedicated interference (see below), though without the censorship
that other media have. Additionally, organizations
that track global Internet freedom have seen a growing intimidation from the government to those who
disseminate information against the Kremlin.21
Recently, pro-Kremlin actors have found ways to
undermine the legitimacy of these websites through
acts of sabotage. One main form of sabotage is through
intentional acts of incitement, known as “trolling,” in
which a specially trained user will intentionally publish inflammatory, libelous, or outlandish statements
in order to evoke emotional responses from other users. This is done in order to derail or squash a legitimate debate, or spread chaos.
RUSSIAN USE OF “AGENTS OF INFLUENCE”
The use of “agents of influence” by Russia is quite
prolific even after the end of the Cold War, as this has
been a tried-and-true espionage tool going all the way
back to the czarist intelligence services. They have
become immersed in the centers of policy promotion,
business, lobbying, and journalism to shape policy
and American opinion to favor Russian interests. Russia’s agents of influence have become an integral part
of its campaign to increase Russia’s influence in international affairs by weakening America’s role in the
world.
Targeting American domestic affairs has been one
of Russia’s greatest foreign priorities despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the more cooperative
relationship between Yeltsin’s Russia and the United
States. In his book, Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin
proposed that post-Soviet Russia should use Russian
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intelligence officers “to provoke all forms of instability
and separatism” in the United States. He recommended agents achieve domestic instability by fomenting
racial tensions, promoting “isolationist tendencies,”
and “actively supporting all dissident movements.”22
A KGB defector alleged that The Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) has become
a main vehicle by which Russian intelligence agents
penetrate into America through its unwary Russianexpat followers. According to former KGB officer
Konstantin Preobrazhensky, once Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR) agents entrench themselves
into the Russian Orthodox Church in America, it becomes a “stronghold for Russian intelligence.”23 Subverted Russian churches in America can potentially
become prime locations for subversive operations and
for recruiting future Russian agents of influence in
America. These allegations, which come from a single
source interested in promoting his book, need further
investigation. Yet, Russian intelligence services have
amassed their own “‘PR line officers,” who work undercover as diplomats or journalists. They attempt to
gain sensitive information, using their secret agents,
contacts in the diplomatic sphere or within the American media, or plant rumors and misinformation.24
The high profile arrest in 2010 of a Russian spy
ring that included Anna Kushchenko, also known as
Anna Chapman, raised many questions with regards
to Russian long-term intelligence goals in America,
including the influence of the policy process. Developing intelligence assets for future insertion into the
media process is a sophisticated use of soft power.
According to a Russian-born Canadian/American
journalist Jamie Glazov, one of the stated goals of this
failed spy ring was “to search and develop ties in poli-
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cymaking circles in [the United States].” Some of the
policy issues the spy ring tried to influence included
nuclear weapons, U.S. arms control, Iran, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) leadership, Congress, presidential elections, and political parties. One of the spy
rings contacts included a New York “financier who
was active in politics.”25 Fortunately, this group of
failed spies did not manage to compromise the integrity of American foreign policy or national security,
but this is only one of many examples of Russia’s continued determination.
Another recently prominent case involved an exposed Russian alleged spy within the British Parliament. Katia Zatuliveter, an assistant for Mike Hancock, a member of the defense committee of the House
of Commons, was arrested for spying on Hancock for
the Russian SVR. Many believe that Zatuliveter intentionally targeted the powerful Member of Parliament
(MP) as he is known as the “most pro-Russian MP
from among all the countries of western Europe.” It
has been alleged that while Zatuliveter was working
in Hancock’s parliamentary office, the office sent requests for an “inventory of Britain’s nuclear weapons
arsenal” and “details of nuclear material outside international safeguards.”26 However, the pro-Russian
statements of Mr. Hancock in the media represented a
considerable boon for this alleged intelligence operation.
Russian firms, especially Gazprom, and the Russian government have spent millions of dollars on
lobbyists to purvey their message and to influence
politicians in Washington to influence policy. According to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of
the Department of Justice’s second semi-annual report
to Congress in 2010, Gazprom, Ketchum Inc., Techs-
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nabexport, the St. Petersburg city government, and
the Russian federal government have called upon the
services of American lobbyists to influence policy and
politicians.27
EXAMPLES OF RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN
ACTION: UKRAINE AND GEORGIA
Russia’s soft power machine was put into practice
first in its “near abroad,” when major crises were unfolding that were threatening Russia’s tenuous control
over its “sphere of privileged interests.” The foremost
tests for determining the effectiveness of Russian soft
power occurred in Ukraine and in Georgia.
The Kremlin has been active in its campaign to
weaken pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine since
the Kuchma presidency; however, the 2004 election
and the Orange Revolution saw an onslaught of Russian TV agitprop towards opposition leaders Victor
Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko and their supporters. The main focus of Russia’s soft-power sabotage
was primarily on ethnic tension and Eastern Ukrainians’ loyalty to Russia, its culture, and language. The
Fund for Effective Politics (FEP), directed by Gleb
Pavlovsky, a “political technologist” and then-adviser
to Putin, was one of the main bases for spreading misinformation on the Orange Revolution and attempts
to discredit it through anti-American propaganda not
seen since the height of the Cold War.28 This included
allegations of Mrs. Yushchenko, an American citizen,
being a CIA agent and of clandestine funding of the
“orange” forces.
Georgia has remained under the direction of proWestern political forces led by Mikheil Saakashvili, in
spite of heavy Russian interference in the country’s
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affairs. Beyond the use of force in the 2008 RussianGeorgian war, Russian intrusion in Georgian politics
has been steadfast and aggressive, including Russianbacked mass protests for Saakashvili’s ouster and
funding for some opposition politicians. From the
aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Russia spread allegations that a tiny Georgia somehow
endangered Russian sovereignty, or had committed
“genocide” against South Ossetians, of which international observers have not found any evidence.
HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RESPOND
TO RUSSIAN SOFT POWER
The lessons from these two cases show how Russian soft power is a clear national security concern and
can undermine domestic security and global stability.
Therefore, the United States must formulate a clear
and active strategy to combat Russian soft power operations within the United States and within its allies
in order to protect national and global security.
The United States has fallen behind Russia in the
struggle for hearts and minds through traditional and
new forms of media. Through outlets like RT or on
the Internet, Russia has already spread its message
effectively by using these low-cost outreach tools,
which connect millions instantaneously everywhere.29
The United States must seize the opportunity to reach
hundreds of millions of new audiences and those with
whom the United States had lost touch after the end
of the Cold War by increased use of low-cost new media on the Internet and mobile devices. Through these
reinvigorated outreach efforts, the United States can
effectively compete with Russian soft power to refute
Russian distortions.
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In using new technologies or other means to reach
more audiences, the United States must remember
how it engaged with its audience during the Cold
War. Then the United States effectively promoted dialogue and exchanged ideas with foreign audiences,
cultivated institutional relationships, assisting the
education of future democratic leaders. Learning how
the United States defeated Soviet soft power will help
guide U.S. policy to combat Russian soft power. 30
The U.S. Government, traditional media, and the
public often view “new media” as a magic tool, portending a revolution in the way the U.S. Government
conducts public diplomacy and addresses the world.31
New media has shown itself to be the “game changer”
that as of July 8, 2001, as former Undersecretary of
State of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith
McHale discussed in her confirmation hearing, can
revolutionize how media communicates with its audience:
[New media provides] the opportunity to move from
an old paradigm, in which our government speaks as
one to many, to a new model of engaging interactively
and collaboratively across lines that might otherwise
divide us from people around the world.32

In developing its ability to use “new media,” the
United States needs to establish a National Communications Strategy outlined by the Undersecretary of
State for Public Diplomacy in order to organize one
unified message against Russian soft power that is
clear, concise, and believable. This National Communications Strategy should especially ensure that its
message through new media is unique and identifiable from potential acts of informational sabotage, like
trolling, and that it is disseminated through those out209

lets that access the most valuable audiences, such as
young people and politically active groups. One way
to promote the success of the U.S. informational campaign is to establish a research body to analyze how to
best reach targeted audiences with which Russia has
actively engaged.33
The United States must also continue to fund
and to promote traditional forms of communication
through outlets such as Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), the Voice of America (VOA), and
the publication of books and journals that comprise
collaboration among Americans and talented locals,
similar to RT recruiting British and American journalists and commentators to spread its message, to generate the most effective message for local audiences. In
addition to its efforts abroad, the United States must
improve its ability to counteract Russian information
operations within the country, including within the
Russian Orthodox Church in America, Russki Mir, and
other Russian-led outlets.
The United States must carefully examine the
scope and success of Russian informational operations. It must counteract Russian soft-power operations by directly engaging with the Russian-speaking
diaspora and other groups targeted by Russian outreach programs. Furthermore, the United States must
focus its most intense public diplomacy efforts on the
former Soviet-controlled regions of Eastern and Central Europe. Although much of this region has become
more economically and politically free and more integrated with the “Euro-Atlantic sphere,” the United
States must work with its allies in Europe to ensure
that Russia does not corral this area back into its ideology sphere of influence and under its control.34
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CONCLUSION
With the growth of Russian soft power on the Internet, through TV and other traditional media, and
through government-sponsored expat organizations,
the world is exposed to Russia’s influence. In addition,
the growing Russian outreach institutions, including
the Russian Orthodox Church, which reach out to
Russians and non-Russians abroad, have become the
advocates and influencers for Russian policy abroad.
Behind the glamor and the ostensibly innocuous nature of the Russian soft power, its goal is to strengthen
Russia’s international influence by weakening America’s global leadership role.
Without a way to counteract this increasingly
popular and effective media empire, the United States
will continue to suffer damage to its interests abroad.
Vladimir Lenin once said that “a lie told often enough
becomes truth.” Today, as before, the key to U.S. victory in the battle of ideas will be leadership and commitment to promote America’s ideals to the world and
to respond effectively to misinformation from Russian
media.
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